文化・宗教・ジェンダーから見たトルコ人-日本人国際結婚 by Igarashi Zeliha Muge
Intimacy Crossroads:
Turkish - Japanese Transnational Marriages Through Lenses of
Culture, Religion and Gender
文化・宗教・ジェンダーから見たトルコ人－日本人国際結婚
A dissertation presented
by
Zeliha Müge Igarashi
to
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
in candidacy for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
International Studies
Waseda University
Tokyo, Japan
September 2014
Copyright ©2014 by Zeliha Müge Igarashi
All rights reserved
Abstract
Globalization and resulting increased mobility have been increasingly interconnecting different
populations and cultures. This in return has resulted in increased interaction among people from
diverse cultures. One of the important outcomes of this process has been the increase in the
establishment of transnational ties and formation of transnational families.
The case of Japan is no exception to the trend outlined above. The number of transnational
marriages in Japan has increased significantly in past decades. When we look at the gender breakdown
of foreign spouses in Japan, most of them are Asian females. Japanese men’s foreign spouse choices
are strongly marked by the rate of Chinese, Koreans and Filipinas who account for the majority of
these marriages. Japanese females’ foreign spouse choices on the other hand show diversity. Within
this diversity, the rate of Muslim foreigners has increased significantly in the past two decades.
Japanese women’s marriages with Muslim men from Pakistan and Iran in particular has been
attracting more attention with emphasis on conversion of these women to Islam and its impact on
these families’ everyday family lives.
When we look at the existing literature on transnational marriages in Japan it has few
shortcomings. First of all, most of the research remains focused on above outlined foreign spouse
groups which undermines the diversity of foreign spouses. Although 30 per cent of immigrants in
Japan are highly skilled, their transnational marriages remain underrepresented as most of the research
is focused on spouses from middle or lower social classes. The number of spouses from lower social
classes might be higher as marriage migration provides a loophole for low skilled workers to enter
Japanese labor market (Brody, 2000). When we look at the largest categories of foreign spouses in the
literature, a huge number of them have previously worked in Japan, legally or illegally and many have
over stayed their visas at the time of marriage.
The second shortcoming of the literature is its foundation on women’s narratives as Japanese
wives of foreign men or foreign wives of Japanese men. This is both the strength and the weakness of
previous research. It is the strength as it provides detailed accounts by focusing on a specific unit.
However it remains weak in explaining gender relations in intercultural communication. In simple
terms, it leaves the reader with only one side of the story. I argue that research on marriage requires
the incorporation of both genders in order to go beyond the monologue of one gender.
Thirdly, although studies on marriages with Muslim men have been attracting more attention,
the relation between social class and religiosity is often overlooked. An important reason underlying
this limitation is the difficulty for researchers to access these groups. Researchers who are outsiders to
groups they study tend to search for Muslim interviewees through mosques and religious organizations.
This inevitably produces data on religious people only. This handicap is important to overcome as
research has shown that religiosity is closely linked to social class (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 1999; 2006; 
Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000). 
This research contributes to the literature on transnational marriages in Japan by addressing the
shortcomings outlined above. The research presents data on intercultural communication of Turkish –
Japanese couples with reference to gender, culture and the Turkish spouses’ religiosity. The focus of
the research is on marriages with middle and upper middle class Turkish spouses. I argue that social
class plays an important role in Japanese transnational marriages but it has often been overlooked. The
research portrays this through de-emphasis of some topics that were significant in previous research,
such as visas of foreign spouses, and through emphasis on topics that had not been previously
explored, such as living space arrangements.
The ethnographic data for this research was collected from September 2009 to October 2013
through semi-structured interviews with Turkish – Japanese couples and participant observation at
activities organized by diverse Turkish immigrant groups in Japan. Based on research findings, I
suggest that religious or cultural differences are not significant in couples’ initial decision to get
married. Furthermore, similarities in the way gender relations are defined in Turkish and Japanese
societies allow couples to have a smooth transition to married life. Couples deal with religious and
cultural problems as they arise during their marriage. Most of these are companion couples who found
their marriages on friendship and communication. The most problematic areas of these marriages are
in line with most transnational marriages, such as relations with in-laws and bicultural childrearing.
Religion, on the other hand, does not cause major problems in these marriages or families’ everyday
lives. These transnational families have an incorporative approach to embracing all religions rituals
rather than choosing one and following strict rules. This is highly influenced by these spouses’ social
classes as well as how religiosity is constructed in Turkey. Turkey as a laic state does not require
foreign spouses to convert to Islam for marriage.
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1Chapter I: Introduction
Increased globalization has caused structural changes which have in return facilitated and
increased movement of people across borders. Today almost 200 million people in the world live
outside of their country of origin (Inglehart & Norris, 2009; Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2008).
This has inevitably led to diverse encounters and interactions between people from various cultures.
An important outcome of this process has been the increase in transnational marriages in Japan as
elsewhere. Marriages between Japanese men and Asian women compose a significant majority of
transnational marriages in Japan and the existing literature is constructed mostly on these foreign
wives’ narratives. The high percentage of these marriages between Japanese men and Asian women is
closely related to Japan’s lessening marriages, dropping birthrate and aging population. Recently there
has been a new branch that emerged within the literature of transnational marriage in Japan. This new
body of literature mostly relies on narratives of Japanese women who have married Muslim men and
converted to Islam in the process. This body of literature has been attracting increasing attention as the
number of Muslim foreign spouses has increased in past decades.
Research on transnational marriages in Japan focuses especially on migrant identities of these
foreign spouses because the majority of these spouses, male or female, are low skilled laborers. This
implies that for many of these spouses it would not have been possible for them to reside or work in
Japan without their spouse visa. Although professionals sum up to almost one third of foreigners
living in Japan, they are underrepresented within the literature on transnational marriages in Japan.
This dissertation focuses on a group of neglected foreign spouses, namely foreign spouses
from middle and higher middle class. It presents findings on transnational marriages of Turkish –
Japanese couples in Japan with reference to gender relations as well as cultural and religious
differences. The dissertation aims to shed light on what motivates the formation of these marriages
and how their dynamics are different from couples covered in the existing literature on transnational
marriages in Japan. This aim is realized with reference to the middle and upper middle class of
2Turkish spouses as well as their Muslim identities. Within this process, contrary to the existing
literature which relies heavily on women’s narratives, this research brings in men’s voices as it relies
on narratives of both genders.
Transnational Marriages
Intensification of globalization provides people with increased variety of choices to re-
formulate their individual definitions of culture and how they would like to construct it. As Gordon
Mathews puts it, people choose what they want to consume from the global supermarket in cultural
terms and this contributes to the reshaping of cultures (Mathews, 2000, p.308). Choices of spouses are
no exception in this prospect. Today, the number of individuals choosing foreign spouses is increasing.
These couples form transnational families in which they construct their own culture according to the
combination of personal preferences.
When we look at the definition of transnational families, there is diversity within the literature.
This term could denote the move of a family to another country (Ong, 2003), the migration of one
family member to another country for work (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2001) or
families that are formed by two individuals from different countries of origin and culture. This
research focuses on the latter definition which shows similarities with international marriages, cross-
border marriages and transnational marriages. This research adopts an approach similar to that
outlined by Frank Kalter and Julia H. Schroedter (2010) as well as Liversage (2013). These scholars
define transnational marriage specifically as a marriage between a migrant and his or her spouse from
the host society. Accordingly, the data presented in this research was gathered from Turkish –
Japanese couples residing in Japan.
Terms such as cross-border marriages and transnational marriages are sometimes used
interchangeably in the literature (Levchenko, 2013; Lyons & Ford, 2008; Piper, 1997, 2003; Constable,
2005, 2009). Although often similarly formulated, the term cross-border marriage often implies
geographical proximity between spouses’ country of origin such as marriages within East Asia (Yang
and Lu, 2010) or within Europe (Charsley, 2012). On the other hand, a term that had previously
3dominated the literature in defining these couples, international marriages, is slowly disappearing.
This is not due to the decreasing interest in these marriages but changes in their nature which is
reflected on the conceptualization of these marriages. The latter is being replaced by the term
transnational marriages.
The term transnational is more contemporary compared to the term international which lacks
the complexity to explain current dynamics. The term transnational is a relatively new term and has
emerged as an attempt to redefine migrants and their characteristics that have changed. These
characteristics have become much more complex through the impact of globalization (Glick-Schiller,
Basch & Szanton-Blanc, 1995). The term transnational emphasizes a move beyond borders, rather
than relations between individuals from two different countries or cultures, as implied by international.
Through the increased impact of globalization, the nature of people’s move across borders has
changed. Migrants no longer migrate leaving their home country behind but on the contrary, they
maintain multiple links. Consequently their public identities are formulated with reference to more
than one country. That is why they are referred to as “transmigrants” (Glick-Schiller, Basch &
Szanton-Blanc, 1995). These transmigrants who are in the case of transnational marriages “trans-
spouses” mobilize resources as well as goods and services as they move between countries. The
establishment of a transnational marriage by default obliges at least one of the couples to become an
immigrant. In some cases they might both become immigrants if they choose to reside in a third
country. Transnational marriages are characterized by mobility of spouses who move across borders
several times. For these transnational spouses, moving across borders and relocations are naturalized,
even normalized. It is a defining characteristic of their married lives. These marriages produce
transnational families for whom migration is the norm rather than the exception, they travel back and
forth between their home and host countries unlike previous generations of migrants who settled down
in the host country (Levchenko, 2013; Levitt, 2001).
In terms of their identities, transnational spouses’ cultural identities goes hand in hand with
flexible citizenship, in line with works of Aihwa Ong (1999) and Yasemin Soysal (1994). Citizenship
is a mere legal formality rather than core identity. Their public identities are formed through a
4combination of elements from the host society and home society (Glick-Schiller, Basch & Szanton-
Blanc, 1995). Even when immigrant spouses adapt to their spouses’ and host country’s culture, they
inevitably continue to reflect their own cultural values that had formed their primal socialization
(Inglehart & Norris, 2009, p.6). Consequently, interactions of migrants with their host societies cause
changes in both the immigrant group itself and the host society. If immigrants are not incorporated
well into their host societies there are risks of alienation and radicalization (Crul & Doomernik, 2003).
For example, some Muslim immigrants’ choice of radicalization over assimilation has caused a
growing fear of Islam in Western Europe (Hillifield, 2004). It is important to ask whether these
immigrants themselves refused to integrate or were they not accommodated into the host society.
There is the choice of naturalization in most countries around the world however it is important to note
that most immigrants prefer to integrate into their host societies in various ways and degrees while
staying connected to their country of origin which is what renders them transnational.
Transnational marriages can be analyzed at various levels with diverse frameworks. When the
topic is elaborated upon under the framework of migration and networks, push and pull forces
between migrant sending and receiving countries become significant. On the one hand there are
factors within migrants’ home country that are motivating them to move abroad, these are push forces.
On the other hand there are factors that render the country of destination appealing, these are pull
forces (Knight, 2002). It is important to note that marriage could be either the cause or consequence of
migration. Transnational marriages do not by default indicate move of a spouse after marriage. There
are many couples who have met in a country and continued residing there after marriage.
Discussions on social class are important for transnational marriages. For low skilled laborers,
there is a stigma attached to “fake” marriages for the sake of a spouse visa. This categorization of
marriages as real or fake is problematic because what a marriage entails shows great differences based
on personal preferences. Kim (2011)’s research on Chinese – Korean brides who migrate to South
Korea provides an insightful presentation on how and why this distinction between fake and real
marriage is problematic. Her research presents findings on how the government’s attempts to classify
marriages as fake or real have failed and put many marriage migrants in a disadvantaged
5position. The reason governments intervene in intimacy of couples is because movement of people
across borders is not without consequences. This is part of governments’ attempts to control migration
flows, in particular unskilled labor movements. Governments have to adapt and formulate new
policies to deal with immigrants if their number is increasing. This was not a pressing issue for
governments prior to 1960 but as movement across borders intensified, migration became problematic
for sending and receiving countries. On the one hand, sending countries fear brain drain, the loss of
human capital to other countries. On the other hand, receiving countries face the challenge of
sustaining their welfare systems while absorbing immigrants into their social and economic systems
(Knight, 2002, p.3). Consequently, some developed countries chose to favor the flow of professionals
rather than low skilled laborers (Ong, 2003, p.271). However as indicated above, spouse visas allow
low skilled laborers to access labor markets that are otherwise inaccessible to them legally.
Under these circumstances governments still maintain power on the decision to either grant or
deny the right to a spouse visa, though it is more often granted than denied exactly because of the
difficulty in classifying marriages as fake or genuine. Japan is one of these industrial countries that
favors inflow of professionals while keeping low skilled laborers out (Brody, 2000). That is why
discussions on transnational marriages and migration are strongly concentrated around spouses who
could not have resided in Japan without a spouse visa or those who have previously worked in Japan
as low skilled laborers.
When we look at transnational marriages in the world, most of them take place in Europe
followed by North America and then Asia (Inglehart & Norris, 2009, p.5). There are many factors that
lead to formation of transnational marriages but two factors are repeatedly found in the literature and
are most significant in the case of Japan. These factors are declining birth rate and aging population
(Kim & Oh, 2011, Yang & Lu, 2010; Takeshita, 2010a). There is an increasing trend of declining birth
rate in many industrialized countries. Although this problem is less worrying for immigration
destination countries, countries with strict immigration control policies are at risk. The latter are
becoming aging societies and this is alarming for the sustainability of their economies in the future. It
is alarming because with the majority of population being over 65, their retirement pensions will be a
6heavy burden on the shrinking work force. Within this process, local governments as well as
provincial administration such as cooperatives first started promoting marriage through diverse
policies and agencies. When policies within countries to promote marriage and childrearing failed to
have significant impact, some industrial countries such as Japan and Korea became dependent on the
migration of brides from other countries. These countries turned mostly towards other Asian countries
to bring in brides from 1980’s onwards. This has led to the rise of the controversial mail order brides
literature that is formulated around female marriage migrant networks (Kim, 2011; Constable, 2009;
Faier, 2009; 2007; Suzuki, 2003a; 2003b; 2005; 2010).
Transnational Marriages in Japan
Globalization has established new migration networks through which migration to Japan has
been increasing and diversifying. This has been the direct outcome of increased interaction between
geographically remote communities and facilitation of people’s movements across borders. Figure 1.1
shows that the number of legally registered foreigners in Japan has risen significantly in the past
decades, especially from the end of 1980’s to 2010.
Figure 1.1 Number of legally registered foreigners in Japan 1950 – 2013
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice, 2013.
7Figure 1.1 indicates a sharp increase in the number of foreigners in Japan, especially from
1990’s onwards. This trend is in parallel with the increase in number of transnational marriages
portrayed in Figure 1.2 below.
Figure 1.2 Transnational Marriages of Japanese Nationals, 2010
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2010
The number of Japanese nationals getting married to foreigners in 2006 was almost six times
higher than in 1980, a significant sharp increase. The parallel trends between Figures 1.1 and 1.2 re-
affirm that transnational marriages are significant to study under the framework of migration either as
the cause or consequence of migration (Faier, 2007; Constable, 2005; Piper, 2003; Brody, 2000). As
indicated at the beginning of this chapter, marriage could be the cause or the consequence of
migrations.
The gender breakdown of transnational marriages in Japan is portrayed in Figure 1.3
presented below. According to this figure 79 per cent of these marriages are between Japanese men
and Asian women.
Figure 1.3 Gender Breakdown of Transnational Marriages in Japan
Japanese husband &foreign wifeJapanese wife &foreign husband
8Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Vital Statistics of Japan, 2010.
When we look at the composition of Japanese men’s spouse choices, the largest groups of
foreign spouses are Chinese, Filipinas and Koreans. The Chinese sum up to almost half of all
transnational marriages with Japanese men at a rate as high as 44 per cent (Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare, Vital Statistics, 2010). The high composition of Asian wives in Japanese transnational
marriages is reaffirmed by the large amount of literature formulated on narratives of these foreign
wives (Le Bail, 2012, 2011; Faier, 2009, 2007; Piper, 2003, 1997; Suzuki, 2010, 2005, 2003a, 2003b;
Sellek, 1994). While Japanese men’s spouse choices could be easily categorized, Japanese women’s
spouse choices, on the other hand, show much more diversity. Categories of foreign spouses are the
same for women and men but the diversity in Japanese women’s foreign spouse choices is clearly
reflected through the thick category of “other nationals” recorded at 31 per cent. This constitutes the
largest category for Japanese women’s foreign spouse choices which is almost one third of their
husbands’ choices. It is followed by a high rate of Korean spouses (Ministry of Health, Labor and
Welfare, Vital statistics of Japan, 2010).
The high rate of Korean spouses for both Japanese men and women is founded historically in
Japan’s colonial past. During Japan’s colonial rule, all colonial subjects were granted Japanese
citizenship, but this changed with the implementation of the San Francisco Treaty in 1952. With this
peace treaty, signed on April 28th, 1952 colonial subjects residing in Japan lost their Japanese
citizenships and became foreigners (Morris-Suzuki, 2010, p.113). These subjects were given the
option of acquiring Japanese citizenship if they wished. However, this process required their
naturalization as Japanese citizenship is based on jus sanguinis. In jus sanguinis nationality is
inherited through bloodline whereas in jus soli nationality is acquired by place of birth (Morris-Suzuki,
2010, p.112). This option was rejected by many Koreans mainly due to nationalistic sentiments.
Consequently, many among this population have continued living in Japan as foreigners and today
present a unique case of up to fourth generation residents of a country without citizenship. Although
they are given more rights than other foreigners residing in Japan, under their classification as ‘special
permanent residents’, when they marry Japanese citizens, their numbers are included under the
9category of foreigners. Thus, this is one of the important factors that explain the high number of
marriages with Koreans (West, 2011). They constitute the only large category of foreign spouses that
Japanese men and women share.
Dynamics of gender are at play in Japanese foreign spouse choices. This is reflected in the
variation between foreign spouse choices of Japanese women and Japanese men. In terms of Japanese
men’s choices of foreign spouses, socio-economic factors play an important role. The high rate of
Chinese and Filipina spouses are the outcome of the agency mediated transnational marriages, kokusai
omiai kekkon. Due to changing conditions and increased urbanization there was a bride shortage in the
countryside from the 1970’s onwards. Many farmers in the countryside were having difficulties
finding Japanese life partners due to their social status and residence in the countryside. Living
standards they could offer their wives had become less and less appealing for contemporary Japanese
women who preferred to live in urban areas and have careers. Although a farmer’s income level could
hardly be classified as low, their profession was looked down upon as physically tiring manual labor.
Being a farmer’s wife and living in the countryside was a demanding task and Japanese women had
become less willing to carry on this burdensome role (Le Bail, 2011; 2012; Suzuki, 2010; 2005;
2003a; 2003b; Moon, 1998; Nakane, 1967). This had led to what was known as bride shortage, famine
or drought in the country side. These are referred to as yome busoku (bride shortage), yome kikin
(bride famine), yome hideri (bride drought) respectively. Local governments as well as provincial
administration such as cooperatives have attempted to promote marriage through diverse policies and
intensified interaction with agencies. They failed to attract more brides from within Japan and thus
turned towards other Asian countries in the 1980’s to bring in brides. These dynamics have led to the
rise of literature which opposed the practice of mail order brides (Faier, 2009; 2007; Suzuki, 2010,
2005, 2003a, 2003b). Many of these spouses came from China, Philippines, Korea, Thailand and Sri
Lanka. The creation of marriage migration networks between these countries and Japan is a good
example of how new migration networks are created under globalization. (Le Bail, 2012, 2011; Faier,
2007, 2009; Constable, 2009, 2005; Piper 2003, 1997; Suzuki, 2010, 2005, 2003a, 2003b).
10
At first glance these marriages seems profitable for both parties. On the one hand, it provides
wives for men who want to get married but have limited choices. On the other hand it allows these
women to live in Japan without fear of deportation, except of course in the case of divorce (Suzuki,
2010). It is underlined in the mail order brides’ literature that many of these foreign women have
previously been to Japan in order to work in the entertainment industry. Thus, for this particular group
of brides who had previously worked in Japan’s entertainment sector, the spouse visa is an
advantageous aspect of marriage. This marriage migration pattern faces harsh criticism from feminists
who categorize it as commodification of women, human trafficking or even prostitution (Oishi, 2005,
pp.36-7).
When we look at Japanese women’s foreign spouse choices, these are much more diversified
and complex in terms of motives. First of all, international upward mobility chances through marriage
are influential in Japanese women’s foreign spouse choices (Kelsky, 2001a). Accordingly, nationals of
English speaking countries are preferred as they offer a future possibility of living abroad in an
English speaking country. This upward mobility is motivated especially by the will to escape from
sexual discrimination in the workplace and the society in general (Borovoy, 2005). Data provided by
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2010) re-affirms this tendency as Americans, British and
Canadians constitute large groups of foreign spouses for Japanese women.
Secondly, Japanese women’s place in their society and gender roles projected on them play
important roles in their foreign spouse choices. Borovoy (2005, p.29) touches upon the impact of
Japan’s engagement with the US with reference to the place of Japanese women in Japanese society
and links it to Karen Kelsky's book “Women on the Verge: Japanese Women, Western Dreams”. In
her book, Kelsky (2001a) explains how today many Japanese women seek to break free from gender
discrimination and are fetishizing foreign men as emblems of “sexual potency, romance and passion,
upward social mobility, and chivalry” (Borovoy, 2005, p.29). Borovoy also refers to Kelsky’s work as
it underlines the labeling of Japanese men as poor lovers, selfish, infantile and tasteless. These
criticisms outlined by Kelsky and re-produced by Borovoy are closely related to the Japanese
household roles in which men are breadwinners while women bear all the housework. Women are
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responsible for taking good care of their husband and addressing their needs. Criticism of Japanese
husbands by Japanese wives is presented in both Kelsky (2001a; 2001b)’s and Borovoy (2005)’s
research. These show similarities with criticism towards Japanese husbands in research based on their
foreign wives’ narratives (Lieba, 2007; Piper, 2003; Nitta, 1990). According to Lebra (1984), Japanese
men do not do housework because it is like a threat to their masculinity. This is closely related to how
masculinity is defined in Japan through the role of the breadwinner. In line with this division of labor
in the household, Barbara Holthus (2009) has researched on how the image of foreign husbands is
projected in Japanese media. The foreign spouse is portrayed as a husband that spends more time at
home and helps his wife with housework. This topic is even covered in some magazines as promotion
for Japanese women to get married to foreigners (Richardson, 2004; Holthus, 2009). In accordance,
Kudo’s (2007) research on Japanese women who have converted to Islam shows that these women’s
choices of Pakistani husbands is based on qualities that are opposite to the criticism outlined above for
Japanese husbands. These Muslim husbands are labeled as honest, kind, caring and family oriented by
their Japanese wives. Takeshita (2010a) and Kudo (2011) focus on the increase in Japanese women’s
spouse choices from Muslim countries, especially from Pakistan and Iran. Takeshita (2010a)
demonstrates that the number of Pakistani and Iranian husbands have increased by 86.1 per cent and
154.9 per cent respectively from 1995 to 2000. (Takeshita, 2010a). Pakistani husbands constitute the
sixth largest category of foreign husbands whereas Iranians constitute the seventh.
The above section has attempted to outline patterns of foreign spouse choices in Japan with
reference to gender differences. However, decision making for marriage includes many factors at
different levels and priorities in spouse choices diverge greatly from one individual to another. The
divergence in Japanese men’s and women’s foreign spouse choices can be explained by their differing
approach to marriage and priorities in marital life choices. In order the better grasp what marriage
entails and how transnational marriages are defined, the next section elaborates on concepts that are
central to this research.
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Conceptual Framework
Marriage can have various meanings for different people but it is basically a contract between
two individuals under an authority. In social terms, marriage is a natural stage of adult life course that
has to do with “position within the life-cycle” (Castles, 2004; Edwards, 1982; 1987; 1989) and
marriage timing is closely linked to age, especially for females (Brinton, 1992; Baltaş & Steptoe, 
2000). The unifying thread for all relationships is the search for “intimacy” and people have different
priorities in partner selection at different stages of their lives (Sassler, 2010). Who marries who is the
outcome of individual preferences and social settings. Consequently there are different approaches and
elaborations on spouse choices and marriage decision. In terms of spouse choices, “love” is the very
problematic but most common motivation that comes out often in narratives within research on
marriage. Swidler (2001) outlines a contradiction within narratives on marriage, even when
interviewees expressed realist and pragmatic views on spouse selection and de-emphasized mythic
romanticism, in many cases their approach to marriage inevitably incorporated characteristics of this
mythic love that was de-emphasized. Swidler (2001) explains this through the dual nature of marriage
as both an institution and a relationship. The above outlined findings were based on research
conducted on American couples. Two years after Ann Swidler’s book, “Talk of Love: How culture
matters” came out, Farrer and Zhongxin (2003) have used the guideline of cultural codes that Swidler
had provided in her study to investigate marriages in China. Their findings were remarkably different.
This difference was in line with Dion and Dion (1996)’s research which has shown that individuals’
approach to marriage is shaped by cultures. Farrer and Zhongxin (2003) indicate that their Chinese
respondents rather emphasized “responsibility” in marriage. When narratives were analyzed, the
definition of responsibility was extended to financial, sexual and domestic elements but excluded
extramarital affairs. This implied that for their Chinese correspondents, having an extramarital affair
did not by default conflict with their responsibilities towards their marriage. Their definition of
responsibility was “context specific”. This was in line with Swidler (2001)’s finding that people have
the tendency to contradict themselves in their narratives simply because for them love was context
specific.
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Following up on the importance of responsibilities in a marriage, in some cultures duties are
closely related with kinship in terms of obligations towards parents and social pressures that frame
these. In such cultures the kin and especially parents are influential in the spouse choice and marriage
decision. Smart & Shipman (2004)’s research on three religious groups in Britain has shown that this
obligation towards parents in finding appropriate spouses was considered as a responsibility in all
Hindu, Muslim and Catholic minorities. Furthermore, the research has shown that for these migrants,
marriages arranged by parents did not conflict with individual freedom of choice. On the contrary,
some of the informants found it to be practical and less troublesome than searching for a spouse
themselves in the marriage market. These informants approached the issue of spouse selection as a
burdensome task. This approach has its echo in transnational marriages within Kim (2011)’s research
in which the task of finding a suitable marriage partner has been pointed out as troublesome.
Searching for a spouse is hard work and this is most clearly reflected through the terminology of
konkatsu in Japan which implies that search for a spouse is similar to search for employment in the
Japanese labor market (Kitamura, 2010).
When we look at transnational marriages, we see that spouses tend to project their cultural
framing of marriage on to their transnational marriages. For example, Liu-Farrer (2010)’s research on
Chinese and Japanese couples revealed a pattern similar to that outlined by Farrer and Zhongxin
(2003) mentioned above. Within this research as well, duties were emphasized. Contextually, duties
were defined as providing meals and generous allowances to Japanese husbands. Once again
extramarital affairs did not imply a contradiction to wifely duties (Liu-Farrer, 2010, p.107). When we
look at another group of foreign spouses for Japanese men, Filipinas, we see the emergence of another
projection of marriage culture, formulated on “love” rather than duties. Narratives of Filipina wives
provided by Faier (2009) draws attention to how these women emphasize their emotional ties with
their husbands. Their choices on defining relations within marriage is contextual as well, their self-
definitions of intimacies renders them modern and equips them with agency within a global setting.
These women’s emphasis on “love” is closely related to discussions on upward social mobility
through marriage as well as what Constable (2009) has defined as global paradoxal endogamy. One’s
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place in the global setting has implication on social class. In its purest definition social class is defined
through the distinction and relationship between the exploited and the exploiter as opposed to the
privileged and the underprivileged. This discourse is often projected on marriage migrants who can be
defined either as the exploiters of the spouse visa or exploited migrants.
Defining social class in transnational marriages has two main problems: the first is a gender
based difficulty with reference to measuring housewives’ social class and the second is the difficulty
in cross-country social class definition. With reference to the first problem, defining women’s social
class is problematic even when they are not in transnational marriages. The dilemma lies within
defining women’s social class based on their own qualities or the qualities of the household she
belongs to. We observe that in most cases a woman’s social class is derived from the husband’s social
class based on income, education and occupation. There are four different approaches in calculating
women’s social class. The first is the borrowed method in which the husband’s social class is taken as
base. The second model is the independent status model which is based on the woman’s own qualities
such as income and education level. The third is the shared status model which is based on the average
of both spouses’ social class. And the last model is the dominant status model in which the spouse
who has the higher social class defines the family’s social class (Tachibanaki, 2010, p.43-4). This
research utilizes the latter to calculate foreign women’s social class.
When we look at Japan in general, there has been a shift from a dominant middle class
ideology to a gap society (Ishida & Slater, 2010). This has had its implications on marriage as well
since it limits potential spouse choices as Japanese tend to marry into the same social class (Shirahase,
2010). This is in line with Gordon Mathews’ declaration that: “One’s cultural choices must fit within
one’s social world, which is more limited” (Mathews, 2000, p.22).
Social class and culture are important factors to elaborate on in transnational marriages. A
form of cultural formation that requires further elaborations is religion. Religion cannot be separated
from culture because it is a cultural structure (Geertz, 1993). It is “the way of life of people” just as
culture is (Mathews, 2000, p.4). Furthermore, there are individualized diversities within religions. Just
as Muslims show diversity, their problems do as well. For example, although Muslim Taiwanese have
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Chinese characteristics, they face resentment due to their Muslim faith. According to Chang (2010),
this is a “mental barrier of cultural recognition” (Chang, 2010, p.3). Religion is outlined as an
important cause of conflict in transnational marriages with Muslims in Europe. However it is
important to note that religiosity is closely linked to social class (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 1999; 2006) and 
that studies on groups from the same culture and religion show diversity according to social class
(Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000).  
Elaborations on marriage with reference to position in life cycle, intimacy, love and
responsibility in different cultures share the similarity of being highly contextual. In transnational
marriages, even social class, culture and religion are contextual. Transnational marriages are more
complicated as they import more cultural elements to the delicate equation of marriage. Furthermore,
problems encountered by these couples are more diversified particularly due to the transnational
nature of these marriages. Some of the cultural areas that become problematic in transnational
marriages that are outlined especially in the case of Japan are: gender relations, relations with the
foreign spouses’ kin, balancing religious differences, language barrier in communication and
challenges in bicultural childrearing.
Significance of Study
Literature on transnational marriages and families have been gaining increasing attention in
the academia especially in the past decades (Charsley, 2012) and this is the direct outcome of
increasing migration flows (Lu & Yang, 2010). The literature is strongly dominated by social class
and gendered aspect of migration and focuses mostly on female care work and marriage migrants.
Consequently, the existing literature is highly dominated by narratives of migrant women who are
studied from aspects such as mail order brides, commodification (Constable, 2009), victimization
(Suzuki, 2003a, 2003b, 2005), human trafficking (Oishi, 2005), empowered individuals who have
agency in a globalized world (Faier, 2007, 2009), transnational mothers who re-define family
relations (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2001), inter-generational differences that
emerge and develop differently in the host society (Ong, 2003; Kalter & Schroedter, 2010), changing
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power relations within families with reference to gender and social class within host society (George,
2005), loss in social position in return for higher living standards, also known as paradoxal
global hypergamy (Constable, 2005) and so on. These will be further elaborated upon in the second
chapter, under literature review. With reference to characteristics outlined in this chapter so far, the
existing literature on transnational marriages has four shortcomings. The literature is highly focused
on low skilled laborers and creates a category of neglected foreign spouses composed of middle or
upper middle class immigrants in Japan. Professional migrants make up almost one third, 30 per cent,
of all migrant workforce in Japan (Kim & Oh, 2011, p.1568). Despite this fact, research conducted on
marriages with middle class and upper middle class foreigners remains limited. Their
underrepresentation in the literature could be explained through the structure of Japan’s labor market
and marriage migration being a loophole in the system for low skilled laborers to live and work in
Japan. This dominant view in the literature is reinforced with employment history of the majority of
marriage migrants in Japan. While scholars such as Piper (1997), Suzuki (2010) and Faier (2009)
underline that most Filipina wives had previously worked in the entertainment sector, Kudo (2007)
and Takeshita (2010) underline that more than half of Pakistani husbands interviewed had overstayed
their visas. These facts strengthen negative perceptions of these foreign spouses as well as perceptions
of upward social mobility through acquisition of a spouse visa. This in turn has resulted in a strong re-
emphasis of paradoxal global hypergamy within the literature (Constable, 2009).
Secondly, the literature on transnational marriages is dominated by research based on
women’s narratives. As Constable argues, “still lacking are studies of men as intimate gendered
subjects, as providers of care work and intimacy, and not just as consumers of sexual services.”
(Constable, 2009, p.58; Malik, 2012). Research including narratives of husbands in these marriages
remains limited. In the case of Japan as well, a large amount of research is based on foreign women’s
narratives and Japanese wives’ narratives. This leads to the accumulation of gender biased literature.
This research attempts to counter-balance this gap by elaborating on gender and gender relations with
the incorporation of men’s narratives.
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Thirdly, following up on gender, I argue that similarities in how gender relations are
constructed in Japan and Turkey are influential in the way families are formed. Existing literature on
transnational marriages of Turkish nationals in Europe underlines that gender-roles driven cultural
conflict is an important source of disagreement in Turkish - European marriages. I argue that the case
of Turkish immigrants in Japan is different as these two societies show similarities in the definition of
gender roles within the household as compared to Europe. These similarities are reflected in their
smooth transitions to married life in terms of their gender roles within the family.
Fourthly, Islam blends with different cultures in different ways and it is difficult to
differentiate religion from culture (Geertz, 1993). This is a problem in the existing literature on
transnational marriages. When researchers are foreign to the Muslim communities they study, their
research is often guided by religious migrants they have reached through mosques or mesjits. To put
this problem in perspective, research on middle and upper middle class Turks in England has shown
that middle and upper middle classes have tendency not to frequent mosques or fast during Ramadan.
Out of thirty-two interviewees included in the above mentioned research, all of them neither went to
the mosque nor fasted during Ramadan (Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000). This is closely linked to the way 
religiosity is constructed and politicized in Turkey. In their research on religiosity, Çarkoğlu and 
Toprak (1999; 2006) have shown that there is a strong link between religiosity and social class. Their
research findings suggest that individuals from higher social classes are more likely to be less religious.
I argue that this link between religiosity and social class is important for understanding dynamics of
transnational marriages between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Research Objectives and Research Questions
This research analyzes transnational marriages of Turkish - Japanese couples through lenses
of culture, religion and gender. It focuses on the group of neglected foreign spouses, namely foreign
spouses from middle and higher middle class. The first aim is to analyze motivations for transnational
marriages when the narrative of upward social mobility of foreign spouses is minimized, to see how
these are different from dynamics presented in the existing literature. The second aim is to look at how
18
these couples balance their cultural and religious differences in their everyday lives, especially with
reference to the Turkish spouses’ religiosity. Within this section, the impact of social class on
religiosity is fundamental. Lastly, contrary to the existing literature on transnational marriages which
heavily relies on women’s narratives, this research brings in men’s voices and the analysis is
constructed on narratives of both genders.
In summary, the research questions are as follows:
(1) The marriage decision making process: to what extent do their cultural or religious
differences matter in the marriage decision making process and to what extent are they aware of these
at the beginning of their relationship?
(2) Negotiation and balancing of cultural and religious differences in couples’ everyday lives.
What matters and what is worth fighting for? What are their intercultural communication dynamics to
overcome problems?
(3) Influence and perceptions of the Turkish spouses’ Muslim identity on their family life
analyzed through higher social class and lower religiosity.
Organization of Study
The dissertation is organized into seven chapters. This first chapter as the introduction aims
at familiarizing the reader with the research topic and presents the foundation of the research through
theories on transnational marriages. This section aims to prepare the ground for research objectives
and research questions which are outlined towards the end of the section.
Chapter Two as the literature review presents academic literature that this research is based on
and is analyzed through. This chapter is divided in two sections: marriages and transnational marriages.
The chapter is organized in this way because transnational marriages are complex versions of
marriages and it is important not to mistake gender relations in marriages with cultural clash in
transnational marriages. That is why the first section of this chapter presents dynamics of marriages in
general followed by dynamics in Turkish and Japanese marriages respectively. The second section
focuses on transnational marriages in particular and introduces important topics in the literature. This
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section then passes on to dynamics of transnational marriages in Japan in particular as the focus of the
research is on Turkish – Japanese couples residing in Japan.
The third chapter is the methodology and provides details on how the research was
conducted and how data was collected. It starts out with a detailed introduction of the researcher
followed by details on how the field research was conducted. The chapter then passes on to the
introduction of the data in detail. The last section of this chapter introduces the Turkish community in
Japan that is the subject of this research and provides details on characteristics and dynamics of three
social groups: low skilled laborers, middle and upper middle class Turkish males and lastly, upper
middle class Turkish Females.
Chapter Four aims to answer the first research question outlined in Chapter One. This chapter
is on forming families and is organized in two sections. The first section analyzes the process from
encounter to marriage with focus on topics that have been underlined as problematic in transnational
marriages. The chapter elaborates on elements that are significant in Turkish – Japanese marriages and
why. This first section has an emphasis on the construction of gender roles within these transnational
families. The second section of this chapter focuses on cultural, religious differences and social class.
It is constructed on elaborations on how these issues are approached in these marriages. This section
also provides elaborations on social class and perceptions of social class at the marriage decision
making process.
Chapter Five presents elaborations on how these couples negotiate their differences in their
married lives. This chapter is divided according to the main problematic areas outlined in the
transnational marriages literature and those that were significant for Turkish – Japanese couples. There
are five sections in this chapter. The chapter starts with elaborations on intercultural communication
followed by sections on relations with in-laws, bicultural childrearing, sexuality and living standards
redefined through living space. The second, third and fourth sections are in conformity with the
existing literature whereas the fifth topic is new. The issue of how living space becomes a problem for
couples remains unexplored under the topic of transnational marriages in Japan.
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Chapter Six is on religious practices and identity construction in these marriages. The first
section of this chapter provides an outline of the religiosity of Turkish spouses with reference to how
religion has been politicized in Turkey. The chapter then passes on to elaborations on how spouses
perceive the Turkish spouses’ religiosity. The last section in this chapter is focused on rituals in
couples’ lives with an emphasis on death as it has been outlined as one of the most problematic topics
in this research.
Chapter 7 as the conclusion elaborates on findings of the research outlined in previous
chapters while answering the research questions outlined in Chapter One. Limitations of the study and
prospective future research, as well as significance and contributions of the study are included in this
section.
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Chapter II: Literature Review
This chapter is organized into two sections: marriages and transnational marriages. The
marriage section starts with elaborations on marriage in general and its conceptualization. This section
includes five sub-sections. While the first two sub-sections are devoted to presenting the historical
evolution of marriage and family in Japan, the third and fourth sub-sections present the case of Turkey.
The fifth sub-section links these two cultures under subjects framing the gender roles within the family.
The second section of this chapter is transnational marriages. It starts out with a general
conceptualization of transnational marriages and is followed by main topics that emerged from the
literature under this topic with reference to dynamics and regional differences. There are two sub-
sections in this section. The first sub-section addresses the issue of how transnational marriages
constitute an intersection of migration, gender and social class. The second sub-section on the other
hand is devoted to cultural conflict and marital problems in transnational marriages that are outlined as
significant in the literature. These subjects are elaborated upon one by one.
Marriage
Marriage is an institution that is defined in different ways in context around the world. It
shows variations according to cultures in general and individuals in particular. Thus the study of
marriages shows great variation. There are, however, concepts that are common to many cultures that
could be useful in understanding what marriage entails. These are gender, sexuality, childbearing and
kinship (Girgis, George & Anderson, 2010). In terms of power relations in marriages, Resource
Theory formulated by Blood and Wolfe (1960) has been the dominant line of work for many decades
now. According to this approach, the value of resources that one spouse can channel into the marriage
determines his or her power within the marriage.
There is a historical construction of romantic intimacy (Giddens, 1992; Padilla et al., 2007).
There is also the differentiation between pragmatic and romantic love. Swidler (1986) shows that there
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is a tendency to idealize romantic love while relying on pragmatic choices in real life. When we look
at the way intimate relationships are formulated, cultures play an important role. When we look at the
literature on marriages, there are large formulations concentrated around individual choice with a
shadow of romantic ideas, namely love, which is the case of Americans (Swidler, 1986). On the other
side of the spectrum, there is responsibility which is emphasized by cultures such as Chinese,
Pakistanis, Japanese and Turks (Farrer & Zhongxin, 2003; Charsley, 2012; Liversage, 2012).
Responsibility could be towards the spouse, in terms of meeting basic needs within the household, or
it could be towards parents and kin in terms of choosing appropriate spouses and keeping up
appearances. It could also be responsibility related to social pressures.
Dion and Dion (1996) have shown that there are cultural differences in approaching and
defining the relation between love and marriage. They make the distinction between individualism and
collectivism in this respect. While individualism assumes close ties between love and marriage, the
latter distances these and burdens love with negative connotations such as pain and suffering. Dion
and Dion (1996) argue that values at both societal and psychological levels should be taken into
account for an in-depth analysis. People have different priorities in life partner selection at different
life stages of their lives and as expressed in the introduction chapter, marriage spouse choices are very
contextual (Sassler, 2010). That is why marriage has to do with one’s position within the life-
cycle (Castles, 2004).
In many countries marriage is regulated by civil law, thus it is the ratification of a bond
between two people with a legal contract under state authority (Girgis, George & Anderson, 2010).
However, it is important to bear in mind that what marriage entails legally varies from country to
country and what it entails emotionally or physically varies from person to person. In some cases it
might entail affectionate emotions such as love and willingness to share a living space with another
person and/or to have legally recognized offspring. On the other hand, in some cases, it might just be
treated as a practical process, a means to escape from solitude or even a means to secure a visa for
higher living standards in a foreign country (Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2008). Regardless of these
variations in the approach to marriage, it is considered as a natural stage of adult life and a part of the
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life cycle in various cultures (Edwards, 1982, 1987, 1989; Castles, 2004). The family is considered to
be the outcome of historical and social circumstances that should be evaluated through people’s
experiences in terms of time, places, and social situation. Thus, marriage itself is very contextual.
In different cultures, different aspects of marriage come forward as more significant. While
love is emphasized in some cultures, responsibilities, kinship and childrearing are emphasized in
others. When we look at what marriage entails, this also shows diversity according to cultures. While
it is formulated around access to sexuality in some cultures, it allows social recognition as an adult in
others. Although it might denote co-habitation in many cultures, it is not always the case (Lyons &
Ford, 2008). At the end when we look at diverse elaborations on marriage, the unifying thread is a
search for a form of intimacy (Sassler, 2010). In this process of search for intimacy, gender relations
are negotiated in various ways and re-defined. Economic power is reflected in the marriage as
leverage, for example, when women work they gain more power while men lose their ground (Sassler,
2003, p.259).
Data from the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2012) illustrate
the motives behind the decision to get married in Japan. As shown in Table 2.1, the highest percentage
is 48.3 for “Felt it was the appropriate age to get married”. The table also portrays that couples in
which Japanese women were between 30-34 years old this “timing” pressure was especially strong.
The issue of timing was much less significant for couples in which the women were under 25 years
old.
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Table 2.1 Motives for Decision to Get Married, 2012
Age of wife at marriage Under 25 25-29 30-34 Over 35 Total
Saved enough money to get married 5 5.2 2.5 2.6 4.2
Established economic base for married life 8.5 12.6 12 12 11.4
Work circumstances of either spouse 4.6 12.8 11.6 8.5 10.2
Wanted to live together as soon as possible 28.1 22.7 19.3 30.8 23.9
Felt it was the appropriate age to get married 24.6 53.9 57.8 55.6 48.3
Wanted to have children as soon as possible 5.8 7.2 8.7 8.5 7.4
Became pregnant 50 12.4 11.6 6 20.2
Friends or people the same age got married 1.9 3.1 2.2 1.7 2.5
Recommended by parents 5.8 6 9.5 9.4 7.1
Other 3.5 5.4 6.2 9.4 5.5
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2012
In terms of marriage timing, age is a significant factor for Japanese women. This was in
accordance with the “Christmas cake” approach according to which women are like Christmas cakes
– if not sold by the 25th of December they have to be discarded - it is difficult for women to get
married after age 25 (Brinton, 1992; Nakano, 2011). This is not limited to Japanese society, but in
Vietnamese society as well women or men who are not yet married at an appropriate age undergo
social discrimination (Thai, 2003, p.236). This view is important in understanding the social pressures
placed on getting married. However it should also be noted that the age of first marriage has risen for
both men and women in Japan (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2013). Reasons for delaying
marriage will be further elaborated on in this chapter under the topic of “Marriage in Contemporary
Japan”.
Coming back to the issue of social pressures, these are not limited to Japanese women. When
we look at the case of Turkish women, we see that they also face pressures to get married early
especially with reference to virginity which symbolizes their and their family’s honor. This topic is
elaborated upon in detail at the end of this chapter under the topic of “Historical Evolution of Marriage
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and Family in Turkey”. Social pressures are not limited to starting a marriage but to ending it as well.
Divorce is stigmatized in many countries around the world such as Turkey, Vietnam, and Japan (Thai,
2003; Parla, 2001; Hertog, 2009). Although stigmatized, there is an increasing trend of divorces in
many countries and this has to do with how the approach to marriage has changed and evolved.
Patterns related to marriage are changing both in Japan and Turkey. In terms of similarities,
we observe the increase in love marriages in both Turkey and Japan. Both countries reflect a shift
from arranged marriages referred to as omiai in Japan and görücü usulü in Turkey to love marriages
referred to as renai in Japan and aşk evliliği in Turkey. This implies that rather than being introduced
for the particular aim of getting married, young people enter relationships with personal motives, not
knowing whether it will end up in marriage or not. Although parents and relatives have previously
played an important role in the spouse selection process, their influence is weakening as individual
decision making is becoming stronger. Marriage has different historical evolutions in Japan and
Turkey, these will be elaborated upon in detail from this point onwards and followed by an
explanation of contemporary dynamics and patterns of marriage in these two countries.
Historical Evolution of Marriage and Family in Japan
Marriage has traditionally been an important institution for social recognition in Japan and is
the norm in the adult life course to become ichininmae, that is, an adult. Children are considered as the
ratification of a happy marriage (Edwards, 1982). At this point it is important to note that the rate of
childrearing outside marriage has traditionally been low in Japanese society (Takenaka & Rebick,
2006). Thus marriage is an important social status that offers Japanese adults an appropriate social
place within society.
During the Meiji restoration, the family system was institutionalized which made the ie living
arrangement the civil code. The term ie basically means family but it also denotes a system of
continuity based on the family name. It was established as a koseki, a registration system, to ensure
that all members of the family shared the same last name and it later became a social system that aims
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at the continuation of the family. Women are part of their father’s registry until marriage and part of
their husband’s registry after marriage. (Krogness, 2011; Ronald & Alexy, 2011; Hertog, 2009; Sand,
2003; Hendry, 1987a; 1987b). Before the institutionalization of the family system, during the Edo
period, everyone had to register at a Buddhist Temple under the Tokugawa Shogunate and this was
replaced by the national family registration system in 1871 (Kawano, 2005).
The ie incorporates all the ancestors and the unborn of the family, thus it represents more than
the sum of all its members and is a continuous system. It is characterized by vertical relations rather
than horizontal ones and is structured by a hierarchy based on age, sex and expectance of permanency.
It is based on Confucian principles of loyalty and benevolence so relations within the ie are about duty
and filial piety rather than love and affection. It was ideologically constructed as a nationwide social
network under which every house was seen as a branch of the imperial family line. This ideologically
implied that the whole nation is interconnected through this system (Krogness, 2011; Ronald & Alexy,
2011; Hendry, 1987b; Bachnik, 1983).
In the ie family system, co-habiting family members compose essential small units and the
continuation of the family line in the home is vital. The eldest son is responsible for bringing in an
appropriate bride, who would take care of his parents, produce offspring and guarantee the
continuation of the family. The importance of marriage was vital in this respect as it was a duty to
ensure the continuation of the family. However, co-habitation of more than one couple from the same
generation was not allowed. There were only two permanent positions in the family, one male and one
female, atatori and yome, thus the groom and the bride (Hendry, 1987b; Bachnik, 1983).
The survival of the ie and the continuation of the family name was essential and this family
system was constructed in a way to adapt to different conditions. The continuation of the ie was so
important that there was even a last resort of youshi, that is, adoption of a son for the sake of the
continuation of the ie. This system requires the adoption of a grown man into the family, a man who is
willing to ensure the continuation of the family through marriage with an appropriate bride (Takenaka
& Rebick, 2006; Bachnik, 1983). At the end of the Edo period, the percentage of farmers who adopted
a successor in this manner was as high as 20 per cent (Kawano, 2010, p.164).
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This family system empowered the man as the head of the family and the father figure. His
powers were symbolic rather than legal, women ran the household but special treatment was given to
fathers, when at home (Hidaka, 2011). Women were more powerful in the private sphere and a
mother’s ideal characteristics included “endurance, patience and constant support for dependent
family members” (Borovoy, 2005, p.3) including the father. Women’s role as caretakers in the home
was considered as the natural outcome of her biology, fertility. Women’s place in the household was
strengthened by the language used, the term okusan which is used for wives in Japanese can be
translated as the person inside or in the back (Lock, 1993, p.86, 93).
As explained above, there was a constant emphasis on continuation through marriage.
Marriage was defined as a step into adulthood. It changed the position of members in the family
(Edwards, 1987). As the continuation of the family line was essential, the elderly arranged marriages
and the young members’ duties towards the family were emphasized. In couples’ relations love was
de-emphasized, so that the couple could focus on more important things in their marriage, like their
duties.
Although there has been a transition away from the above outlined family system, some of its
characteristics have been carried on to contemporary nuclear families. The previous family system
repressed sexuality, individual based partnership and affection among couples with an emphasis on
their roles to be carried within the family. This has been extended to some contemporary families.
This is closely linked to the sexless marriages literature on Japanese families according to which these
couples tend to seek satisfaction of emotional and sexual needs outside the family (Ronald & Alexy,
2011, p.18; Suzuki, 2010; Holloway, 2010; Hendry, 1987a, p. 34).
Marriage in Contemporary Japan
When we look at family structures in contemporary Japan, the twentieth century has marked
the weakening of the ie family system outlined above and there has been a clear transition to the
nuclear family system. According to Kawano (2010, p.61), more than half of Japanese of households
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were already nuclear family households in 1920. Figure 2.1 below portrays changes in Japan’s
household compositions up to 2010.
Figure 2.1. Changes in Households Compositions in Japan up to 2010
Source: Statistics Bureau, Statistical Handbook of Japan, 2013.
The changing household composition in Figure 2.1 shows a clear pattern as the percentage of
three generation households is as low as 7.1 per cent against 56.3 per cent of nuclear families which
compose the largest category. Figure 2.1 also displays the increasing trend of one person households
which reflect the decreasing number of marriages. This is closely related to the lateness and lessening
of marriages which define the situation in contemporary Japan. However Tachibanaki (2010) points
out that despite these trends, Japan is still a marrying society as about 90 per cent expressed the
willingness to get married one day (Tachibanaki, 2010, p.94). This implies that what have changed are
expectancies from a marriage rather than the willingness to get married. Konkatsu, the search for an
appropriate spouse has become a serious business in Japan (Le Bail, 2011; Kitamura, 2010). However
the definition of an “appropriate spouse” shows diversity from one person to another. The trend of
building marriages on friendship and forming companion couples have become popular in the world in
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past decades. Le Bail (2011) argues that companion spouses briefly emerged in Japan in line with
general trends in the world in 1970’s but soon disappeared. Foundation of marriage on companionship
still remains weak in Japan.
There are important transitional steps in life courses identified as graduating from school,
finding full-time employment, leaving parental house and getting married. These stages show
similarities with the west and each stage has variations within itself based on class, gender and
ethnicity. Research on contemporary Japanese women has shown that they seek comfort throughout
their transition to adulthood. As for marriage, they seek spouses who could cover all the family’s
financial needs while the women themselves pursue self-actualization (Okano, 2009, p.270; Bardsley
& Hirakawa, 2005, p.122). This self-centered approach to marriage also implies an escape from
motherly duties brought on by having children. The tendency to avoid having families to avoid wifely
or motherly duties could also be explained either through the changing role of mothers within the
transition process from the ie family system to the nuclear family or through urbanization (Lock, 1993,
pp. 113-4). In line with this argument, we observe a decreasing trend in the number of marriages in
Japan.
Women’s place in the family as well as gender relations has evolved in Japan. In the1970’s
women found fulfillment in being fulltime mothers and were expected to devote their energy
exclusively to managing the household. They were responsible for providing a supportive environment
to their husbands and children. This started dropping in the 1980’s and 1990’s as women started
demanding their husbands to be more actively involved in the family, especially in child rearing
(Holloway, 2010). Until this period, couples had gender-specific child rearing duties: women were
responsible for meeting the children’s day to day needs whereas fathers’ childrearing was limited to
setting a manly example as the breadwinner. Under this framework, economic power was associated
with manliness, masculinity of the fatherly figure (Hidaka, 2011). Husbands were breadwinners who
provided for their wives and children. They were often absent from the home and this prevented them
from developing meaningful relationships with other family members. They were supposed to give
priority to their company and work over their relationships at home (Okano, 2009; Ogasawara, 1998).
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The corporate culture was embedded in this masculinity and notions such as workaholism or death by
overwork were associated with this masculinity in the 1970’s and 80’s (Hidaka, 2011). Women, on the
other hand, had to manage the house and were turned into asexual beings with the main goal of
nurturing their children. Parents but especially mothers were highly responsible for how their children
turn out to be (Hertog, 2009; Lock, 1993).
Changes in the labor market is an important factor for marriage to become less appealing for
women. Being a mother who has to take care of the home and children while the husband is often
absent is no longer attractive (Retherford, Ogawa & Matsukura, 2004). Under this framework
Japanese women might seem to be portrayed as victims oppressed by Japanese patriarchy’s social and
cultural norms. It is important to note that Japanese women can use this structure to their advantage.
Within this social structure Japanese women have better opportunities of self-fulfillment through non-
work channels (Okano, 2009). As opposed to men who find their ikigai1 in mainly work and family,
women belong to clubs, circles and associations (Mathews, 1996). It should be noted, however, that
this is not the case for all women. In some cases women might have no time left to themselves
depending on their circumstances since being a wife is not as easy as san shoku hirune tsuki (three
meals a day with a nap) implies. Some housewives especially in previous generations have faced
many difficulties in their family life due to their relations with mothers-in-law (Lock, 1993).
There have been other shifts in modern family life and gender relations within the family.
Tachibanaki (2010) points out that in contemporary Japan, women are the ones asking for divorce in
most cases. The childrearing process has also changed greatly. It was much more demanding in terms
of restraining one’s emotions whereas it has now evolved to show warmth and responsiveness and to
provide the attention that children need (Hidaka, 2011, p.37). Today, marriage is delayed, its
association with sex is weakened and the birth rate is dropping. Families are getting smaller and the
number of co-habiting couples as well as single person households are rising (Hertog, 2009, p.3).
Young people have new life styles in which they change jobs, move in and out of the workforce,
reside in the parental house longer and lack interest in getting married or having children. This change
1Reason for being, sense of purpose.
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in the new generations’ lifestyle has led to their labeling as parasite singles (Brinton, 2011, p.5; Le
Bail, 2011; Yamada, 1999). In addition to the above outlined changes, even when young Japanese do
get married, there is a high chance of their marriage ending in divorce. Alexy (2007) underlines that
one third of marriages will end in divorce and these will be marriages of people around their thirties.
These changing dynamics have been important factors for Japan’s aging population and dropping
birthrate.
Historical Evolution of Marriage and Family in Turkey
In Turkey, polygyny2 existed during the Ottoman era but has been abolished and forbidden
by law almost a century ago. It was replaced by monogamy3 with the foundation of the laic Turkish
Republic. The abolition of polygyny was a gradual reform: it was first made consensual for women in
1917 during the Ottoman era and then abolished for good in 1926 shortly after the establishment of the
Republic. The foundation of the Turkish Republic also marked the acceptance of the civil code based
on the Swiss model (Berktay, 1995; Çakır, 1995). 
Marriage under the Ottoman law was different from both today’s civil code which is based
on the Swiss one and the sharia4 implemented in other Muslim countries. It was utilized as a guideline,
a moral code rather than law. The Koran regulated the matrimonial settlement as ownership of
property, allowance of polygamy, social roles in domestic lives, patriarchal society and
discouragement of divorce. The performance of marriage without the intervention of authorities was
already banned in the 16th century, thus Turks were different from Arabs in their matrimonial practice.
Polygamy existed but monogamous marriage was the ideal. Bigamy was encountered in the country
side as a means for supplementary workforce to work on the field and these women who have no legal
rights but just a religious ceremony were called kuma (Vergin, 1985, p. 572-3).
The development of the social framework for the modern Turkish family was in parallel with
legal developments. Having a civil code was not an option under the Ottoman Empire’s sharia rule but
2 The marriage custom of a man having several wives at the same time, a form of polygamy.
3 Marriage in which an individual has a single spouse.
4 Islamic law
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it gained importance after the foundation of the republic. The Kanunname was the civil code that
settled marriage laws during the Ottoman Empire. An important achievement to empower women
within the family was the replacement of the Muslim family law by the Swiss Civil Code in 1926 as
well as the suffrage in 1934 (Parla, 2001, p.70; Vergin, 1985, p.571).
The establishment of the Turkish Republic was characterized by Western model
modernization. Many social and legal reforms were adopted in a short time span for the sake of
transforming an Empire into a Republic. In contemporary Turkey only civil marriage is recognized,
religious marriages are allowed though they are not legally binding. Today there are cases of couples
living together with a religious marriage only but this is explained through the preference of marriage,
legal or religious, over co-habitation (Remez, 1998, p.97). At this point it is important to note that
Turkish law does not require for both spouses to be Muslim. This is valid for both marriages among
Muslim and non-Muslim Turks as well as marriages between Turks and non-Muslim foreigners.
Spouses’ conversion to Islam is not a legal requirement however is socially welcomed and might be
appreciated depending on religiosity of the family.
The position of women in the family is strongly linked to feminist movement that dates back
to the Ottoman era in the late 19th and early 20th century. During this period the argument for gender
equality was based on the notion of equality within Islam itself (Knaus, 2007). The emphasis on the
importance of women within the Turkish family structure can be traced back to the Young Ottomans
movement. This was a group formed by intellectuals who believed in progress by adopting western
ideas. This group underlined the importance of educating women and their argument was based on the
assumption that women will be raising the children as mothers within the family (Parla, 2001, p.71).
When we look at gender inequality in Turkey, even though laws are egalitarian and liberal, social life
remains characterized by patriarchal ideology (Koç, 2007; Berktay, 1995; Çakır, 1995).  Although 
there are regional variations, Turkey has traditions of patrilateral parallel-cousin marriage5, patrilateral
cross-cousin marriage6, levirate7 and bride price also known as bride wealth8. These traditions related
5 Marriage of a man to his father’s brother’s daughter, or a woman to her father’s brother’s son.
6 Marriage of a woman to her father’s sister’s son, or a man to his mother’s brother’s daughter.
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to marriage have been constantly weakening through modernization in the past century but are
unlikely to disappear in the near future.
Virginity is considered as the purity of a female in Turkey and it is important to get married
as a virgin, especially in more conservative parts of the society. The difference between females who
are virgin or not is implied through the language. The term kız (girl) implies virginity whereas kadın 
(woman) implies not being a virgin. Even the state has control over the issue of young Turkish
women’s virginity to a certain extent. In 1992, there was a controversial event in which a virginity
exam was performed on a 15-year-old young woman’s body. The young woman had run away from
home and the principal of her school called her father. The principal expressed concern over the young
woman meeting boys. He feared that she might not be a virgin anymore. The exam was demanded by
her father who wished to clear the family name and save their honor. The minister in charge of
women’s affairs at that time was Mrs. Işılay Saygın. During an interview, Mrs. Saygın was asked 
about the event outlined above. She, the minister in charge of women’s affairs, argued that virginity
controls were upholding “our practices, customs, and traditions” (Parla, 2001, p. 67). She also argued
that Turkey did not need to be westernized in all respects and that Turkish nation’s manners, customs
and traditions were being admired by the whole world. This incident portrays the severity of the
gender issue and the burden that virginity places on Turkish females. The minister in charge of
women’s affairs, a woman herself, openly defended practices, customs, and traditions over a woman’s
rights of her own body. Parla (2001) summarized the pressures Turkish women face regarding
virginity as follows:
An honorable woman leaves her house only twice in her lifetime: one time to get married,
and the other to get buried. (p.79)
The cultural emphasis on virginity is not particular to Islam or Turkey as virginity remains
important in some Asian countries like Cambodia as well. Ong (2003) touches upon this issue with
7 Marriage custom according to which a widow marries a brother of her dead husband.
8 Compensation paid by the groom or his family to the bride’s family upon marriage.
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reference to the Cambodian community she has studied: “A daughter who lost her virginity before
marriage struck a blow to (what remained of) the family honor that could seldom be overcome”
(p.178). In Cambodian culture as well as some Asian cultures, virginity of daughters and the
preservation of sexual purity equals family honor.
Marriage in Contemporary Turkey
In the Turkish family, the primary role of women is to be the nurturing mother taking care of
the children and doing housework. Gender roles in the Turkish family are clearly defined and
household is mainly under female control. This is even strengthened with the saying; yuvayı dişi kuş 
yapar (the female bird constructs the nest). (Baltaş, Steptoe & Duman, 2000, p.2). However, through 
industrialization, balances within the family are changing as women join the workforce. Mothers are
then supplemented by nurseries, public parks or inexpensive cafeterias. These are institutions and
services that assist the family when both parents work. Regardless, these are not enough to prevent the
doubling of Turkish women’s burden as they are held responsible for the housework even after joining
the workforce. Back in the 1980’s, even if they did join the workforce, their roles remained limited to
the extended caregiver professions such as nurses, teachers which were considered as low status
occupations. Provisions of childcare services remain limited pushing Turkish women back into their
caregiver roles in the household (Knaus, 2007; Kandiyoti, 1985).
Turkey is a segregated society where social lines are drawn based on gender. Gender
relations have been resistant to radical change since the establishment of the republic and
implementation of reforms in the 1920’s. However the home is defined as the sphere of women and
the wife’s attributes determine the balance of power within the family. Thus, in line with Blood and
Wolfe (1960)’s research, gender equality within the family can only be brought about by a change in
women’s resources and status. In terms of the impact of the education level in Turkish marriages, Fox
(1973, p.723) suggests that husbands with the same education level as their wives have the least power
in their marriages.
Vergin (1985) explains changes in Turkey’s social structure and family life based on the
parallel of economic development and the move to industrial, western type of society. She argues that
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there is no causal relationship between industrialization and transition to nuclear family but there were
structural and cultural changes that took place in society at large. The family home, Hane is the unit of
production and consumption in which tasks are organized according to the age and sex of family
members (Vergin, 1985, p.571). Although the nuclear family is the modern family pattern, extended
family is still very important both in the metropolis and the urban areas. Two words denote family in
Turkish: aile and sülale. Aile is the nuclear family whereas sülale includes relatives. Co-habitation of
generations shows variation in different regions. In terms of two generation co-habitation, co-
habitation of males with their parents is higher in accordance with the social responsibilities of sons.
Although there are regional differences, in case of two generation co-habitation, couples mostly live
with the groom’s parents after marriage. Living arrangements of family co-habitation depend on the
socio-economic status and shows regional variation. By the age of 30, the percentage of females
leaving the parental house is 90 per cent whereas it is still at 70 per cent for males (Koç, 2007, p.35).
Percentage of nuclear families is high at 79 per cent for landless agricultural workers whereas it is low
at 44 per cent for peasants farming their own land.
Vergin (1985, pp.573-4) argues that the Turkish family has kept its authoritarian and
patriarchal character. She links this to the division of labor that had long been established in Turkish
society. However the Turkish family has been influenced by the west, especially American culture, in
the process of modernization. Solidarity within the family is still very important and highly valued.
The Turkish family is resisting external pressures and consequently urbanization has not resulted in
the dissolution of kinship relationships. Bride price, başlık parası was paid to the bride’s father in 29
per cent of marriages. This money is paid to the father as a compensation for his loss of labor force to
work in the field. Vergin (1985, p.573) points out that the state has been trying to abolish başlık parası 
by rendering it illegal. However peasants in less developed parts of Turkey are still holding on to this
tradition.
Parla (2001) explains how women gain significance even in the political sphere by becoming
citizens through their important social roles as mothers. She also refers to the Turkish penal code
according to which, attacks on the body constitute a breach of individual rights only when the bodies
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in question are male. The women’s body under sexual attack, on the other hand, is construed not as a
violation of individual rights, but of the family order. Thus the purity of the woman becomes the
family honor. The penalty code had longer years of punishment for cases in which the female victim
was married. This reflects the social strength of patriarchy, a crime that involved a woman married to
another man resulted in heavier punishment (Berktay, 1995).
Gender Relations and Family Dynamics in Comparison
Gender Gap and Religion
There are structural gender biases and grave gender gaps both in Japan and Turkey. Japan faces
severe criticism for its gender gap due to its classification as a developed industrial country and one of
the world’s leading economies. When we look at their legal rights, Japanese women were granted
universal suffrage by the postwar constitution. This constitution also gave them equal rights in
marriage and in divorce. Unfortunately these developments did not guarantee overall equality between
genders. For example, it was not possible for Japanese women to transmit their nationality to their
children until 1985 when the Nationality Law was revised (Lewallen, 2010, p.12).
Japan’s gender gap is best explained when put in comparison: a full-time female employee in
Japan earns only 62 per cent of what a full-time male employee earns (Hertog, 2009, p.50). When we
look at the Gender Gap Rankings, Turkey and Japan both score very poorly year after year. In the
listing for 2012, Japan ranked 101st amongst 135 countries, whereas Turkey ranked 124th. Rankings by
year between 2006 and 2012 are presented in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1. Gender Gap Rankings of Turkey and Japan 2006 - 2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Japan 80 91 98 101 94 98 101
Turkey 105 121 123 129 126 121 124
Source: The Gender Gap Report 2012 (Hausmann, R., Tyson, L. D., & Zahidi, S., 2012).
Explanations of this structural gender gap in Turkey and Japan are both formulated around
religion. Japanese feminists trace the gender gap to particular notions in Shinto and Buddhist religions:
the notion of pollution from monthly menstruation and childbirth derived from Shinto religion and
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female inferiority from early Buddhist doctrine. Japan presents the mix of Buddhist concept of danson
johi which denotes natural female inferiority with the concept of kateiseikatsusha which denotes
homebodies (Lock, 1993, p.83).
Turkey’s case is explained through its Islamic culture and women’s secondary position within
Islam. Most of the Turkish people are Sunni (Kara, 1995; Laçiner, 1995) and women have a secondary
position within the Sunni sect of Islam. The sect specification is important because while Sunni
women and men are required to pray separately, the case of Alevi Muslims is different. It should be
noted that Islam has different sects and that gender relations as well as worshipping methods show
variation in different sects.
The gender gap that is portrayed in Table 2.1 is based on corporate promotions and political
achievement but there are Asian feminists who oppose this western measure of gender power relations.
Some feminists argue that women’s power in Japan should be calculated and elaborated through
different parameters particular to its case. According to them, the calculation should include: Japanese
women’s power within the household, their non-political or non-corporate activities such as
consumerism, activities in childrearing related areas, community building and activism. For example,
when we look at gender relations in volunteering, there is more flexibility in negotiating gender
identities compared to other areas of life in Japan. Furthermore, in childrearing related areas,
PTA9meetings and improvement of children’s schooling experiences hold an important place in
housewives’ lives. Volunteering activities that Japanese women participate in might not solve Japan’s
problems but they improve lives. Volunteering builds community relations while providing the
sentiment of fulfillment to those who took part (Nakano, 2005).
Gender roles within the family
In terms of gender relations within the household, Turkey and Japan have similar structures
although the power balance within the family is different. Both Japanese and Turkish societies have
patrilineal descent dominated by a gendered division of labor in the private sphere ideally classifying
9Parent Teacher Association
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men as breadwinners while women run the household. In many Japanese households the husband
hands in his money to his wife who manages their accounts and regulates their spending and savings.
There is variation in Turkey’s case which is based on the occupation of the husband. Contrary to the
Japanese case where women are stronger in the private sphere, power relations within the family show
variation in the Turkish case. The power balance of women in Turkish marriages is affected by their
education level, urban experience, father’s education level and father’s occupation. Increase in these
factors increases the woman’s power within the family in relation to her husband and this is also seen
in the cases of Greece and Yugoslavia (Fox, 1993, p.721). The patriarchal system was so strong in
Turkey that a woman’s employment was subject to the husband’s permission until the mid-20th
century (Çakır, 1995). 
Relations with in-laws
The strongest proof that in-laws are still important actors in their children’s marriage is that in
both Japan and Turkey negative relations or problems with in-laws are listed within main reasons for
divorce (Alexy, 2007, p.181; Turğut, 2011).  
Parents and thus in-laws play an important role in spouse choices. This can be explained
through two factors. First, historically, the tradition of arranged marriages existed in both Turkey and
Japan as omiai in Japan and görücü usulü in Turkey. Families and parents played an important role in
the spouse selection process. Second, in both Turkey and Japan, marriage is more than a legal contract
between two individuals. Marriage is an institution that connects two families. It connects the kin of
the wife to the kin of the husband. And thus, parents come into the picture through this connection.
Children have their duties towards their parents and this is reflected in their spouse choices as well as
their married life in both Turkey and Japan. Although motives to get married as well as dynamics of
marriage have changed and have been modernized, in-laws still play an important role in marriage
decision making (Nakano, 2011, p.138).
One of the central characteristics of Japanese marriage is the depth of the in-laws involvement
in the couples’ married life, which becomes problematic in some international marriages (Edwards,
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1987). Family structures have changed and modernized in the past decades through the shift from ie
family system to nuclear families. However parents still intervene in their children’s marriage
decisions, especially in the case of daughters. In Japan, parents intervene in their child’s decision on
marriage either to protect them from having illegitimate children or for them to make comfortable
marriages. A comfortable marriage implies marriage with a person from a compatible social
background who could provide financial security and stability. However marrying up is discouraged in
Japan as social upward mobility through marriage was associated with unhappiness (Hertog, 2009;
Okano, 2009, p.208).
Traditional Japanese mothers-in-law could be very harsh on their daughters- in-law as they
instruct the brides on how to become good wives and wise mothers. This power of the mother-in-law
can be traced back to the old family system in which mothers-in-law were in charge of training new
brides to run the household (Lock, 1993, pp.95-99).
Structural Differences related to Marriage and Family
The most significant difference between these two countries is their birth rates. Over the past
decades the Japanese population has been shrinking rapidly. In 1947 an average women would have
4.5 children whereas this number dropped to 1.3 in 60 years (Holloway, 2010). Figure 2.2 from the
Statistics Bureau of Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2013) presents the comparison of Japan’s
past, near present and projected future population pyramids.
Figure 2.2 Japan’s Population Pyramid for 1950, 2007 and 2050
40
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2013.
This figure clearly portrays shifts in Japanese demographics. Although about 65 per cent of
the population was in the workforce in 2007, this is expected to fall to around 51.8 per cent in 2050.
The percentage of retirees, thus population over 65, is projected to rise from 21.5 per cent in 2007 to
39.6 per cent in 2050. This clearly portrays a disproportion between the number of retirees and
workers who are responsible for their pensions. The change in Japan’s age demographics has led to its
characterization as a hyper-aged society (Kawano, 2010, p.31). One of the important characteristics of
Japan’s aging society that differentiates it from other aging societies is its speed. Compared to other
countries with aging population, Japan’s change in demographics took place very rapidly. In
comparison, the emergence of an aging population took one hundred and thirty years in France, eighty
five years in Sweden and seventy years in the United States. The same process took only twenty five
years in the case of Japan (Lock, 1993, p.117). On top of this demographic change, Japan has the
longest life expectancy in the world which means the expense of pensions will also be longer in
comparison to other countries.
The Japanese population is decreasing mostly because Japanese people are neither getting
married nor having children as they used to. Consequently, the declining birth rate is resulting in an
aging society problem (Faier, 2009). As childrearing out of the wedlock is not common in Japan due
to the social stigma, dropping birth rate is the direct outcome of late and less marriages (Hertog, 2009).
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As has been explained in the previous section, family forming and child rearing are burdensome tasks
in Japan for both women and men. Furthermore, having a family brings about heavy economic
responsibilities that young Japanese are no longer willing to undertake, this was also touched upon
with reference to parasite singles at the beginning of this chapter (Takeda, 2011; Brinton, 2011, p.5;
Le Bail, 2011; Yamada, 1999).
The Japanese government has attempted to promote child rearing through government
policies such as The Angel Plan. Most recently, in 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a new
policy which has attracted more opposition than support (Iida, 2013). Abe has proposed a plan to
extend women’s childcare leave to three years but this was in contradiction with what was being
demanded in the first place: support for working mothers rather than isolating them from the
workforce. Latest survey conducted by the Labor Ministry found that only 2.63 percent of fathers took
childcare leave in fiscal year 2011, in stark contrast with 87.8 percent of mothers (Iida, 2013). These
numbers are high compared to a decade ago. According to the Japan Institute for Workers’ Evolution
the participation of men in childrearing and housework is not influenced by the flexibility of their
schedule and they tend to use their free time for leisure rather than household chores. Roberts (2002)
explains this through the gender role paradigm. When we look at the number of people who took
childcare leave only 49 per cent of eligible women took it whereas this number was only 0.12 per cent
amongst eligible men.
State intervention in dropping birth rate is somewhat similar in Turkey and Japan as policies
in both countries focus on making it more appealing for women to have children by giving them
longer childcare leave. This is a controversial topic as this type of policies is based on keeping women
away from the workforce rather than providing support while continuing working. In Japan,
companies offer fourteen weeks childcare leave and the Childcare Leave Law that came into effect in
1992 allows one year paid childcare leave for either the mother, the father or shared. In comparison to
other industrial countries Japan has good childcare services although other options such as employing
domestic workers, which is more common in the case of Turkey, are limited (Hertog, 2009, p.54;
Ogasawara, 1998).
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When we look at the case of Turkey, it is among the world’s 20 most populous countries,
just like Japan. It is number one in the Middle East and number two in Europe after Germany (Koç,
2007, p.35). One third of the population is under the age of 15 and Turkish people over the age of 65
constitute only 6 per cent of the population. The birth rate was around 5 children per woman in the
1970s whereas it has gone down to 2.2 in the 2000s. The birth rate shows significant regional variation
and is higher in the underdeveloped eastern part compared to the modernized west (Remez, 1998,
p.98). However the main difference with Japan’s case is the young population.
Figure 2.3. Turkey’s Population pyramid (left) compared with Japan’s Population Pyramid
(right), 2010
Source: Population Pyramid.net (De Wulf, 2010).
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Turkey’s population on the left has a thick base which reflects its sustainable birth rate and
young population. On the other hand, Japan’s population pyramid on the right has a narrow base
which suggests a small young population. It is clearly becoming narrower as the birth rate continues to
drop. When we look at the top of the pyramid, life expectancy in Japan is much higher compared to
Turkey. Therefore, the population dynamics of Turkey and Japan are very different.
Although Turkey’s birth rate of 2.2 is not low, when the average of 5 children in the 70’s or
even 7 children six decades ago is taken into account, it marks a steep decline. Dropping birth rate in
Turkey is explained by modernization and industrialization from the establishment of the republic
onwards. Children can no longer be used as laborers within agrarian families as schooling is
compulsory. Introduction of compulsory education makes it less profitable for families to have more
children as the cost of having children has gone up. Furthermore, women have joined the labor force
and are unlikely to have a third child mainly in order not to stay away from the work force too long.
Thus, the dropping birth rate is closely linked to shifting priorities of parents as outlined above as well
(Klaus, 2010). According to data provided by Turkey Demographic and Health Survey (Remez, 1998),
Turkish women who are educated for more than 11 years have fewer children. They have even fewer
children if they have a job that pays social security. Spouses’ choices are also influential, women who
have freedom to choose their spouses over arranged marriages have less children. In terms of spouse
choices, 26 per cent of marriages were arranged by spouses themselves, 54 per cent by the couple’s
families and 14 per cent without the bride’s consent.
The dropping birth rates in both Japan and Turkey are closely related to changes in approaches
to marriage as well as changing gender relations. There are both individual and structural
characteristics that effect spouse choices, (González-Ferrer, 2006). Marriage market constraints are
also important. Marriage has become serious business in Japan with the introduction of the term
konkatsu (Le Bail, 2011; Kitamura, 2010). There are constraints on spouse choices within the marriage
market due to the limited number of available spouses, this is an important factor that contributes to
the increase of transnational marriages (Kim, 2012; Thai, 2003). However, marriage dynamics change
when intercultural communication comes into the picture.
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Personal attributes, ability to understand, communication skills and optimism are important
factors in intercultural communication. However as conflict is considered as a natural part of intimate
relationships, conflicts may arise due to personal expectations from a marriage or due to gender
differences, the way men and women think (Allender & Longman, 2009; Oduro-Frimpong, 2007;
Tallman & Hsiao, 2004). The second section of this chapter elaborates on transnational marriages with
reference to problems underlined within the existing literature. These are cultural conflict, intercultural
communication and language barrier, expectations from marriage, gender relations and employment,
relations with in-laws, challenges of bicultural childrearing, sexuality, foreign spouses’ relations with
the host society and social class of foreign spouses.
Transnational Marriages
Globalization plays an important role in the formation of transnational families because it
has facilitated the interaction of people from different cultures through existing as well as newly
formed migration patterns. Thus, transnational marriages and the complexities these entail are best
explained under the framework of globalization, facilitation of people’s movement across borders and
the increased interaction of cultures resulting from it. Marriage is a social institution that is quite
complicated even for people born in and raised through the same socialization mechanisms and this
social institution becomes much more complex when it gains a transnational nature and involves two
geographically distant countries, with diverging cultures, customs and religious belief systems.
Intersection of Migration, Gender and Social Class
Patterns and dynamics of migration have changed through modernity and facilitation of
movement. Most immigrants express a willingness to go back to their home country although this is
not always an easy task to accomplish. In some cases they go back only to migrate to a third country
afterwards. Thus the process of migration has become very complex to study (Şenyürekli & Menjívar,
2012). Furthermore, migration flows have been transforming. Although labor migration used to be the
dominant trend, it was first complemented by family re-unification and then marriage migration
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(González-Ferrer, 2006). Immigrants bringing in spouses from their country of origin resulted in a
very high number of immigrants (Van Kerckem et al. 2013)
When we look at transnational marriages in the world, their studies are mostly area specific.
This means that themes that dominate transnational marriages in one area are less significant in other
areas. When we look at transnational marriages in Europe, the way gender relations are constructed
within different cultures as well as the social incorporation of foreign spouses into host societies stand
out as main themes. In addition to cultural differences, religion is an important factor, especially with
reference to Muslim minorities from Pakistan, Morocco, Turkey, Iran and so on. Kastoryano (2004)
elaborates on this topic with reference to Islam’s compatibility with the West and the ability to adopt
Western values. Thus, the literature is formulated around immigrants’ relations with the host society
and adaptation issues in the country of residence with reference to their religious differences.
Ideologically, Islam is perceived as a danger to Europe’s historical continuity. The irony within this
perception lies in the lack of unity or a common identity among Muslim immigrants residing in
Europe. Muslims residing in Europe show great variations in nationalities, sects and ethnic
groups (Kastoryano, 2004, p.1252). Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul (2008) argue that Islam in
Europe is problematized especially from the perspective of gender relations. To support their
argument, they refer to subordination of women through forced marriages, honor killings and forced
covering. These cultural traits of Islam lead to the questioning of Islam’s compatibility with western
values. However they also underline in their studies that this criticism of Islam itself is criticized by
Islamist migrant women who argue for the limitation of their freedom of faith by this attempt to
“Westernize” Muslims. One of the main problems in Muslim immigrants’ incorporation in Europe is
the equalization of good citizenship with “Europeanization”, disregarding diversity in Muslims
immigrants’ ethnic-national and religious backgrounds. These are reflected on immigrants’
transnational marriages as well; problems related to integration into the host society results in
vulnerability of marriage migrants (Merali, 2008).
There is a clear gender characteristic of migration in Europe; it has long been male
dominated and female migrants were often categorized under family re-unification and spouses as
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dependents. These female marriage migrants did not have legal rights to work upon arrival. In the
1970’s dependent spouses had to wait four years before they could apply for work permits (Kofman,
1999, p.271-8). However we see that this has changed in recent decades especially with reference to
marriage migration of females. Related to this nature of current migration settings, most marriage
migrants in the world are females (Thai, 2003). Thus, within the literature, the gendered nature of
marriage migration is highly emphasized. Within this framework, there is a tendency to equate women
to commodities and men to consumers. This literature is dominated by female narratives with
reference to their affective work (Kim, 2011). Constable comments on this situation as follows:
“Globalization does not simply result in greater commodification of intimate sexual, marital, and
reproductive relationships; it also offers opportunities for defining new sorts of relationships and for
redefining spaces, meanings, and expressions of intimacy that can transform and transgress
conventional gendered spaces and norms” (Constable, 2009, p.58).
There is a tendency to victimize female marriage migrants associated with affective work by
labeling them as commodities. It should be noted though that gender relations are being redefined by
new modes of interaction. For example, Chinese-Korean women pay their way into Korea by
marriages that are arranged through agencies (Kim, 2011). This change in dynamics implies that these
women have become consumers rather than being commodified. Thus, the creation of new niches
allows women to empower themselves. It is no longer just about men who migrate and women who
follow. Under this framework gender relations are important as changes in one gender category
inevitably cause changes in the other. Some researchers have elaborated on how gender relations
change when women migrate rather than men (George, 2005, Malik, 2012, Parreñas, 2001).
When elaborating on migration, the measurement of social class within countries as well as
at the international level is important but problematic. Thai (2003) studies highly educated women
from Vietnam getting married to Vietnamese men doing low wage work overseas. Although a well-
educated professional Vietnamese women might belong to the upper class in Vietnam, at the global
level she would rank low as Vietnam ranks low as a country in welfare. This projection of social class
based on country of origin is not limited to Vietnamese women as Filipina women face the same
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prejudice. However some immigrants are willing to undergo this downward social mobility; this is
linked to perceptions and idealization of the destination country as portrayed in cases of Pakistani and
Turkish spouses moving to Europe (Thai, 2003, Malik, 2012; Liversage, 2012).
Social class of the transnational family is also dependent on who migrates. The movement of
the family due to women has impact on the social class of the family and the position of the men in
particular. This is not in terms of the couples’ relations but how these migrant men are treated within
the host society (George, 2005; Malik, 2012). Under this framework, as George puts it, “gender and
social class are transformed and reproduced” both within the family and the host society. In some
cases, this change in gender relations itself might be the motivation for migration. Thai (2003) argues
that the willingness to escape traditional gender roles projected on them in the home country is an
important motivation for Vietnamese women to marry out even if it means downward social mobility
at the global level. Migration for the sake of escaping traditional gender roles is not new. Kelsky
(2001) references Japanese women’s escape from social pressures and hope for upward social mobility
through marriage with western men.
Once the migration has taken place, transnational families have to re-define themselves and
their cultures as an outcome of their interactions with governmental, institutional and social agencies
in the host society. Aihwa Ong frames this as cultural citizenship. This process has significant impact
on relations within families (Ong, 2003). Transnational families have different family dynamics. An
example of this difference is reflected through transnational motherhood; cases when the mother
departs abroad to provide for her child(ren) (Hondagneu-Sotelo & Avila, 1997; Parreñas, 2001). In
other cases couples might migrate leaving their children in the country of origin (Kofman, 2008). With
reference to who migrates, Parreñas (2001) attracts attention to economic power. As Liversage (2013)
points out: “This parallels the observation that women who earn more than their husbands may
themselves collude to break the customary link between earning power and power in domestic
decision-making processes to avoid such female power upsetting conventional notions of gender”.
Economy is an important factor to take into account for transnational families. Lyons and
Ford (2008)’s study on Singaporean men and Indonesian women portrays a different mode of
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marriage without cohabitation established on crossing borders without migrating. In their research
Lyons and Ford (2008) show different dynamics of couples not cohabiting mainly due to economic
factors. It should be noted that in their research the state’s regulations on immigration and citizenship
as well as perceptions of social class based on nationality are significant. Because of the difference in
cost of living it could be more practical for some couples, like these Singaporean - Indonesian couples,
not to cohabit. In terms of gender relations, in the particular group they study, men control the money
and have more power, and they decide when the couple meets or cohabits.
As outlined above, transnational families have various dynamics that come into play especially
with reference to the region these marriages take place, gender, economic power and culture. When
we look at transnational marriages, even the approach to meals and how a meal should be eaten can
become a cultural conflict for transnational couples (Ko, 2012). There are, however, some main topics
that are commonly outlined as problematic and these are elaborated upon in the next section.
Cultural Conflict and Marital Problems in Transnational Marriages
One of the challenges of conducting research on transnational marriages is differentiating
between cultural conflict and gender based conflict. There are gender based approaches to conflicts in
marriages. Christensen et al. (2006) have conducted research in Brazil, Italy, Taiwan and the US, in
their findings they argue that women tend to engage in conflict and demand it whereas men more often
withdraw. Men are more likely to be withdrawers from arguments compared to women. This is
explained by women being more likely to ask for change within the couples’ relationship. Topics that
are significant in terms of women’s demand for change are housework, childrearing and increased
intimacy (Christensen et al, 2006, p.1031). These findings are in line with previous research conducted
by Komter (1989) who also concluded that men tend to go silent in arguments. When we look at
transnational marriages and the impact of gender conflict, the main areas outlined as problematic are
as follows: intercultural communication and language barrier, cultural divergences in expectations
from a marriage, cultural definition of gender relations, social class and mobility, relations with
foreigner in-laws and challenges of bicultural childrearing.
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Intercultural communication and language barrier
Perceptions as well as the willingness to communicate play an important role in marriages. On
top of this, in transnational marriages, spouses’ prior knowledge about their respective cultures has an
impact on their marriages as it diminishes the amount of conflict they face. It also facilitates the way
they formulate solutions to their marital problems. Research has shown that mixing values in daily
routine helps transnational couples avoid conflict (Ko, 2012).
Language ability is an important aspect of communication. Foreign spouses who have a
language barrier in the host society not only face problems themselves but also project these on their
families (Ong, 2003). For foreigner spouses, difficulties caused by the lack of command of the
language in host society as well as not being able to understand the culture becomes problematic
(Piper, 1997). For their spouses, marrying a foreigner with a language barrier can be perceived as
burden. Especially if they were already well settled in the host society prior to marriage. It should be
noted however that research has shown that language barrier can be used by foreign spouses as an
excuse to avoid responsibilities (Ko, 2012).
Furthermore, in cases of families living all together or closely with kin, this leads to a
language deficit. If they speak their mother tongue at home and socialize mostly with their own kind,
they have difficulties learning the language of the host country (Crul & Doomernik. 2003; Ogelman,
2003).
Expectations from marriages
Expectations and motivations of spouses for marriage could be problematic if they are
incompatible. This aspect becomes especially complicated in cases of transnational marriages as there
are two cultures at play. The couple is more likely to face problems if they have different expectations
from a marriage based on their own cultural or religious background. Cases of Chinese and Filipina
spouses in Japan reflect their disappointment in love, and not growing in their marriage through time
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as they had hoped (Le Bail, 2011; Liu-Farrer, 2010). The cases of some women were even worse as
domestic violence was a problem in some of these families (Piper, 1997; p.330).
When we look at cases in Europe, there is an abundant amount of literature on compatibility of
marriages with Muslims. The literature on marriages between Muslims and westerners are dominated
by the view of incompatibility of the ways in which family, marriage and gender roles are defined in
Islam and in European values. Inglehart and Norris (2009, p.14)’s work has re-affirmed this cultural
gap in areas of religiosity, sexuality and gender.
Gender relations and employment
In patriarchal societies men are encouraged to bring in the money as husbands and fathers
while wives are homemakers (Ko, 2012). However there are different mechanisms of setting the
balance of power within the household, especially in a transnational one. Gender relations within the
family show great variety according to spouse’s cultures as well as the family’s migration process.
Migration patterns are gendered, women migrate mostly for care work, social reproduction, welfare
and social professions whereas men constitute the majority of highly skilled migrants (Kofman, 2008,
p.72). Regardless of which spouse migrates, the availability of work for the other spouse influences
relations within the family. Kofman (2008) gives the example of Europe with reference to how the
labor market is constructed as most females work mostly in the civil service. This implies that
professional women who migrate due their husbands’ work could face barriers in finding work
depending on the labor market of the destination country. This argument is valid for males as well as
females depending on which spouse migrates first (George, 2005).
In terms of gender roles and housework, research in diverse countries in Europe and in Asia
has shown that women do the housework regardless of whether they work or not (Tachibanaki, 2010;
George, 2005; Komter, 1989, p.197). Women want change in this area which burdens them with the
“second shift” (George, 2005) obliging them to do housework after they come back from work. Their
second shift is the housework.
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Relations with in-laws
Family plays an important role in marriage decision making and this trend has been shown to be
especially strong for some migrant groups (Kalter & Schroedter, 2010). The involvement of parents is
not limited to the marriage decision making process only. In-laws may intervene in the couples’
childrearing process as well (Takeshita, 2007). In some cases, a spouse’s close family ties could be
disturbing for the other spouse (Bacas, 1994).
The main reason why immigrants’ parents intervene in their children’s marriage decisions
with foreigners is because marriage is perceived as an important factor in permanent settlement. Those
who bring in relatives and who marry someone from the host society are more likely to settle down
(Khoo 2003; Jensen & Pedersen 2007; Şenyürekli & Menjívar, 2012). Family plays a two-sided role in 
the decision to go back to the country of origin. On the one hand there are worries about aging parents
in the home country whereas on the other hand there are children who grew up in the host society.
Immigrants worry about caring for their elderly but they also worry about their children’s adaptation
problems upon their return so this is a two-edged sword for most immigrants (Şenyürekli & Menjívar, 
2012, p.10). That is why kin relations play an important role in some immigrant’s spouse choices
(Charsley, 2012; Van Kerckem et al, 2013).
Relations with in-laws in the host society are somewhat less problematic. Language barrier
and intercultural communication difficulties could become problems (Piper, 1997). But they might
also be used to an advantage to avoid communication. In some cases, if kinship relations are different
and less demanding, this might become an advantage for foreign spouses. Some kinship relations
emphasize power relations and obligations whereas others do not (Ko, 2012).
In economic terms, the issue of remittances could cause problems for the family. On the one
hand it might cause problems among the couples if one spouse does not want to send back remittances
(Liversage, 2012). On the other hand, if the couple send remittances, this might cause social inequality
between them and their kin and thus impact their family relations (Thai, 2003).
Challenges of bicultural childrearing
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When we look at childrearing in marriages, it is an important issue among couples in terms of
power relations. It is one of the areas that most women want change. The demand for change in
sharing childrearing duties is stronger from upper class women who do not work. Lower classes have
a tendency to abide by their traditional patriarchal roles (Komter, 1989, p.198)
Childrearing is an important source of problems for transnational couples and areas in which
problems arise are much more diversified. Problems start even before the child is born, at the naming
process. Each spouse sees the child as a member of their own culture and wants to re-affirm it in
society through the naming (Bacas, 1994).
Once the child is born, schooling choices are negotiated in families. Some spouses might want
to provide higher intellectual standards to their children whereas the other spouse might not be as
insistent (Le Bail, 2012). Furthermore, some spouses might insist on re-locating their children to
another country for the sake of cultural education, (Takeshita, 2007). In terms of cultural education,
even kin might intervene in couples’ education choices. This shows great diversity from culture to
culture.
In bicultural childrearing language education is used not only for communication but also as a
means to preserve identity. There are, however, cases of preference of English as a second language
over the native language. This reflects the hierarchy of values inherent in the socio-cultural image of
advanced nations versus developing nations (Takeshita, 2010). In terms of how multi-layered identity
and feelings of belongingness are formed, Fry (2007) comments that: “Parents are considered to be
gatekeepers at the cultural boundary” (Fry, 2007, p.145).
Research has shown that the academic success of migrant children is dependent on the child’s
effort, community social capital and family support. Social class matters as well, as research shows
that upper class immigrants’ children studied less but expected more. In terms of gender, girls
performed better than boys (Wu, Tsang & Min, 2014).
Research has shown that educational achievement of migrant children is low in Europe. This
is in contradiction with some of the literature on bicultural childrearing in Asia, as outlined above.
When we look at the case of lowly skilled laborers in Europe we see that their social class is
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reproduced by their children in most cases. In numbers, although university education for Dutch
people was 32 per cent, it was only 5 per cent for Turkish immigrants’ children in 1998 (Crul &
Doomernik, 2003, p.1046). The low level of schooling is also caused by the perception that education
is unimportant for Turkish females. In this sample, one quarter of Turkish females under the age of 21
were already married. Turkish immigrant parents in Europe preferred marrying their daughters early to
avoid any gossip or shame that might be brought on the family (Crul & Doomernik, 2003, p.1053).
However, recently this trend has been changing as some of these early marriages have resulted in
divorce and brought shame on the family, thus the emphasis has shifted from early marriage to
schooling.
Sexuality
Sexuality within couples is an important topic. Research on married life in the Netherlands has
reaffirmed less frequency of sexual relations after long years of marriage. Sexuality is mostly
formulated around men’s needs and desires but there is dissatisfaction and demand for change from
both genders and social classes. However, what men want is different from what women want in terms
of change. In terms of couples’ social class, upper middle class men whose wives do not work are the
most dissatisfied. Women from lower classes perceive sex as a duty to meet their husband’s sexual
needs whereas women from higher social classes do not (Komter, 1989).
Research focusing on sexuality in transnational marriages remains relatively limited although
the topic comes up in research that focuses on other aspects of marriages such as extramarital affairs
or identity formation of foreign spouses (Liu-Farrer, 2010; Faier, 2009). Sexuality also has cultural
marks. While sexuality of transnational marriages is formulated around sexless marriages in the
Japanese case, the focus is on sexual liberalization in Europe.
Preferences in sexuality have been outlined as a problematic topic for Muslim immigrants in
Europe with reference to support for sexual liberalization. Factors that reinforced sexual liberalization
of immigrants are education, employment and income. Within Muslim immigrants themselves there
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was a large group that opposed sexual liberalization. This group consisted of older generations,
married people, men and religious members of the community (Inglehart & Norris, 2009, p.17).
In line with this argument for sexual liberalization coming from the Europeans, there is also
Muslim prejudice on non-Muslims as being sexually loose. This is projected especially on women
who have converted as a result of their marriages (Kudo, 2007). Some foreigner women married to
Muslim men carry the stigma of being sexually loose if they converted only prior to marriage.
Foreign spouses’ relations with the host society
Marriage migrants’ expectations on the destination country are important. Kim (2011), Malik
(2012) and Thai (2003) have shown that both male and female marriage migrants fantasize about the
prospect destination country prior to their marriage and move. These researchers have revealed that
idealization about the new life that awaits these migrants is often crushed by harsh reality conditions
by Pakistani husbands in Britain or Korean-Chinese wives in South Korea.
When we look at the case of Europe, many immigrants in Europe live in closed
communities; they keep close ties with their families back home, and are better informed on news in
their country of origin compared to local news. Some immigrants are more in-group oriented
compared to others and prefer living within their community and preserving their traditions (Crul &
Doomernik, 2003, p.1042). This cannot be explained by religious differences. When we look at
Muslim groups, although the Turkish community in the Netherlands is in-group oriented, their
Moroccan counterparts in both Netherlands and Belgium have better adapted to their host societies.
There are strong gendered patterns as well, as women have adapted better.
When we look at how foreign spouses are perceived by the host society, in the case of Asia
and Japan in particular, foreigners are usually associated with illegal immigration and high levels of
crime. Illegal immigrants from poorer countries are often perceived as a risk because of their potential
to engage in criminal acts if they are unemployed, dissatisfied or hungry. In terms of health, there is a
high number of female workers from Thailand and Philippines in the sex-entertainment industry and
they are often accused of causing the rise of AIDS (Sellek, 1994). Cullinane (2007) re-affirms that
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AIDS is approached as a foreign disease. The association of diseases with foreigners is even portrayed
in condom commercials for men traveling abroad (Miller, 2002).
Social class of foreign spouses
It should be noted that within all these areas that have been underlined as problematic in
transnational families, social class plays an important role. Mathews (2000) argues that social class is
important because our cultural choices are limited by our social environment. The social environment
we live in requires us to choose what is acceptable and appropriate (Mathews, 2000, p.22). Kofman
points out that there are clear distinctions made depending on whether immigrants are skilled or lesser
skilled, legal or illegal (Kofman, 2008, p.73).
Kofman (2008) gives the example of Filipina domestic workers in Europe as the most
valuable immigrant workers due to their Christian upbringing, English proficiency and educations. On
the other hand Albanians or Moroccans are more vulnerable and consequently have less bargaining
power with their employers (Kofman, 2008, p.69). Social class on the whole plays an important role in
acceptance into host societies so skilled migrants are preferred and thus advantaged.
Beyond the social class of immigrants, their social positions could be devaluated, especially
in the case of female marriage migrants (Le Bail, 2011). This is closely linked to the gap between the
social class of the immigrant and their perceived social class by the host society. Piper (2007, p.324-4)
links the migration patterns of women to socio-economic backgrounds and emphasizes the impact of
their social class on their marriage in terms of how it can put them in a disadvantaged position. Along
similar lines, Suzuki (2005, p.162-6) elaborates on how Filipina brides in Japan are being victimized
and even labeled as imported brides who marry Japanese men who were unable to marry. The
discourse that Suzuki and Piper both oppose to is formulated under a colonial framework. It places the
Philippines below Japan in a global setting and considers these women as subordinates of Japanese
women because they entered marriages that the Japanese women have rejected. One of the reasons this
research has many references to Filipina brides in Japan is the structural placing of both Turkey and
the Philippines as countries that score lower than Japan in the global economy. Cross-national social
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class classification outlined above labels Filipina women below their “liberated” western counterparts.
This approach disregards their freedom of choice and ignores the fact that those who migrate are not
the poorest of the poor (Nakamatsu, 2003).
These discussions on cross-cultural social class compatibility are debated over by other
marriage migrant groups as well. Kudo (2007) elaborates on this problem with reference to Pakistani
husbands from the middle class in Pakistan who do low-skilled laborer work in Japan. In such cases
there is upward social mobility at the state level in moving to a country with higher living standards,
however, there is also downward mobility at the individual level as the middle class man become a
low-skilled laborer in a foreign country.
Social class and conservatism are also closely linked. When we look at studies on marriages
with Muslim migrants in Europe, cultural conflict is emphasized. However most of these marriage
migrants are from lower classes and more conservative in religious terms. When we look at the studies
on psychological well-being of spouses, researchers conclude that the main conflicts in these
marriages are not based on cultural differences. This is also linked to the availability of resources to
these couples as social class of the family has an impact on couples’ leisure times and socialization
processes (Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000). While upper classes do not have time for leisure activities, lower 
classes do not have the money (Komter, 1989, p.202). The social class of the family and thus the
availability of resources influence their relationship.
Chapter III - Methodology
This chapter will present the overall methodology used for this research throughout the
fieldwork as well as the writing process. The chapter starts with an introduction of the interviewer,
myself. It is then followed by three headings that present details on when, where and how the field
research was conducted. This chapter also presents a glimpse of the data under participant observation
section. Three groups that I have conducted participant observation with and their dynamics are
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explained under this section. I outline elements used to calculate interviewees’ social classes under
each heading. The classification I use for social class is in line with the social class section under the
literature review in Chapter Two.
Researcher
I found many things about my own life in this research because I come from a transnational
family in two different meanings. Firstly, although both my parents are Turkish I grew up in a
transnational family and had already lived in four countries by the age 12. We moved often due to my
father’s work. Secondly, I am now in a transnational marriage with a Japanese man and have a
bicultural child.
My initial transnational identity was formed during my childhood, marked by moving back
and forth between Turkey and Europe. I started kindergarten in Germany, then continued in Turkey. I
started primary school in England where my parents taught me how to read and write in Turkish at
home. I was in Turkey for the following four years after which we moved to Belgium. I went to
middle school in Belgium for three years and attended a French Catholic school although both my
parents are Muslim. Turks living in Europe have very close in-group relations that often prevent them
from incorporating into the host society. The situation in Belgium was no different. My father was in
charge of making my education decisions and when he found out about the schooling situation of
other Turkish expatriates, he made sure there were no Turks at the school I attended. Although we
lived in the same apartment building with other Turkish expatriates, I did not socialize with them as
most of my friends were from my school and thus foreigners rather than Turks. Thus, I had an unusual
schooling and socialization period for a Turkish child in Europe.
My unusual socialization period has provided both advantages and disadvantages for this
research. I was and perhaps still am both an insider and an outsider to the Turkish community. I did
not seek to socialize with Turkish people in particular after my arrival in Japan but entered various
groups for the sake of this research. This was an advantage as it allowed me to separate socialization
from research. It was however a disadvantage as I did not have access to all social groups due to my
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social class, religiosity and gender. Due to my social class I did not have much access to lower social
classes. Not being a religious person limited my access to religious groups. In terms of gender
relations, my divorce from a Turkish man and second marriage to a Japanese man have surely affected
my image within the community.
When I had first arrived in Japan and started research I was married to a Turkish man who
resided in Turkey. The first year of my research was marked by my divorce negotiations which was
known in the Turkish community in Japan. This influenced my image in the community. I assume that
I was perceived as very liberal in terms of lifestyle. I might have been perceived as sexually loose
since I was a divorcee. The issue of virginity and its reflection on divorcees as being more easily
accessible sexually will be elaborated upon under the section of “Participant observation with low
skilled laborers” under this chapter. My gender and divorcee identity have prevented me from
obtaining rich data from this group within the Turkish community in Japan.
I got married to my Japanese husband in 2012. My marriage and taking on the name Igarashi
has had a very positive impact on my research within the community. This allowed me easier access to
some Turkish groups. I was more welcomed than when I was a simple divorcee and Ph.D. student
because my marriage implied that I was in Japan to stay, just as most of these people were. There was
a difference between students and spouses as students were perceived as temporary whereas spouses
were perceived as permanent.
As the researcher I always encouraged my interviewees to express their views freely without
worrying about being judged. I allowed them to ask me questions about my private life as well. I
shared the following information about myself with my interviewees upfront: I am a Turkish Ph.D.
student around thirty years old. I have previously lived abroad during my childhood which made my
upbringing a bit more unusual than the average Turkish child. I come from a middle class family with
a mixture of conservatism and liberalism. At the beginning of my research I also shared with my
interviewees that I was previously married to a Turkish man, if the topic came up. The topic did not
come up after I got re-married.
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In terms of my Turkish social class, my mother’s kin has lower social class and are more
religious. My father’s kin has slightly higher social class, they are conservative but not religious. My
mother performs religious rituals to the extent that she can but much less than her kin. My father does
not perform any religious ritual, I cannot recall him ever being to a mosque. I have one brother,
although we grew up in the same family and lived in the same countries, my brother is more religious
than I am. I did not practice any Muslim rituals except those regarding my son. My son has had a
religious ceremony for his naming and a prayer after birth for him to live a long life in good health. He
has not been circumcised as my husband feared he might be discriminated against in a Japanese school.
As a family we occasionally visit shrines for events such New Year or my pregnancy. We visit my
husband’s family grave few times a year. Our religiosity as a family is limited to rituals for our son
and my husband’s superstitions.
Field Research
Field research was conducted between September 2009 and October 2013 in Turkey and
Japan. This dissertation relies mostly on the data collected from couples living in the greater Tokyo
area. Some couples from Turkey were initially included in the research. The full list of interviewees
given in Appendix I provides details on country of residence, nationality, gender, years of marriage,
number of children, education level and employment status.
I started field research from 2009 onwards. Most initial interviews were conducted between
2009 and 2011 whereas follow-up interviews were conducted between 2011 and 2013. Participant
observation data was collected from September 2009 through October 2013. The research includes an
interview with the Envoy and Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Japan as well. The Secretary at the
Turkish Embassy has been at that post for about two decades and handles marriage paperwork.
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The Statistical Data
Most of the statistical data used in the research were obtained online from ministries in
Turkey and Japan. Data on Turkey was obtained through Family and Social Services under the
Ministry of Family and Social Policies, Turkish Statistical Institute, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Demography and Citizenship Institute and Turkish Embassy in Tokyo. Data on Japan was obtained
through Ministry of Communications, Statistics Bureau, Director-General for Policy Planning,
Statistical Standards & Statistical Research and Training Institute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice.
The Qualitative Data
The qualitative data used in this dissertation were obtained through interviews and
participant observation. One-on-one, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 45
spouses and two Turkish Embassy employees in total. In order to prevent any tension, argument or
misunderstanding between spouses I have insisted on interviewing each spouse separately. Four
couples resisted and were interviewed together. Out of these four couples, two spouses had second
interviews, one-on-one. In the first case during the couple’s interview, when the husband had briefly
left the room the Japanese wife expressed not being able to speak freely in front of her husband. Thus
we later arranged a one-on-one interview. The second couple’s case was more complicated as they had
many disagreements during the interview. I changed the subject every time tension got high as they
would start raising their voices and speak at the same time. This was the least productive interview as I
had to avoid many topics. Fortunately, in this case as well I had the opportunity to interview the
Turkish husband one-on-one later.
Interviews took from forty-five minutes to six hours, depending on the different life stories.
Each took about ninety minutes on average. Most interviews were conducted at coffee shops or
restaurants whereas some were conducted at interviewees’ homes. Follow-up interviews and
participant observation were conducted with couples that form the core of this dissertation research.
The longest interview was Mehmet’s. He shared details of his marriage with me for six hours. On the
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day of the interview we met up at a coffee shop for coffee in the afternoon, and then had a light lunch
after he confessed not having eaten that day. I had all the data I needed at the end of our lunch but he
insisted on going for a drink and so we did.
Couples included in the research were contacted and chosen by snowball sampling. I started
out by interviewing couples I already knew. Personal connections and introductions from mutual
friends led me from one interviewee to another. When I realized my sample lacked diversity I started
recruiting couples through other means such as receptions at the Turkish Embassy or cultural events in
Tokyo. Since the size of the Turkish community in Japan is relatively small and news travels fast I
soon became a semi-famous researcher in the community. I had an interviewee come up to me in
person asking to be interviewed.
The language used during data collection showed variation according to preferences of
interviewees and the setting. In most cases it ended up being a mixture of Turkish, Japanese and
English, especially in cases when a word had a loaded meaning in a particular language that could not
be translated directly. Within chapters these words are inserted in the original language and then
explained in English.
At the beginning of each interview I handed out a questionnaire to my interviewees to fill out
(see Appendix II). These forms allowed me to have written personal information on my interviewees
that I kept in a folder. But more importantly this gave me a few minutes to break the ice and make
small conversation before we began our interview. This was particularly useful in cases where I did
not know the spouse prior to the interview.
I conducted and transcribed all interviews by myself. A digital voice recorder was used in
order not to interrupt or distract interviewees. Although I avoided taking written notes in front of my
interviewees, the voice recorder, my folders, notebook and pen were always placed on the table to re-
affirm my identity as a researcher collecting data. I transcribed all interviews soon after they were over
and completed them with notes on the couple in general and their interviews in particular. My notes
included how and when we were introduced as well as the interviewees’ general attitude, mimics and
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facial expressions during the interview. These were included in notes as they could not be understood
through a voice recorder.
I am grateful to all my interviewees who have open-heartedly shared details of their private
lives, even information not known to their spouses. I have carefully avoided talking to my
interviewees about their spouse’s interviews. I did my best in being cautious throughout the research
and during the writing process to protect their identities. At some points I have refrained from giving
too much information on interviewees for the sake of protecting their privacies. This was to avoid
gossip circulation within the community which has been the main limitation of this research.
Pseudonyms are used in this dissertation instead of interviewees’ real names. In each chapter the first
time a pseudonyms is used, it is followed by the interviewee’s age and a combination of two letters
such as “JF”, “JM”, “TF” or “TM”. The first letter refers to the interviewee’s nationality, as “J” for
Japanese or “T” for Turkish. Whereas the second letter refers to the interviewee’s gender, such as “F”
for female or “M” for male. For example “Mehmet (33, TM)” indicates that the interviewee Mehmet
is a 33 years old Turkish Male.
Participant Observation
When we look at the number of Turks in Japan, there were 3,083 Turks legally registered at
municipalities in 2013. The Turkish Embassy workers estimate the total number of Turks to be around
6000 when illegal immigrants are taken into account. Table 3.1 shows that both the number of Turks
legally entering Japan as well as the number of legal residents has more than doubled since year 2000.
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Table 3.1 Number of Turkish citizens entering Japan and Number of legally registered Turkish
residents 2000-2013
Years Number of Turks entering
Japan
Number of Turks registered at
municipalities
2000 5003 1194
2001 4313 1424
2002 6566 2054
2003 7101 2309
2004 7254 2407
2005 7577 2275
2006 8849 2264
2007 8,654 2366
2008 10,501 2466
2009 8,679 2452
2010 10,784 2547
2011 7,587 2513
2012 11,489 2528
2013 13,470 3083
Source: Japanese Ministry of Justice, 2014
Interviews have revealed that the Turkish community in Japan is divided into smaller groups
classified mostly through social class, gender and religiosity. In order to learn more about these social
groups separately from each other, I have attended various regular and irregular meetings to do
participant observation. I made sure everyone at these events knew I was doing research on Turkish–
Japanese couples. In the end I decided to focus on three groups that I found most fruitful. These
groups were selected in accordance with the division within the Turkish community in Tokyo. As
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outlined above, social circles were formulated according to gender and social class and these rarely
mixed. Categories for the intersection gave me four categories as follows;
Table 3.2 Categories of Turks in Japan based on social class and gender
Lower social class males Lower social class females
Middle and Higher social class males Middle and Higher social class females
I did not differentiate between middle class and upper social classes because these had the
tendency to socialize together. Thus, they formed one group. I ended up focusing on three of these
groups because I have not encountered many females from lower social classes during my research.
The ones that I did encounter were not in transnational marriages in the sense this research defines it,
as they had Turkish spouses. These marriages were in line with dominant research on Turks in Europe
who prefer to bring in spouses from Turkey (Crul & Doomernik, 2003, Liversage, 2012).
Consequently, I have focused on the remaining three groups and carried on participant observation
with these.
In terms of defining social class, there is a gender based difference. For men, I take into
account their social background in Turkey, their education level and income level. The classification
of females’ social classes is more problematic. The problem lies within defining to what extent their
husbands’ social class matters. There are different ways of defining females’ class according to
whether they work or not. If they do not work there are two choices. Since there will be no income, the
social class of the husband could be considered as her social class, or it could be evaluated on the basis
of her own family background and education level. If the female does work there are still two more
choices with reference to the husband’s social class. Her social class could either be defined according
to her own income and education level or according to her husband’s if he is from a higher social class.
In my research I adopt the latter. The spouse with higher social class determines the social class of the
family.
I included low skilled laborers but focused mostly on middle and upper middle class Turks.
Regarding my groups of middle and upper middle class Turks, the first group is composed of Turkish
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women married to Japanese men and the second is composed of Turkish men married to Japanese
women. All members in these two groups also have middle or upper middle classes families in Turkey.
They come from diverse regions in Turkey: the east, the west, the middle and northern parts. However
their families are urban and none has come from a small village. Their social class in Turkey was
determined through the combination of a few factors. First, the occupation of their parents that also
provided rough ideas about their incomes. Secondly, their education background in Turkey. Thirdly,
their income in Turkey if they had previously worked there.
All interviewees in these two groups of middle and upper middle class Turks had university
degrees and some had graduate degrees. At this point it is important to note that these two groups were
not dominated by spouses who had initially come to Japan as students and this was not about their
transition from studentship to spouse. Some had attended schools in Japan however those did not
compose the majority. In the case of Turkish females, most had migrated to Japan due to their
husbands’ work, only one had already been living here when she met her husband.
Although most spouses were fluent and literate in Japanese I did not take this as an indicator.
It might have been a useful indicator if they were from middle or lower social classes however those
from higher classes who were not fluent in Japanese did not need to. This was neither due to their
employment in a strict niche nor was it due to their reliance on their Japanese spouses. Those few
interviewees who were not fluent worked at either international corporations or organizations and thus
did not use Japanese in their work. They did not rely much on their spouses because their corporations
were meeting most of their needs related to Japan. In their private lives their wives managed the
household however they bore this role as housewives rather than as having dependent husbands. They
did not show any difference compared to other spouses who were fluent in Japanese. These
interviewees communicated with their spouses in English. There were two Turkish females who were
not fluent in Japanese but neither they nor their husbands expressed any dependency. They somehow
managed to work things out on their own to the extent of finding part-time work themselves. In this
respect there was no vulnerability of foreign spouses within the host society contrary to the existing
literature on dependent spouses (Merali, 2008; George, 2005; Ong, 2003).
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The third group of participant observation was a group of low skilled laborers. I will start
this section from the third group as it has been the most problematic one for this research not in terms
of defining their social class but in terms of my interactions with them as a female divorcee researcher.
When I first started my research, I was interested in visa marriages of Turkish low skilled
laborers in Japan. With the assumption of a high percentage of them making visa marriages, I wanted
to look at the dynamics in their marriages as well as their married life styles. I was interested in
finding out their motives and priorities in their marriages, what these couples invested in their
marriages and what they have gained from it. My initial research questions have changed and evolved
for two main reasons. Firstly, after an overview of the literature on marriage migration I realized that
my initial questions were limited by my biased approach to marriage in general. Motives for marriage
and the definition of how married life should be show great variation depending on gender, social
class, religiosity and cultural upbringing. Secondly, my interactions with low skilled laborers were not
as productive as I wished it to be and I faced some limitations to conduct more research with them.
These limitations are outlined in detailed in the next section.
Participant Observation 1: Low Skilled Laborers
Turkish low skilled laborers in Japan come from diverse ethnic groups. The group that I
observed was dominated by Kurdish members. Although there are no official numbers, Kurdish
people are assumed to constitute about 20% of Turkey’s population. They live mostly in the Eastern
less developed parts of Turkey. Kurdish people constitute an oppressed minority in Turkey with
limited cultural rights. Kurds have a negative image due to the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK,
which has carried armed conflict against the Turkish state for several decades now. There is a high
number Kurds who apply for asylum to Japan. In 2013, 17% of all asylum seekers who applied to
Japan were Turks with a high proportion of Kurds who hold Turkish citizenship.
Most of the members of this social group belong to this oppressed minority and have
migrated from less developed parts of the country, small villages and slums. I could not gather
information on their family backgrounds in Turkey. None of the members in this group had university
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degrees though some had graduated from technical high schools. These men were irregular workers
who often switch between jobs but remain in Japan either illegally or through their spouse visas. There
were a few young members who were still on tourist visas when I met them and they were still
puzzled about their future options.
Their meeting point is in Shinjuku in central Tokyo. Although there is no precise invitation
or scheduled event, they all gather at the same pub in Shinjuku every Friday from the afternoon until
late at night. Those who can make it earlier get there as early as possible to make the most of the
happy hour. If they get there very early, they tend to be tipsy as early as around 7-8 p.m. in the
evening. I became aware of their meeting point by chance. On a Friday night an Australian friend
called me to say that there were some Turkish men in the bar he went to that evening. Being a very
social person, he was at first enthusiastic to talk to them. After all he had a few Turkish friends and
had been to Turkey himself. He hesitated after observing them for a while and then changed his mind.
He noticed that they socialized in a different way than I or other Turkish people he knows. These men
were mostly shouting around in Turkish and they switched to Japanese or English only when they
wished to flirt with Japanese women around them. He noticed there were a few Japanese women at
their table as well but he could not figure out their relationship. He commented that these women did
not seem to talk or understand Turkish and were more preoccupied with their phones than the men
around them. This puzzled him. Why were these women sitting at their table? What kind of
relationship did they have with these men? This is how my friend described the situation to me, live
from the bar that night.
After this initial hint on where I could start my research, I headed over to the bar my friend
had mentioned on another Friday evening. I chose not to go there alone for two reasons. First of all, I
feared the group might shut me off if I showed up with a recorder and asked for interviews right away.
Thus, I arranged to go with another Turkish female friend to facilitate my socialization with the group.
Secondly, I did not want to be on my own at a bar, interacting with a large group of Turkish men who
had been drinking.
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Our socialization was easier than I had expected. When we entered the relatively spacious
bar, we must have stood out as two foreigner girls. Soon after we sat at a table, a man from the group
came over to flirt with us in his broken English. Although his approach was disturbing this saved me
further effort to approach the group. We were soon warmly welcomed to their table. The group of men
was acting very friendly towards us at the beginning. Several of them even shyly expressed not having
been in contact with young Turkish women for years. It somehow excited them that we were both
Turkish and women. Unfortunately their attitudes changed after a few more drinks. The dose of what
they would call flirting and what we would call sexual harassment gradually increased. I left the bar
defeated but determined to go back with new strategies.
I went to the same pub three more times in the following weeks and managed to get a few
phone numbers and set up two interviews. The dose of their flirting increased if they had drinks and
became relaxed. I was trying to change the setting of our interactions from bar to coffee shop. I was
hoping this would solve the sexual harassment problem but they were insistent on meeting in bars. I
managed to conduct an in-depth interview with only one of them, Mehmet (33, TM). Our interview
started at a coffee shop, continued over a late lunch and inevitably ended in a bar.
Unfortunately the second interview had to be cancelled. The situation of this man was very
interesting; he had just lost his spouse visa through a divorce which had rendered him illegal in Japan.
He was co-habiting with his Korean girlfriend and trying to figure out ways to stay in Japan. We
agreed to meet in the evening on a weekday for the interview as he said he might have work during the
day. On the day of the interview he called me in the afternoon saying he would rather meet late at
night. I was puzzled as to how he was going to catch his last train if we met so late. He then explained
that it would be best to have the interview at my apartment and for him to stay over. At that time I
lived in a one-room, six-tatami apartment but he expressed having no problems with that. That marked
the end of our conversation. I later heard from other members that he had fled to Okinawa but I do not
know what happened to him afterwards. I could not help but think all his problems could be readily
solved if he could marry his Korean girlfriend who had permanent residency.
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The second potential interviewee’s attitudes towards me, the researcher can be analyzed
through sexuality and gender relations in Turkey. While virginity is an important topic in Turkish
society, this interviewee’s approach to me was based on his mindset formulated around centrality of
virginity. First of all, being a divorcee implied that I was not a virgin and thus easier to access sexually
compared to virgins. Secondly, I was living abroad on my own and frequented bars, which for them
implied that I had looser moral values. They frequented bars as well however this did not have any
implication on their moral values as men. These were in line with the existing literature on spouse
choices and gender relations of Turks as well as other Muslim groups residing abroad.
In terms of language abilities, most of them were somewhat fluent in Japanese and could
communicate in English at the very basic level. They had learned Japanese through their daily lives in
Japan and interactions at bars. This limited their Japanese language ability to the simple conversation
form and they did not use polite language in their conversations with Japanese people. The most
interesting aspect of their use of language was how they literally translated some Turkish sayings into
Japanese. In one instance, one of these men wanted to flirt with the young women at the next table. He
first looked at her for a while and then went over and said; “Namae nan dake?” I was surprised as
much as the girl was when I first heard this sentence. He had used this as an introduction line instead
of hajimemashite. Then I heard this several times from other group members. Although this sentence
does not make much sense as an introduction sentence in Japanese, it is in fact a direct translation of
the Turkish line “Adınız neydi?” into Japanese. This is a polite form of starting introductions in
Turkish and thus the equivalent of Hajimemashite. Their approach to women does seem to have paid
off as most of the men in this group had Japanese wives and held spouse visas. Though they held visas,
none had stable work. When I asked them which line of work they were in, most of them expressed
doing whatever they can when the opportunity arose. There were few who were in the kebab business.
These men often complained about the Japanese police preventing them from selling kebabs illegally.
I ran into some members of this group at random events around Tokyo where they were selling kebabs
from a minivan. I do not know if they had been through the legal process or not. I once ran into one of
them at a reception organized at the Turkish Embassy and he was once again in charge of the kebab.
70
Some of these men were involved in more suspicious illegal work, and they avoided talking about
their line of work altogether. All I could gather about their occupation was that they traveled overseas
often and that some of these men were not allowed to enter Turkey for political reasons.
There was a hierarchy among the men in this group. This could be closely related to the line
of work they were in. Their age played an important role in their ranking as well as younger men
ranked lower. This hierarchy became clear on my second participant observation with the group. By
chance, a Turkish man that I had briefly met at another setting joined the group that evening. He was
surprised to see me in the group as much as I was surprised to see him. His presence in the group as
well as his interactions with other members made me realize the hierarchy. He seemed to hold a high
position in the group. They referred to him by his first name followed by ağbi which literally means
older brother in Turkish. This term culturally denoted respect and affection towards an older man who
has higher social ranking. I will refer to him as Baran. I do not have him listed in Appendix I because
he refrained from providing any personal data.
Baran had been in Japan for more than a decade and had been through a few marriages
himself. He did not want to talk about his marriages in particular but he confessed helping low skilled
laborers get married for a spouse visa. He currently holds a permanent residency that he obtained
through marriage. When I told him about my research and asked for an interview he sounded eager to
help out and he expressed his belief that this research would be useful for Turkish men who arrive in
Japan. I asked for an interview several times in person and through e-mails. Somehow he seemed
eager but would refrain from providing a date on the pretext of his work load. When I insisted, he
offered to have an interview at his office, doors locked so that “no one would disturb us”. This
somehow did not sound very reassuring. I tried to arrange an interview with him at a public place
without success. He was, however, kind enough to send me one long e-mail about his views on
Turkish–Japanese cultural communication. This was a long mail formulated around sexuality between
young Turkish low skilled laborers who arrive in Japan and the Japanese women they encounter. His
e-mail marked the end of my contact with him and this group.
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Participant Observation 2: Middle and Upper Middle Class Turkish Males
Soon after I started my research I became aware of this social group established mainly by
two graduates of a prestigious University in Turkey. The social group was named after the University
as an alumni club but it had open membership. There were members who graduated from different
universities as well as Japanese people who had particular interest in Turkish language and culture.
There were no Turkish women married to Japanese men in this group and thus no attendance of
Japanese husbands of Turkish women either.
Most members, if not all were Turkish men from middle or upper middle classes. Almost all
had attended prestigious universities in Turkey and many had graduate degrees. Most had high income,
around or above 500,000 yen per month after tax. These men worked mostly at international
corporations as consultants, bankers, IT professionals, corporate professionals and international
organization employees. Only a few had established their own business. All men had stable work and
most of their wives were housewives who took care of their children and did occasional part-time
work. There was only one exception where the couple had no children and the wife was full time
housewife not working full-time or part-time. I defined members of this group as from middle or
upper middle class based on a combination of their white collar work, relatively high income and high
education level. I do not have detailed information of their families’ social status in Turkey but it can
be deduced to be middle class or upper middle class families considering all these men attended
prestigious universities. In Turkey, as in Japan, attending prestigious universities requires investment
in good schooling from primary school onwards. This investment can only be met by families who
have middle class status or higher.
When I was introduced to the founders of this group they explained to me that they wanted it
to operate as a social network rather than an alumni club. That is why members from other universities
were accepted to their social group as well. As indicated above though, these were all graduates of
prestigious universities. Main two establishers of this group were both long term residents in Japan.
The level of divide as well as detachment within different segments of the Turkish community Tokyo
worried them. Thus, their aim was to create a social hub that allows interactions and connects people.
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They held monthly casual meetings to meet-up over dinner or drinks. This group was dominated by
upper-middle class Turkish men living in Japan mostly in their thirties and forties. The group became
less and less active as it grew with new members. Then after a few years, they stopped announcing
events on their Facebook page where all activity used to be carried on. When I asked one of the
founders what had happened he commented that there were some people disrupting the harmony
within the group. They had found the solution in not announcing events to all members but socializing
among themselves as before when they had first founded the group. Thus, although they had initially
claimed to have an incorporative group, it was incorporative as long as people shared the same social
class and political views as them. I have not encountered any people from lower social classes at any
of the meetings of this group and I was usually the only Turkish female.
The group usually meets over the weekend as most members have to work during the week.
Social gatherings are mostly organized at restaurants and cafe type of social venues. These events
were announced at what could be called at the very last minute according to Japanese standards, with a
week’s notice at most. Members tended not to confirm their attendance either. Each time there were
members who showed up unannounced as well as members who did not show up even though they
had confirmed attendance. In that sense meetings were kept very casual. There was no one fixed
venue but rather a tendency to try out new places each time. Parameters for location selection were
prices, locality and space. One of the gatherings was organized at a house in 2010. At meetings
students were asked to pay less while full-time workers were asked to pay extra. The founders had the
aim to pool some money to finance the activities of students with this extra amount of money.
These gatherings were good opportunities for me to meet up with my interviewees and get
updates from them. This group also allowed me to get in touch with many members of the community
who kindly offered their views on Turkish–Japanese relations based on their personal experiences.
Most members of the group were fluent in all three languages: Turkish, Japanese and English but the
dominant language of all meetings was Turkish. Members attend these meeting without their Japanese
wives or children. The language barrier made these meetings less appealing for most wives who were
not fluent in Turkish. Furthermore, as Japanese, most of them usually already had made plans for the
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weekend by the time the organizers announced the meeting, place and time. Although most Japanese
wives do not attend these gatherings, most couples know each other. I found out through conversations
from these gatherings that some couples did meet up to socialize during weekends. I was surprised that
these had not come up during the interviews although I had asked them in particular if they socialized
with other Turkish–Japanese families. Not all the couples in the group got along well or met up.
In terms of gender relations, participant observation has revealed that Japanese wives seem to
have an upper hand in their marriages. This had not come up during the interviews. After these
meetings, Turkish men were usually careful to get back home in time and not to keep their spouse
waiting or worried. This especially became clear through hesitancy to move on to nijikai or sanjikai,
second or third round of drinks at a different place or event. In one instance in particular, I was
planning on going to a Blues / Jazz event after the gathering and a member I had just met that day
seemed really interested in joining me but in the end he said, “I should get back home”. It was
interesting that he used the term “should”. It was clear that he would rather go to the event but he did
not want to go at the expense of upsetting his wife. In his defense, he might have had other plans with
his wife for the evening, although he did not mention any in particular.
Separate socialization of spouses is normalized in Japanese marriages whereas they are the
exception for Turkish marriages. This played out in differently for Turkish males and Turkish females.
Although this is more restraining for Turkish women in Turkey, in Japan’s case, Turkish men were
restrained by their Japanese wives whereas Turkish females enjoyed more freedom. The next section
presents participant observation data from Turkish females group.
Participant Observation 3: Upper Middle Class Turkish Females
Members of this group are Turkish females who reside in Japan. Most of them are permanent
residents who are married to Japanese men. The group also includes Turkish housewives of Turkish
men who work at the embassy. These are temporary members who leave the group for good once their
husbands fixed term at the embassy is over. The formation of the group was similar to the formation of
the group of upper middle class men’s group. The group was formed as an initiative to create and
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strengthen social links between Turkish women in Japan. The initiative to form the group was taken
by the former female Turkish Ambassador. She had noticed that the Turkish community in Japan was
dispersed and that women were disadvantaged as their socialization mechanisms remained limited.
She aimed to empower women through increased communication in Turkish, even if it meant meeting
once a month over a meal. The ambassador’s name was mentioned at almost all the meetings with
gratitude and a bit of grief as she had passed away from cancer.
In terms of social class, Turkish women married to Japanese men all had university degrees.
Most of them were fluent in all Turkish, English and Japanese. Their families in Turkey were middle
class and upper middle class. None of the women came from villages or small cities. They were all
from urban centers of Turkey. Their husbands’ social class and income was also significant. Husbands
came mostly from upper middle classes in terms of family background, education and employment.
Only a few of these women had full time work while most were housewives doing limited or no part-
time work. Although some women worked full-time their husbands had higher salaries and more
prestigious work with the exception of one couple. I have relied at a combination of all above
mentioned elements in classifying them as middle or upper middle class. Most of them worked part-
time or full-time. There was only one full-time housewife. Two women had PhD degrees, these two
had initially arrived in Japan as students and met their husbands here. Other women had moved to
Japan after marriage, thus migrating to Japan was not their individual choice.
Their meetings were more structured compared to the other two groups mentioned under
previous headings. The meeting date was set as the first Thursday of the month and there were only
two venue choices. Communication was carried out through chain e-mails and a reservation was made
according to the number of attendees. Venues were chosen at restaurants close to the Turkish Embassy
in Tokyo in order to make it easier for women working at the embassy to attend. Some of the Japanese
female employees from the embassy who were fluent in Turkish also attended these meetings.
Usually ten to fifteen people would attend the meetings. The number of people who were
informed about the event was around twenty. Most of the attendees were housewives which made it
easy for them to have a lunch gathering in the middle of the week. Among these members, about half
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were wives of embassy workers and thus they were in Japan only temporarily. Most active members in
this group were married to Japanese men as they were well settled down in Japan.
As half of the women were married to Japanese men, conversations inevitably touch upon
their marriages and their husbands. One important difference between this group and the group of
Turkish males was that there was no jokes founded on complaint or criticism towards spouses.
Japanese husbands were mostly praised. At the beginning I thought this might be the influence of my
presence as a researcher. However my presence as a researcher had not stopped some Turkish men
from criticizing their wives. Praises of Japanese husbands were mostly formulated around their
naivety, kindness and the freedom they had granted their wives to socialize. Turkish females with
Japanese husbands seemed to enjoy a greater freedom in socializing when compared to middle and
upper middle class men. Or perhaps their freedom was the same as the men’s but it was given more
attention. Freedom to socialize was more precious for women who were culturally raised to be
dominated by men in their lives, be their fathers, brothers or husbands.
This group of women met up not only for lunches during the week but some also met up in
the evenings for dinner or even karaoke. It is very unusual in Turkish culture for women to go out at
night with their friends after marriage. I had the chance to attend one of their karaoke events. I was
puzzled as to how they sang songs, whether they sang in Japanese or English. Some of the members
attending that karaoke event did not speak Japanese well and spoke English only to a certain extent.
That night was interesting to observe how these women were creating their own “Turkish space”
within Japan. Beyond Turkish language dominated lunches, they sang Turkish songs at the karaoke.
Each time they went out for karaoke, they arranged a computer with internet access. This allowed
them to watch and sing Turkish songs from YouTube, a technology that they would not even have
imagined a decade ago. None of them were good with computers but with some help from the workers,
they connected this computer to the karaoke machine in their private karaoke room. Once it was all set
up, they enjoyed singing various Turkish songs all together. Although one would have the microphone,
others would clap or sing along. There were even some who danced. This night at the karaoke with
women in their forties and fifties made me think how fortunate they were. They were advantaged to
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enjoy a freedom that many other Turkish females could not in other countries including Turkey.
Furthermore, they enjoyed their culture by creating their small Turkish space through the use of
technological advancement. This was not an option for the generation of Turkish female migrants
before them, in Japan or elsewhere.
I am grateful to all members of this group who have welcomed me as a member and allowed
me to think more about gender. I had first become aware of this group through an interviewee. On the
first day that I attended their meeting, she introduced me as a researcher with the potential of
becoming one of them through marriage. My introduction as a researcher generated a bit of suspicion
about my motives among those who had Japanese husbands.
The second time I attended the meeting I was approached by one of the permanent members
who directly came up to me to say she would not want to be interviewed for my research. I was
surprised as this was the first time she spoke to me directly and I had not asked her for an interview.
She had arrived in Japan three decades ago through an arranged marriage with a Kazan-Turk man. Her
marriage had not worked out and she was now happily divorced. She was the only person within the
group who criticized her former husband. Despite the refusal to share her experiences, she was very
eager to learn about my findings. Although I was only halfway through my research at that time, I
gave her a compact summary of what I had found out so far. Unfortunately she seemed disappointed
that my answer was not satisfying enough for her. She insisted on knowing what the result was. No
matter what I told her, I could not please her with my findings. Then the woman sitting next to her
who seemed to have eavesdropped on our conversation intervened. They both seemed to know what
they wanted to hear although I could not grasp it. The lady sitting next to her then put it in simple
terms for me:
So you did your research, so it equals what? I mean if you have an equation you
know that two plus two is four, what does your equation equal to?
One of the main difficulties I had with this group was that some of them assumed that I had
answers for all Turkish-Japanese marital problems; that I had come up with this magical equation that
77
could explain all aspects of these marriages through one number or one word. Although they were the
ones in these marriages, they wanted me to tell them whether Turkish – Japanese marriages worked
well or not.
Limitations
Research on family has an intimate nature which leads to ethical dilemmas and constraints.
According to Larossa, R., Bennett L. A., and Gelles R. J. (1981):
Four aspects of the family life create special contingencies within which investigators must
seek and maintain the informed consent of their subjects:
1) the pervasiveness of family life; 2) the inaccessibility of family life; 3) the physical setting
in which qualitative family research is conducted; and 4) the resemblance of qualitative
family research to therapy (p.305).
Within this research, the most problematic area was number four, “the resemblance of
qualitative family research to therapy”. This remark was made by a few interviewees during their
interviews. This placed me in a difficult position when interviewees expected me to suggest solutions
for their marital problems.
There were instances of interviewees widening the interviews to cover new subjects. Most
importantly, sexuality was not initially included in this research. I had left it out because sexuality is a
subject difficult to approach and I did not want them to react by shutting off. At the beginning of the
research I did not expect the spouses to so openly talk to me about their sexualities but to my surprise,
many interviewees were very eager to talk about their sex lives. Consequently, I decided to include the
subject as it was an important topic that interviewees were bringing up. The decision on how much of
couples’ sexualities should be presented in this dissertation was another dilemma I faced due to the
possible public exposure of the families’ private lives. That is why I have refrained from using names,
even pseudonyms under the topic of sexuality.
All interviewees said they look forward to reading about the findings of this research.
Although pseudonyms were used, the risk of insufficient disguises to protect their privacy was a
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limiting factor in presenting the data. The main limitation of this research has been the size of the
community and the circulation of gossip. Furthermore, there were interviewees who publicly revealed
themselves despite my attempts to protect their privacies.
Regarding informant consent, I explained about my research to all the interviewees prior to
the interviews and gave them the option to withdraw if they felt uncomfortable. There were one
Japanese female spouse and one Turkish male spouse in Japan who chose not to participate in the
research. Their spouses were interviewed regardless, these are Cem (40, TM) and Shoko (33, JF). The
Japanese female did not put forward a reason whereas the Turkish husband claimed that he was very
busy at work. He was a low skilled laborer who had recently taken the initiative to establish his own
company with the support of his wife. I could not interview Mete’s or Mehmet’s spouses either, as I
had no direct contact with them and the men seemed to have reservations about introducing me to their
wives. These two men are low skilled laborers as well. Mete works at a restaurant as a waiter whereas
Mehmet works mostly in the construction industry but is often between jobs.
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Chapter IV: Forming Families
There is a great variety of mechanisms in the decision making process for marriage and these
are based on individuals’ personalities and life style choices. These have been explained in detail in
Chapters One and Two. This chapter will elaborate on how these families were formed and analyses
dynamics that have been influential in these couples’ marriage decision making process. With
reference to this framework the chapter also elaborates on whether couples were aware of potential
marriage problems due to their religious and cultural differences.
Dynamics of marriage are similar for spouses from same country of origin and for a
transnational couple. These are similar in terms of negotiation of gender relations and establishing a
balance of power within the family. However transnational marriages are much more complex by their
nature. This complexity relies in cultural and religious differences as well as the definition of gender
roles in their respective societies. When we look at the literature on transnational marriages, it is
highly dominated by focus on conflict areas. These areas of conflict that are often underlined in the
literature are; cultural conflict (Ko, 2012; Inglehart & Norris, 2009; Liversage, 2012, 2013), social
class and paradoxal global hypergamy (Constable, 2009; Le Bail, 2011; Kofman, 2008; Crul &
Doomernik, 2003); cultural differences in defining and re-defining gender relations (Ko, 2012;
Kofman, 2008; Christensen et al, 2006; Komter, 1989; Tachibanaki, 2010; George, 2005);
intercultural communication and language barrier in communication (Nitta, 1990; Ko, 2012; Baltaş & 
Steptoe, 2000; Piper, 1997; Faier, 2007); Relations with in laws (Kalter & Schroedter, 2010; Crul &
Doomernik, 2003; Thai, 2003; Takeshita 2007; Bacas, 1994; Ko, 2012); relations with the host society
and visa issues (Kofman, 2008).
In order to look at the above outlined areas of potential conflict, I have looked at different
stages of family formation for Turkish-Japanese couples. For these couples in particular I present their
data under two main topics as; “Spouse Choices” and “Cultural, Religious Differences and Social
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Class.” The first topic has three sub-sections: initial encounter, gender roles and household finances.
The second topic is presented in two sub-sections as cultural and religious differences and social class.
Spouse Choices
Initial Encounter
In terms of their spouse choices I have looked at whether there was a pattern on how these
families were formed. As previous literature emphasizes strong in group ties of Turkish immigrants
leading to bringing in spouses from Turkey, I wanted to see if there was a pattern to balance out this
strong trend. However, couples in the sample had met and started dating through diverse means and
there was no strong pattern among these. Couples had met through diverse means such as: search for
language exchange partner, introduction through friends, marriage advertisement on-line, through
work, language education in a third country, nampa (flirting), while the Japanese spouse was residing
in Turkey for work or studies and lastly during Japanese spouse’s vacation in Turkey.
Although there was no clear pattern and encounters were diversified, there were a few
interesting points worth highlighting about these encounters. First of all, most couples had to initially
maintain a long-distance relationship. The way they maintained their long-distance relationship varied
according to communication technologies of the period of their encounter. Some spouses from
previous generations carried on their relationship through letters and overpriced phone calls. On the
other hand, younger couples had the advantage of keeping in touch through e-mails and Skype
conversations on-line. Secondly, there were no cases of couple meeting while the Turkish spouse was
travelling in Japan although many couples had met while the Japanese spouse was travelling in Turkey.
Thirdly, there were couples who met during their language study in a third country which meant they
did not have a common language to communicate in at the beginning of their relationship. This pattern
was significant as it implied that language barrier was not a problem for the formation of these couples
although it is often underlined as an important marital problem in transnational marriages.
Communication and language barrier
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Piper (1997, p.329) refers to difficulties couples face in their transnational marriages when
spouses are not fluent in each other’s languages. Her interviewees have expressed having
communication difficulties due to their lack of command of the Japanese language. Furthermore, not
being able to understand the culture exacerbated their situation. Even body language was not enough
for their communication as they did not understand the meanings of gestures. There was no such
hardship expressed by any of the interviewees in this research on Turkish–Japanese couples.
Interviews have revealed that couples did not consider it as a problem because they were doing their
best to overcome their language barrier. This was especially clear in cases of spouses who had met
abroad while studying a third language and spouses who met through language exchange. When they
were asked how they communicated without being fluent in a common language, their reactions
revealed that they had not even thought about this aspect during their initial courtship. This is
portrayed through the case of Emi (36, JF) and Enis (40, TM) below.
Emi (36, JF) and Enis (40, TM) had been together for 12 years in total at the time of their
interview which was conducted at their home. Emi had a university degree and came from a middle or
upper middle class family from Tokyo. Similarly, Enis came from a high social class in Turkey. His
social class was reflected through his father’s occupation and his strong political connections as well
as the area his family resided in Istanbul. Emi had a two years college degree and Enis had a master’s
degree. They had met at a language school in a third country while they were both studying basic level
English. Now the couple communicated mostly in amateur English and Turkish. They were one of the
few couples who insisted on being interviewed together. Emi spoke an intermediate level Turkish
whereas Enis did not speak any Japanese. When I asked them how and when they had met, Enis
enthusiastically started telling the story as follows:
Enis: We were in the same class in 2000. We were classmates first then started hanging
around and well, dating. I could clearly say that I saw her and was struck [it was love at first
sight]. I was always sitting next to her. I was always going next to her and trying to arrange
seats for us to sit together.
Emi: I’m not supposed to intervene now right?
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Researcher: No, please do if you feel the need to.
Emi: [Turns to him] you used to call me. You were going early and once I arrived you used
to call me next to you “Emi, come, come!”
Enis: Yes, true, I reserved seats for us. I used to have fruits in my bag so whenever she
arrived I would give her a fruit, like an apple for example.
Emi: True, he would take out an apple from his bag and ask me if I wanted it.
Researcher: Was this for your undergraduate degree?
Enis: No, it was a language class, we were both learning English.
Researcher: So you didn’t have a common language to communicate in when you met? How
did you communicate?
Emi: [pauses] I don’t recall how we communicated.
Enis: It was an English course so we had Basic English. You know, she came from Japan, I
came from Turkey, there were other international students in the class as well so we would
have basic conversations like “How are you? What are you up to?” We learned English
together.
Emi: We communicated with such few words. How did we communicate, really?
Enis: True our English was weak but we were talking somehow.
Emi: Yeah, we were somehow.
Emi and Enis could not recall how exactly they communicated at the beginning of their
relationship. The issue of how they communicated without a common language was puzzling for them
as well. It seemed their relationship started in such a smooth manner that not having a common
language to communicate in was not a problem for them. They expressed not having even thought
about this issue prior to the interview. Their case as well as many other couples’ cases in the research
has showed that fluency in a common language was not an important factor at the beginning of their
relationship.
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This section from their interview incorporates two important patterns that emerged under this
topic for Turkish – Japanese couples. First, that language barrier was not a problem or limitation for
the communication of these couples. They somehow managed to communicate through body language
or with the use of dictionaries. Willingness to communicate was the most significant factor. Secondly,
it also revealed their ideas and approach to marriage. Enis had chosen an individualist approach and
emphasized “love” within their initial encounter. This was a dominant pattern that emerged from
Turkish spouses discourses. However, none of the Japanese spouses referred to “love” as a parameter
for marriage, this underlined a different cultural approach to marriage. There was however a general
pattern to underline personal qualities of spouses as an important factor in marriage decision. This was
valid for both Turkish and Japanese spouses.
Marriage decision
Couples included in the research have met through various ways as explained at the
beginning of this chapter. Regardless of the different ways through which their relationships started
out, most couples seem to have followed the order of encounter, friendship, dating, co-habitation and
marriage respectively. Length of these processes varied from couple to couple but this was the general
pattern for almost all couples in this sample. This was in contradiction with the literature on Turks
preferring marriage over co-habitation (Koç, 2007; Crul & Doomernik, 2003). However it is important
to note that social class and especially religiosity were determinant factors for cohabitation of Turks
(Remez, 1998). Social class is an important factor as poor people tend to prefer cohabitation to cut
down on their living expenses. Turks are included in this pattern as well however they tend to marry
rather than cohabit mostly due to religiosity. Accordingly, Turkish female interviewees who were
more religious did not cohabit prior to marriage. There were only a few exceptions to this pattern.
Marriage was seen as the natural outcome of a relationship and a stage in adult life by all Turkish and
Japanese interviewees. This was in line with how marriage was constructed in both Japanese and
Turkish cultures as outlined in Chapter Two (Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000; Brinton, 1992; Edwards, 1982; 
1987; 1989). This was such a dominant view that a Turkish male interviewee, Gürol (42,TM), found
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the question on marriage timing pointless: “I was dating her for several years, what was I supposed to
do? Marry someone else?” This sarcastic answer gives an idea on the extent to which he, as well as
many other interviewees considered marriage to be the natural outcome of a romantic relationship.
As marriage was considered to be a natural process in adult life course for both Japanese and
Turks in the research, this inevitably led to discussions on when is an appropriate time for marriage.
Under the topic of marriage timing social pressures were significant in both cultures for both genders
but the intensity showed diversity. All interviewees were asked when and how they decided to get
married, and most interviewees replied; “It was time”. This “time” was strongly linked to
intensification of social pressures around 30 years old. As shown in Table 2.1, 48.3 per cent of
Japanese “Felt it was the appropriate age to get married” when women in these couples were between
30-34 years old. As indicated in the same section women feel stronger pressures to get married
compared to men with reference to aging (Brinton, 1992; Nakano, 2011) and pressure to remain
virgins (Parla, 2001; Berktay, 1995; Vergin, 1985).
Social pressures
In terms of marriage timing, age factor was a significant factor for Japanese women. Most
Japanese women included in this research considered late twenties as the limit to get married. This
was in accordance with the assumption that it is difficult for women to get married after age 25
(Brinton, 1992; Nakano, 2011). This however is changing as the age of first marriage for females in
Japan is now as late as 29.2 years (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 2013). Within this research
the oldest Japanese bride was Tami (40, JF) who was 39 at the time of marriage. It was clear
throughout all females’ interviews, both Turkish and Japanese, that there was social pressure on them
to get married. This pressure was intensified earlier for Turkish females in line with the age of first
marriage being as low as 21.6 years for Turkish women (Koç, 2007).
Marriage timing of Turkish couples are different from the Japanese. Koç (2007, p.29) shows
that in Turkey, the mean age for children to leave the parental house for marriage is 24.4 years. It is
higher for men at 27.2 years and lower for women at 21.6 years. In the case of females, this marks a
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move from the fathers’ house to the husbands’ house as there is strong patriarchy. When we look at
the dynamics for Turkish men’s choices to leave the parental house, stable income is the most
important prerequisite. On the other hand, for females, finding a spouse is the most important factor.
This gendered approach is similar to the Japanese case and how these gender based differences are
played out will be presented in the case of Melisa and Hiroki further in this chapter.
Social pressures to get married are stronger on women compared to men in both Turkish and
Japanese societies. This topic came up twice during my participant observation with Turkish upper
middle class males. In the first case, a 32-year-old Turkish man expressed not wanting to co-habit or
get married to his girlfriend. They had been dating for two years and she was staying at his apartment
for about three to four days a week. However, he expressed not feeling ready to get married yet. When
asked for the reason, he said it just felt too soon since he was only 32 years old. In this case although
he had already passed the mean age of first marriage for an average Turkish man, he wanted to delay
his marriage further. In the second case another Turkish man, who was also 32 years old as well, did
not want to even talk about marriage. He had just moved in with his Japanese girlfriend and the
subject came up with them throwing a house-warming party. Some members of the group asked him
when they were planning to tie the knot. After all, marriage was the natural outcome of a relationship
and they had already arrived at the co-habitation stage. This man, just like the man in the previous
case, thought it was still early for marriage and avoided the subject of marriage. This second man did
get married within a year of their move whereas the man from the first case is still single and in the
same relationship after four years.
It is easier for a Turkish man to remain single longer as outlined in two cases above. One of
the interviewees, Cem (40, TM), had chosen not to get married although he had already been in a
stable relationship and cohabiting for more than a decade. Cem had arrived in Japan as a student but
he was already 40 at the time of his interview and worked at an international corporation. He was
fluent in all three languages, Turkish, Japanese and English. He had graduated from a prestigious
university in Turkey and his family was upper middle class based on his father’s occupation and the
area the family resided in Istanbul. Cem and his girlfriend co-habited but had no intention of getting
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married. They had initially met through work, became friends, started dating and then decided to move
in together. During the interview when Cem was asked about his approach to marriage he simply
expressed not believing in the institution of marriage. When asked to elaborate, he indicated being
pleased with their current relationship and emphasized having no intention of proposing to his
girlfriend. He did not want things to change, he said “This way, every day is a date!” He simply liked
the current arrangement with his girlfriend and did not see any reason to change things. Furthermore,
he saw marriage as a legal process only and did not believe that marriage would improve their
relationship in any way. Although people tend to approach marriage both as a relationship and an
institution (Swidler, 1986), Cem did not agree on this dual nature of marriage. He did, however, wear
a ring similar to a wedding ring on his left hand. When asked what the ring meant, he said he wore a
ring for people to understand that he was in a relationship. Later through his interview he confessed
that there was one disadvantage of not being married. This troubled him. Since marriage is a legal
institution recognized by state authority, not being married has its limitations on their relationship. He
feared that in case he or his girlfriend was hospitalized with a severe illness or after a sudden accident,
they would not have any rights to make decisions for one another. Furthermore, they would not even
be allowed to visit each other as they would not be considered as “family”. Thus, Cem’s only concern
about staying single came not from social pressures but legal limitation.
Turkish females face stronger social pressures to get married especially from their families.
This pressure is not weakened even by geographic distances. This was especially clear for the case of
Melisa (30, TF) and Hiroki (32, JM). This couple had met while the Japanese spouse was travelling in
Turkey. They were introduced by common friends at an event and started dating soon after. They first
co-habited in Turkey and then in a third country prior to marriage. When I asked Melisa about their
marriage decision she outlined all social pressures she felt as follows:
Ever since we came to Tokyo I was expecting him to just come to me with a diamond ring
and propose but time was passing by and my return date was approaching. One day he came
to me and said: “I will take you somewhere but it’s hot there, pack summer clothes”. Then
suddenly we were at Haneda Airport. He took me to Okinawa! I said OK, this is it! I was
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expecting him to propose thinking how romantic it will be… in Okinawa… but then the
vacation ended and we came back to Tokyo.
In the end I had to confront him. I mean he wasn’t making a move and I couldn’t have gone
back to Turkey without getting married. Everyone was expecting me to get married!
I spoke to Hiroki in the end. I said: “You told my parents we will get married but you’re not
taking action!” We had already been to the Turkish Embassy upon our arrival to find out
about the legal procedure. Then he was like yeah, sure, but you know I still don’t have work,
it’s not a good time. At that point I started getting very angry, I said: “You said we will get
married so I can’t go back to Turkey without us getting married. That was the deal!”
He wanted to find work, stabilize his income then have a ceremony and get married but it’s
not like that, in Turkey it’s important to have that ring on your finger and to be able to say
I’m married. My mom was troubled about what to say to people around us.
Now that we put the ring on, everyone shut up.
Melisa’s long story is a very good example of how two genders approach the issue of marriage
differently. Her husband Hiroki did not think it was a good time to get married as he was still
unemployed and cohabiting with his parents. Melisa on the other hand needed an official ratification
of their relationship to liberate herself as well as her family from social pressures. It is interesting that
the social pressure was not on Melisa only but on her family back in Turkey as well. This is also
linked to her sexuality. The reason Turkish females feel more pressure to get married is the direct
outcome of their sexuality and the association of virginity with family honor (Parla, 2001; Vergin,
1985). Her family needed her to get married in order to clear their honor since the couple had already
co-habited for more than a year. Turkish men or their families do not face such strong social pressures
as sexual control remains focused on female bodies. Furthermore, there is increasing suspicion on
females’ virginity if Turkish women delay marriage. There were two Turkish female interviewees who
have expressed getting married as virgins and these social pressures on controlling Turkish female
bodies was especially clear in their narratives. One of these women was Mine (31, TF).
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Mine (31, TF) and her Japanese husband Naoki (41, JM)’s marriage was one of those
exceptions in the research as the couple’s relationship started off with the specific intention of
marriage rather than following stages of encounter, friendship, courtship, co-habitation and marriage.
Mine was one of the few interviewees who had initially arrived in Japan as a student. She was
originally from a relatively small city in Turkey from an agrarian middle class family. She obtained
her undergraduate degree from a Turkish university and then arrived in Japan for her graduate studies.
She now holds a PhD degree and works full-time. Her husband Naoki was initially from a middle
class family that lived close to Tokyo. He had a two years college degree and stable work.
Mine had arrived in Japan several years ago. During her stay in Japan, as years went by,
people around her were changing, Turkish people, especially students were arriving and then leaving
Japan while she stayed. She started feeling a bit lonely and since she was already 26 years old, she
decided it was a good time for her to get married. It was perhaps the age factor or having been living
on her own in Japan, however beyond her motive, the interesting aspect was that she was not in a
romantic relationship at the time of her decision to get married. In fact, she had never dated anyone.
She considered dating pointless. When I asked her what she meant from dating being pointless, she
commented as follows: “So you meet someone, you date, you do stuff but then what? I mean what’s
the point?” Clearly she was the exception. For her, marriage did not have to be the natural outcome of
a relationship. She was referring to sexuality as to “do stuff”. For her, sexuality was limited to
marriage and that was the life style and approach to virginity she preferred. She was the only
interviewee who was very direct and open about her thoughts on sexuality and marriage.
Gender Roles
Gender roles within families show similarities in Japan’s and Turkey’s patriarchal social
structures. Most wives, either Japanese or Turkish, were housewives even when they were well
educated or had careers prior to marriage. Most of them did part-time work occasionally. Full-time
working female spouses were rare especially if they had children.
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Most housewives, both Turkish and Japanese, expressed willingness to work, however they
found it difficult to find work once they had taken a break after marriage, especially if they had
children. This was in accordance with the M curve that characterizes women’s work cycle in Japan
(Roberts, 1994; 1996). The labor market in Japan is constructed in such a way that women are
encouraged to quit work once married or pregnant so that they could focus on raising a family. They
can re-join the workforce after their children have grown up but when they do get back into the labor
market their choices are limited to part-time work with less benefits (Ogasawara, 1998; Roberts, 1996).
Within this research, Güngör (56, TF), a mother of two, described her struggle with the gender biased
Japanese labor market structure as follows:
When I decided to go back to work it was just after the bubble burst. The labor market was
very bad. They usually offered half of what used to be offered before, during the bubble
economy. I was already 42 years old by that time. Whenever I sent in my resume I would get
a phone call right away and they would ask for an interview. They usually liked my resume.
At first, our conversations would go well and when I think that it’s a done deal they would
ask me why I took time off. I would reply “To raise my children”. They then asked me how
old my children were. I would say: “Five and eight” and then they would just tell me I
should stay home and not work. They used to hang up on me! I can’t even tell you how many
times this happened. They decided for me whether I should work or not. I was supposed not
to work since I was married and had children. I could never find full-time work again. There
was prejudice against me firstly because I was already 42 years old and secondly because I
had small children.
Güngör had to give up a fight to get back into the labor market. She was a language teacher.
Although she used to work at universities, she could only find work at a high school after she had
taken a break to raise her children. For her this was a regression but she took the position anyway
since she wanted to get back into the labor market. After a few years passed she was able to start
teaching at universities again. She said once she was back in the labor market, they forgot about her
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child leave. It should be noted that the M curve is not the particular case of Japan only, in other
countries as well it is difficult for women to join the workforce after they take a break from work
(George, 2005, p.85).
Household Management
Within this research husbands were main breadwinners in all families except for one. With
the exception of this family, men made more money than their wives and covered the family’s living
expenses. This was in line with how gender was constructed both in Japan and Turkey. However, there
was a difference in the way gender relations were defined according to Japanese and Turkish spouses.
It was over masculinity and power relations between spouses with reference to income and economic
contribution to household finances. These two points will be further elaborated upon from this point
onwards.
Masculinity was defined in a similar way by Turkish and Japanese spouses however there
was one significant difference. In line with the existing literature, Japanese spouses defined
masculinity through the husband’s role as the provider for the family. Men brought in the money and
housewives were responsible for managing household finances. But some Turkish husbands had
strong opposition to this formulation of masculinity. For these men the idea of handing in their salary
to their wives and not controlling the money themselves implied loss of power. During their interview
I asked Enis if he was handing in his income to Emi for her to manage household finances. His reply
was as follows;
What do you think? [Looks at me suspiciously while lifting up one eyebrow].
There's no way a man would hand in his salary to his wife in Turkey, I've never heard of a
Turkish man who would give all his money to his wife.
I've never heard of such a thing… I don’t think so. Even if it exists it can’t be common.
Women can’t manage money.
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We both work so we have separate bank accounts and credit cards. Our accounts are
somewhat common though. There are few expenses like mortgage, I arrange those. But we
know each other’s passwords, there’s no separation of hers or my money.
According to Enis, his wife’s management of household finances is irrational for two reasons.
First of all he considers handing over his salary to his wife to be emasculating. Secondly, he argues
that women cannot manage money in general. It is interesting how patriarchal gender roles are firmly
set in his mind although they do not fit the reality of his family life. Despite his patriarchal mindset
explained above and his defensive Turkish masculinity, his wife Emi was the one who arranged and
established their business in Japan. She had to take care of everything in their daily lives as well as he
did not speak Japanese. In terms of spending, they did not keep track of who paid for what in
particular. He did however emphasize paying for the mortgage from his salary. He gave that example
to re-affirm his masculine identity. As the head of the family, he was providing for them, paying for
the house. That made him masculine. He felt the need to have control over the money he was bringing
home. His idea of masculinity was the combination of bringing in money and having control over it.
He associated not having control over money as a loss of power (Beeley , 1970; George, 2005).
Turkish approach to masculinity is different from the Japanese masculinity in terms of control over
money. Just like in the case of India, Turkish masculinity presents a combination of both bringing in
the money and controlling it. There is a feeling of loss of power if one of these elements is missing
(George, 2005, p.88).
When we look at the women’s case, most housewives in the research did not contribute to
household finances, even if they worked part-time. Household expenses were mostly covered by their
husband’s salary. In their interviews, husbands were asked whether they wanted their wives to work or
be full-time housewives. All except one expressed respecting their wives choices not to work. None of
the husbands, Japanese or Turkish, asked their wives to work or contribute to household finances
except Tolga (30, TM).
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Tolga had initially arrived in Japan with his former long-term Japanese girlfriend whom he
had met in Turkey and cohabited for many years, in Turkey. The couple then decided to move to
Japan together but did not get married. A short period after their move to Japan, their relationship
changed and they ended up separating. At that time Tolga had initially arrived on some kind of a
student visa from a language school. He already had a university degree and was not pursuing
graduate studies. At this language school, although he paid the fee, he was not attending classes and
was legally working part-time on this student visa. When we look at his social background, he
attended a well-established university in Istanbul and was fluent in English. He had previously lived in
Canada for several years and was teaching English in Japan. His parents were middle class based on
their occupations and area of residence. His social class had not changed after his arrival. He belonged
to middle class both in Japan and Turkey. Tolga’s wife Aki (28, JF) also came from a middle class
family. She had a university degree from a women’s university and was working full-time at a
company. Tolga’s wish to work longer hours than his student visa permitted was an important factor
for the couple to get married. They had already cohabited for several months before the decision for
marriage was made. In their marriage, Tolga wanted Aki to contribute to household finances since she
was working full-time as well. He explained his point of view as follows:
Researcher: How do you balance household finances?
Tolga: We split the rent other than that I pay for almost everything, bills and stuff because
my salary is higher. I pay for everything on week-ends when we go out as well. In terms of
equality I want her to pay something, that’s all. She doesn’t pay that much.
Researcher: Why do you want her to pay?
Tolga: Because she is working and since she can work I want her to contribute. If I paid for
everything that would make her feel inferior to me, I mean that’s what I think, I don’t know.
I mean I would’ve done the same thing if I was in the same position.
Tolga’s statement was interesting for two reasons in particular. First of all, it did not reflect
Aki’s view or the outcome of a conversation they had on the subject. Their arrangement was based on
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Tolga’s perception of what Aki probably thinks and how he thinks she would feel if she did not
contribute. Aki did not express willingness to work or contribute to household finances in particular.
In fact, her salary was almost about half of his. This miscommunication between the couple reflected
their ignorance on gender relations within families in comparison. Although women have the upper
hand in the household according to Japanese gender roles, the division of owner could be negotiated
for Turkish couples (Fox, 1973) and how much each spouse brings in to the marriage is important in
determining the balance of power. When there is room to negotiate the balance of power within the
marriage, the outcome depends on what resources spouses have that they can mobilize for the
marriage (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Following up on resources, financial resources are considered an
important source of power in Turkish marriages. Thus, in this case Tolga was projecting his own view
of gender relations on Aki who did not complain but might have had a different approach in
accordance with Japanese gender relations within the family. Although withdrawal from arguments to
avoid conflict is a behavior attributed mostly to men (Christensen et al., 2006), in this marriage the
wife was using this method to avoid conflict.
The issue of financial inferiority that Tolga mentioned above came up during only one other
interview, Melissa’s. Melisa (30, TF) came from a middle class and relatively liberal family who were
aware of the cohabitation of the couple prior to marriage although this trend is not common in Turkey.
She had attended a good university in Turkey and was fluent in English. She even started working
part-time as an English teacher for children soon after our interview. At the time of her initial
interview she was not working yet and expressed feeling discomfort asking her husband for money.
The issue of who brings in the money to the household seemed to matter for her although it did not
seem to matter for her husband. This issue did not come up during her husband’s interview, he did not
mind whether she worked or not. Melisa on the other hand had a mindset similar to Tolga’s and was
feeling inferior. According to Melisa, her not working influenced the balance of power within the
household. This issue came up very clearly in relation to the organization of their living space. She did
not like living in a Japanese style tatami room and wished to have furniture as in Turkish style houses.
On this subject she commented as follows: “If I had a regular income I would have had more of a say.
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I would’ve insisted. Hiroki always tells me that this is a temporary living arrangement and that I
should hang in there.” This reflects Melisa’s feeling of inferiority for not having an income. She thinks
she would have more power in their relation if she brought in money to the household. This reflects
her discomfort in spending his income. When we look at narratives of Japanese wives, this issue of
discomfort in relying on the husbands’ income did not come up at all. For most Japanese interviewees,
it was only natural for the man to bring in the money and the women to spend it for the household
management. In Japan, wife’s management of the household money is normalized to such an extent
that many Japanese housewives pool secret savings from their husband’s income (Alexy, 2007). In
fact, at the beginning of their marriage Hiroki had offered to let Melisa to manage their money but she
refused. She found Hiroki to be better at handling and saving money while she enjoyed spending
money.
When we look at other couples within this research, physical handling of money was
minimized. Development of banking system technologies was an important factor as most bills, if not
all, were automatically deducted from bank accounts of those who worked. In cases of both spouses
working full time they did not recall clearly what was deducted from which account but in almost all
cases men paid for bigger sums such as mortgages or children’s schooling as this reflected their
masculinity. In terms of daily spending housewives preferred credit cards over cash. This was
practical for Turkish housewives in particular so that they would not feel inferior by asking for money
in person.
Although most men worked and most women were housewives, most couples expressed
sharing household duties. Shoko (33, JF) was the only interviewee who openly complained about her
husband not helping her with housework at all. She was surprised by this at the beginning of their
marriage as she had a much more cooperative image of foreign husbands. This was in line with the
image of foreign husbands portrayed in Japanese media as more involved with the family and
household (Richardson, 2004; Holthus, 2009).
Housework was divided between spouses based on who does which household chore best
and who works how long. Since most husbands worked full-time on weekdays they mostly helped
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their wives when asked to do so on weekends. There was one particular case in which the Turkish wife
was working full-time and the Japanese husband was a stay-home-dad caring for their daughter and
doing housework. This couple, Gözde (32, TF) and Hiro (37, JM), had met in Japan while Gözde was
a graduate student. Gözde came from a middle class family in Turkey. Her initial move to Japan was
formulated by her wish to escape gender discrimination within the very male dominated sector she
worked in. During her studies in Japan, she wanted to improve her Japanese and that led to her
encounter with Hiro who wanted to improve his English. The couple met through language exchange.
Their relationship advanced in the general pattern of friendship, courtship and marriage. Hiro came
from an upper middle class due to his father’s prestigious profession however he did not have a
university degree, he was a high school graduate. Consequently, he did not have a career in particular
whereas Gözde was on a career path. This reversed their classic gender roles according to both
Turkish and Japanese societies. Gözde described their situation as follows:
Gözde: He (Hiro) has been unemployed for three years now and he’s already 37. So it’s
going to be very hard for him to find work again.
Researcher: So he takes care of the baby now?
Gözde: Yes. Day care is very expensive, even if he worked I don’t think he can make more
money than that so there’s no point.
Researcher: Does he do all the housework? Or do you do it together?
Gözde: Well he is doing it all nowadays, it has been hard for me after the baby. I should be
helping him out a bit. I do help him out at times but he does most of the work. I’m such a
bad wife.
Gözde’s narrative above clearly outlines a gender roles dilemma. Although she was already
working full time Gözde felt guilty about not being able to help her husband with household duties.
Her husband Hiro did not complain about the situation though he did find the combination of
housework and childrearing to be more tiring than working at a company. The guilt that Gözde felt is
the outcome of gender roles projected on her by Turkish society. She was the only breadwinner in the
96
family. None of the other –male- breadwinners, Japanese or Turkish, expressed guilt in not helping
their wives enough with the housework. This obligation on women to do housework after coming
home from working outside the home is referred to as the second shift (George, 2005, p.77). This is a
common problem in both Japanese and Turkish families. The case of Gözde and Hiro clearly
portrayed the projection of traditional gender roles upon them and their discomfort in not fitting.
When Hiro was asked whether he was familiar with the image of ikumen10 in Japan and whether he
considered himself one, his reply was a fast and firm “No”. He avoided talking about the subject
altogether dismissed my other attempts to discuss the subject as well.
Country of Residence
Decisions on country of residence were fairly easy for most couples included in this research.
Willingness to work, availability of work, careers, salaries and happiness were determining factors. In
cases where the couples had conflicting interests, the one with a higher salary had the upper hand. As
men were main breadwinners in this sample, they had the upper hand in most cases except for two.
The first exception was the case of Gözde and Hiro. As mentioned under the previous title,
Gözde was working full-time while Hiro took care of their daughter. This had to do with availability
of work for spouses. Gözde had achieved higher education than Hiro and had more options of work
with higher salary. The couple had decided to reverse their traditional gender roles when a job
opportunity in a third country with good pay arose for Gözde. It is important to note neither the
decision nor the process was easy for them. During her interview Gözde expressed feeling pressured
not to complain about work or living conditions to Hiro although she was dissatisfied. She felt
pressure from being the one responsible for their move to a third country. It is interesting that although
Hiro could not have offered higher living standards for their family either in Turkey, Japan or
elsewhere, she felt responsible over him not working. The couple was well aware of the fact that they
had reversed their gender roles and they did not seem at ease with the current situation. This was
reflected through both Hiro’s dismissal of the ikumen subject and Gözde’s guilt over not allowing her
10This terms refers to a new trend of cool men who are fathers actively involved in childrearing beyond
their traditional role of financial provider for the family.
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husband to fulfil his role as the breadwinner. Migration impacts gender relations. For example,
George (2005, p.67)’s research shows that men who migrate due to their wives’ work undergo status
loss mostly because they do not fit the patriarchal model when the conventional role of breadwinner is
performed by their wives. Although they move to a country with higher living standards, their
migration results in a change of their social and economic situation and a loss of status. This is the
direct outcome of these spouses having difficulty finding work in the host society.
Once the decision on the country of residence was made, this also had an implication for the
spouse who was not the main breadwinner in terms of availability of work. However this issue did not
come up with any other couples. This was because men did not feel guilt, as Gözde did, over their
highly educated wives not being able to work. At this point it is important to note that willingness to
work was an important factor as well. Regardless of their educational achievement and skills, not all
women wanted to work. This pattern was in line with Duleep and Sanders (1993)’s findings on
Japanese women being less likely to work after marriage despite having high educational achievement
and lesser children. Only a few women in this sample were on career paths and had the determination
to work full-time but most housewives did part-time work occasionally. Their social class was an
important factor in their freedom not to work. As most housewives were married to men with high
educational achievement and good income these women did not need to work in order to contribute to
family finances.
Couples discussed their options on country of residence and decided together. However their
perceptions on gender roles were important determinants in this process. Sevgi (51, TF) and Masato
(53, JM) had met in a third country while both were studying English. Sevgi came from a middle class
family and had a university degree. She was determined to work and thus went overseas to improve
her English. Masato on the other hand came from an upper middle class Christian family. He was the
elderly son in the family and was to take over his father’s business one day. He was attending the
same language school as Sevgi to learn English. The relationship of this couple evolved through stages
of friendship, courtship and marriage as in most cases in the research although they did not express co-
habiting before marriage. When they decided to get married, the decision on the country of residence
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was relatively easy. Masato did not want to take Sevgi to Japan for two reasons. Firstly the geographic
distance from Japan to Turkey would make it hard for Sevgi to maintain her close family ties and
secondly he believed that she would have adaptation problems in Japan. He commented:
I told myself, you can’t take this girl to Japan, such a strange country. Because Japan is so
strange. Especially kanji and so on…
It was interesting that in this statement he defined his own country as strange and then gave
kanji as an important source of strangeness. What he meant was that it was likely for her to have
communication problems as she did not speak Japanese and was not familiar with the culture. This
was a problem that other foreign brides had encountered upon their arrival in Japan (Piper, 1997; Nitta,
1990). Masato also implied that under these circumstances it would be difficult for Sevgi to find new
activities in Japan to keep herself busy. This couple ended up initially settling down in the country
they met. However, as they aged, about a decade in to their marriage, they reconsidered their options
and ended up moving to Japan. It is important to note that Sevgi and Masato were a young couple with
no children when they first made the decision on the country of residence. They were new to each
other’s culture and both had opportunity to work in the country they had met. When they reconsidered
their decision, a decade later, they had two children and were much more familiar with each other’s
cultures. They had aged ten years and thus started thinking more about their future as well as merits
and demerits of living in a third country in the long term. When Sevgi was asked during their
interview if they had considered moving to Turkey she expressed worry over Masato’s well-being if
they did so. While making this claim she dismissed the idea of her providing for the family by
emphasizing the importance of gender roles as follows:
It would have been very hard on Masato if we moved to Turkey. He provides for our family.
Also I think the husband should be psychologically satisfied. I mean even if the woman isn’t
working or just working part-time she can always find something to keep herself busy but
it’s much more difficult for men.
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Sevgi’s approach to self-fulfillment was in line with the literature on how gender roles are
constructed in Japan and Turkey. She did not consider herself becoming the breadwinner, furthermore,
she argued that her husband needed to provide for the family in order to be “psychologically satisfied”
as she put it. She referred to women’s opportunities for self-actualization and satisfaction through
hobbies or part-time work (Hidako, 2011; Okano, 2009; Bardsley & Hirakawa, 2005) when she said:
“She [women] can always find something to keep herself busy”. This approach to gender roles is not
particular to Japan and Turkey only, but for other immigrant groups as well, unemployment of
husbands in a foreign country is linked to feelings of insecurity (George, 2005, p. 91). On top of this
gender based explanation, it is important to note that volunteering activities are high in Japan. When
volunteers were asked what made them think volunteering was worth doing, the most common
answers were as follows: I made new friends, I was able to make my life worth living, and the activity
was fun. Thus volunteering is in a way used to compensate for what could not be achieved in other
arenas of life (Nakano, 2005). In line with this trend, Sevgi also joined volunteer groups after their
move to Japan.
Decision on the country of residence was relatively easy for couples who believed in the
above explained gender roles. However there was more bargaining on the country of residence when
the wife had a solid career and both spouses wanted to work. For example, in the case of Megumi (39,
JF) and Ümit (40, TM), Megumi was on a career path and she did not consider stopping working.
Thus their decision making process for marriage and to settle down was more complicated compared
to other couples. Ümit came from a middle class family and had overseas experience from his
childhood. He was fluent in English and had attended one of the most prestigious universities in
Turkey. He worked in the finance sector after graduation and met Megumi through acquaintances.
Megumi had a university degree and worked for the government. When the couple met she was in
Turkey on language training and was taking classes at the university Ümit had graduated from. They
were introduced at a social gathering. As both of them were on career paths, they were a couple that
had to make concessions in choosing their country of residence. Ümit summarized the process as
follows:
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Rather than a marriage proposal our case advanced step by step. Our case was particular
because we had to calculate how we could build a future together. In the end we decided that
worse comes to worse we can live on one income. We still didn’t want to risk it though so I got
a master’s degree to be able to work in Japan.
The couple lived in different cities when they met so their relationship started off as long
distance one to begin with. After having lived in separate cities and countries for several years they
could finally settle down in Japan together and start a family. This was also the outcome of their
careful planning of their future life together in detail. She did not consider quitting work as she had a
solid career. Ümit was also aware that she would not give up her career, and had no intention to ask
her to do so. That was why they maintained a long-term relationship for several years and delayed
their marriage decision. When the couple agreed on their move to Japan, Ümit aimed at obtaining
higher educational achievement in order to increase his chances of finding stable work in Japan.
During his interview Ümit said: “We decided that worse comes to worse we can live on one income.”
This implies two things, first, that one of them not being able to work was the worst case scenario for
this couple. Secondly, Ümit did not indicate whose income they would live in this worst case scenario.
But the situation hints that it would have probably been Megumi’s.
Once they had made the decision on where to live, the continuation of residence in that
country was dependent on their life satisfaction and as they put it, “happiness”. The transnational
nature of their relationship was especially clear through their moves across countries. One third of
interviewees had already lived in more than two countries during their marriage. This re-affirmed the
transnationality of their marriages and indicates that most spouses were open to the idea of moving to
another country depending on the factors outlined above. This is closely related to their social class.
As most of these couples were middle and upper middle class families, they had mobility
opportunities and incentives. They had more mobility due to availability of a larger variety of
transnational options due to their social class (Castles, 2004). Social class is an important topic under
migration because it has a direct impact on the classification of immigrants. Castles (2004) underlines
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the distinction of using the term mobility for the move of the elite whereas the term migrant is used for
lower classes. Migration of lower classes brings about the question of social upward mobility. In
contrary to the existing literature on transnational marriages, migration does not emerge as a
motivation for marriage but the outcome of a marriage. In some cases it was not the preferable
outcome.
The happiness and well-being of spouses was an important factor in determining the country
of residence. Couples re-considered their decision on the country of residence if one or both spouses
were unhappy with their current living arrangement. Emi (36, JF) and Enis (40, TM) were one of these
couples. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, Emi and Enis had met in a third country at an
English school. Upon the decision to get married, the couple initially agreed on moving to Turkey
together. This decision was based on their definition of gender roles. Moving to Japan was not a likely
option for them at the beginning of their marriage as Enis was going to be the breadwinner of the
family. He did not speak Japanese and had limited knowledge of Japan. It was unlikely for him to be
able to find work in Japan. Thus, the couple moved to Turkey together where Emi attended a Turkish
language school and Enis established a business. After their move things did not go as they had
planned as both had difficulties in adapting to their new life together in Turkey. They were both
displeased with the situation and thus they reconsidered their options after one year of residence in
Turkey. It was a difficult decision to make as Enis had established a business from scratch, they had
bought a house and fully furnished it. They had tried to settle down. It was a hard and risky decision
for them to relocate but they decided to take their chances in Japan regardless. This is how Emi
explained the process:
He was looking for a job and business opportunities. He tried things in Turkey but it didn’t
work. He was seeing that I wasn’t happy as well. We didn’t talk about it but he was probably
thinking about it. We came to Japan to try a new opportunity. I wasn’t sure how long it
would last. We might have had to move back to Turkey if things hadn’t worked out.
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It is interesting how Emi was enduring the situation, not complaining about difficulties she
was having. She did not complain to Enis about problems she was having because she saw he was
having a hard time at work. This shows that she was fulfilling her gender role as the nurturing and
supportive housewife who pushed her own needs to second place to meet her husband’s needs
(Holloway, 2010; Kurotani, 2005; Borovoy, 2005; Lock, 1993). Both of them being unhappy was an
important factor in their reconsideration of the country of residence after a year. He was not pleased
with the business culture in Turkey and Emi was having difficulties adapting to Turkish culture.
Having the mobility option due to their social class, they took their chances in Japan and things
worked out well for this couple in Japan. They first established a business together, bought a house
and then had two children.
Cultural, Religious Differences and Social Class
Cultural and Religious Differences
Almost none of the couples had considered, at the time of their marriage decision, to what
extent their religious or cultural differences would matter in their married life. Only one couple,
Zümrüt (40, TF) and Satoru (36, JM) had an upfront negotiation with reference to culture and religion.
Most couples dealt with problems only as they arose. At their initial encounter they all focused on
their spouses’ personal traits and qualities rather than their cultural or religious differences.
Zümrüt and Satoru had met in Turkey while he was working there. Zümrüt comes from an
upper middle class family, is fluent in English, and has a university degree from a respectful university.
She was working when the couple met but she was not career oriented, she quit her work after their
decision to get married. Satoru on the other hand came from an upper class family, was the eldest son,
attended university and worked at a prestigious company. This couple as well went through stages of
friendship, courtship and marriage like many other couples. Their country of residence was
determined according to Satoru’s work as Zümrüt had quit work when they decided to get married.
She was 31 at the time of marriage and was upfront with Satoru about what she expected from the
marriage. During her interview, she outlined her conditions to get married as follows:
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Regardless of who I would end up getting married to I had decided that my family and
friends should definitely be there for my wedding. It had to be in Turkey. We discussed some
things upfront without romanticism. If we get married, it (wedding) will be in Turkey, if we
have a son he will be circumcised and you will not push your religion upon him, he will
choose when he grows up.
Zümrüt’s approach to this negotiation included the two things that she valued: family ties
and freedom of faith. Although self-defined as a liberal Muslim consuming alcohol and pork and not
reproducing religious rituals, circumcision of their son was a precondition for marriage. Her husband
Satoru had found these demands reasonable and they got married on her terms. They did in fact have a
wedding in Turkey with her family and friends as well as Satoru’s family present. Satoru let her
decide on everything about the wedding as he was busy at work and believed that weddings were for
brides, not grooms. Later on in their marriage they had a son, who was born in Turkey and
circumcised soon after birth as they had agreed prior to their marriage. They were the exception in the
sample, except for the case of Zümrüt and Satoru, most couples preferred to deal with problems as
they arose on a day-to-day basis rather than having upfront negotiations before marriage. Most
interviewees confessed that this was due to them not knowing which areas would later become
problematic in their marriages. Thus culture and religion were deemphasized at beginning of
marriages. Couples were then asked what was important in their spouse choices if culture and religion
were not. All couples underlined the importance of communication. They underlined being able to
communicate well and to speak honestly with their spouses as the key characteristic of their marriages.
Quite interestingly even spouses who did not have a common language to communicate in at their
initial encounter expressed honesty and communication as most important factors in their marriages.
This implies that what they refer to as communication is not just about language ability but
understanding, compassion and willingness to communicate.
While religion and culture were pushed back to second place, personal qualities of spouses
played an important role in their marriage decision. The way interviewees defined their spouses
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showed similarities based on nationality and gender. Both male and female Turkish spouses have
repeatedly used terms such as calm, patient, considerate and polite to define their Japanese spouses.
There were gender based differences in how Japanese spouses defined their Turkish spouses. Turkish
husbands were defined as sincere, honest, outspoken and family oriented whereas Turkish female
spouses were defined as cheerful, affectionate and caring. Qualities attributed to Turkish female
spouses show similarities to the case of Filipina brides of Japanese men. Filipina brides consider
themselves attractive spouse choices for Japanese men because they are “very affectionate, very
loving” (Faier, 2007, p.153) in comparison to Japanese women.
One strong contradiction with the existing literature on spouse qualities was the way Turkish
women defined their Japanese husbands. Japanese husbands were labelled as affectionate by most of
their Turkish spouses and this contradicted existing literature on Japanese husband’ qualities. As
explained in Chapter Two, Japanese men were defined by many negative attributes by their Japanese,
Filipina or American wives. They were criticized for their long working hours, heavy drinking, not
doing housework, and lack of display of physical affection (Lieba, 2007; Borovoy, 2005; Piper, 2003;
Kelsky, 2001a; 2001b; Nitta, 1990). At one of my participant observations with the Turkish females
group that I have introduced in the Chapter Three, I brought up this subject for discussion. I explained
negative attributes of Japanese husbands in the literature cited above and asked for these Turkish
women’s opinions. The initial reaction from most of them was to deny these criticisms and defend
their husbands. I will outline their defense arguments from this point onwards.
First of all, most if not all husbands who worked in Japan, had long working hours. This was
the case for both Japanese and Turkish husbands. It was accepted as a natural outcome of residing in
Japan and its work conditions. Women did not blame their husbands for working long hours but they
blamed the work culture in Japan instead. This was especially underlined by couples who had
previously lived abroad. When they lived abroad, husbands came home earlier in the evenings.
Secondly, concerning alcohol consumption, none of the husbands were heavy drinkers. Only
one husband, Naoki (41, JM), was drinking every day though this was not pointed out as a problem in
their marriage. Naoki liked having a beer after he came home from work, sometimes two. His wife
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Mine (31, TF) did not like this in particular though she was not disturbed by it either. She accepted his
habit as a reflection of his Japanese identity. She was aware that in Japan, alcohol consumption is
associated with relaxation. It is consumed after work meetings and social events. Drunkenness is so
normalized that it is an acceptable excuse for misconduct through expression of true feelings (Kawano,
2010, p.102). The relation between Japanese culture and alcohol consumption is well summarized by
Borovoy (2001, p.102) as: “Alcohol itself is woven into the fabric of Japanese society.”
Thirdly, in contradiction to the literature on gendered division of labor at home, according to
these women, Japanese husbands did housework when they were home and asked to do something in
particular. However, it should be noted that most Turkish housewives found it irrational to ask their
husbands to do housework after coming back from work late at night or over the week-end when they
can spend quality family time. During their separate interviews, all husbands, Japanese or Turkish
expressed helping their wives with housework if their wives seemed tired, if they were asked
particularly or if their wives could not do that particular task well on their own. There were Turkish
husbands who criticized their Japanese wives’ housework.
Lastly, in terms of physical display of affection, most Turkish wives agreed that their
husbands disliked public display of affection. They quickly added that this did not mean they were not
affectionate. In one particular case the interviewee’s husband became much more affectionate towards
her after they found out about her illness. She expressed never having doubted his love throughout
their marriage, nevertheless hearing it out loud everyday made her very happy.
A quality of Japanese men not found in the literature came up during another participant
observation with Turkish females. It was the topic of freedom of socialization within marriages. As
explained under the participant observation section in Chapter Three, these women enjoyed freedom
in socialization more than the average Turkish female and were grateful for it. There were two
interesting ambiguities under this topic. First of all there was no reference to the facilitation of
extramarital affairs through this separate socialization of Japanese spouses (Liu-Farrer, 2010). In fact,
there was no reference to extramarital affairs whatsoever in any of the meetings of this group. Many
members said that their Japanese husbands were not jealous at all. Secondly, although none of the
106
participants were previously married to Turkish men, they discussed and agreed among themselves
that this freedom of socialization would have been impossible if they were married to Turkish men.
Ironically, there were women who were married to Turkish men in this group. These women kept
silent although they also participated in social events with women married to Japanese men. This
implied that dynamics in gender relations in Turkish society had shaped the image of a stereotype
Turkish husband in their heads. A stereotype they disliked. Although social class is an important factor
in determining gender relations within the family in Turkey (Fox, 1973; Remez, 1998), the issue of
social class did not come up at any of their gatherings.
Social Class
Transnational marriages literature is strongly formulated around global endogamy with
reference to higher upward social mobility of foreign spouses through marriage. This argument was
irrelevant for most couples in this research as the focus is on marriages with middle and upper middle
class Turks. It only became an issue with reference to low skilled laborers incorporated in the research.
However there was a stigma on low skilled laborers for using marriage as a means for global
endogamy. During the interview at the Turkish Embassy (2009, November 12), both the Envoy and
Secretary expressed their strong opinions on the exploitation of spouse visa category by Turkish low
skilled laborers. They somehow seemed upset with these men who resided in Japan through
acquisition of spouse visas. They believed that all were in fake marriages. They even outlined their
own criteria to identify such marriages during the application procedure at the Embassy. Marriage of
Japanese and Turkish nationals requires the Turkish citizen to obtain a document from the Turkish
Embassy in Tokyo which proves the person’s civil status to be single under Turkish law. The
Secretary who participated in the interview is in charge of providing these documents. He expressed
that there were some men who had gotten married and divorced several times. In most cases, he
commented, they would apply for the marriage document and then come back within a year to get
married again. The Envoy and Secretary who were both married to foreigners themselves, agreed that
visa marriages do not work. They also expressed that these were usually young men who showed up at
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the Embassy with elderly ladies as their bride-to-be. They commented that there was very little, if any,
possibility of a sincere romantic relationship between such couples. Although it seemed exaggerated,
they argued that, according to their observations, 70 per cent of Turkish – Japanese marriages were
visa marriages and that 50 per cent of these ended up in divorce. They believed that the most
important decisions for divorce were age difference, food cultures and religion. Overall the interview
with the Envoy and Secretary was dominated by their negative views on low skilled laborers. They did
not explain why they despised visa marriages of low skilled laborers so much. They neither referred to
it as a damaging factor for the Turkish image in Japan nor as causing them troubles as the Turkish
Embassy. I could not find an appropriate way of asking them why they were so strongly opinionated
against them. Furthermore, why did marriages have to be based on “love”? Most of all, I wanted to ask
them how they knew so much about these marriages just through handling the paperwork. All my
attempts to search for these answers during our interview led me to conclude that these were their
personal perceptions only, projected through their self-defined elite social class rather than facts I was
asking from them as Embassy workers.
Their approach to the issue was interesting and is cited in this section for the following
reasons. First of all, their mindsets, as well as of many other people in the Turkish community, were
fixed at having a set of appropriate reasons to get married. Visa marriage was not one of them. There
had to be a romantic relationship between the couple. “Love” was emphasized as an important and
most important legitimate reason to get married (Swidler, 1986; Dion & Dion, 1996). Secondly, it
was interesting that they referred to food culture as an important factor for divorce. The Envoy, who
was on short assignment in Japan, gave the examples of sushi and pork. Although pork did come up in
connection to religiosity and food cultures, sushi and Japanese cuisine had never come up at any of my
interviews as a source of disagreement between couples, let alone being a reason for divorce. When
we look at the literature, food culture does cause conflict in some transnational marriages (Ko, 2012)
however these are about differences in food cultures rather than problems caused by dishes in
particular. Thirdly, the tone of the interview was dominated by their discrimination based on social
class.
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Although a small community, the Turkish population in Japan is divided into smaller social
groups. Important factors that lead to the formation of these social groups are socio-economic
background in Turkey, religiosity, gender, ethnicity, occupation and income. Since information flow
between diverse Turkish groups is limited, their current social classes in Japan are defined through;
level of education, occupation, income and social class of their Japanese spouses. The classification
becomes complicated when there are contradicting factors regarding social class in Turkey and social
class in Japan. For example, how does one classify a Turkish person who has middle class background
in Turkey but works as a chef and owns a restaurant in Tokyo? The person has only middle school
education but high income. In some cases such people define themselves as upper middle class but
other members of the Turkish community define them as lower class. Thus, defining transnational
social class can be a problematic issue. Why is this classification important? Because there is
prejudice based on social class as we have seen above. The prejudice in the Turkish community went
both ways, from upper classes to lower classes as well as from lower classes towards upper classes.
The upper classes labeled low skilled laborers as opportunistic people who made visa marriages in
order to settle down in Japan. On the other hand, low skilled laborers labeled upper classes as snobbish,
assimilated and detached from their own cultural heritage and Turkish origins.
The issue of visa marriages was more problematic to talk about with low skilled laborers.
They have expressed unease with negative connotations associated with spouse visas holders. During
conversations on marriage low skilled laborers had the tendency to over-emphasize love as the main
reason for their decision to get married. This showed similarities with Filipina brides that Faier (2007)
has studied, these brides also had the tendency to strongly emphasize “love” in their marriages. In the
case of low skilled laborer Turkish men, this was a direct result of their marriages being perceived as
fake marriages for immigration. This bias on low skilled laborers came up during conversations with
diverse members of the community.
Legal status of Turkish spouses in Japan
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Most Turkish spouses, though not all, held spouse visas in Japan. Some interviewees had
switched to Japanese citizenship for practical reasons such as freedom to travel and permanently
settling down in Japan. The spouse visa in Japan is advantageous in comparison to other visa
categories since it automatically provides the spouse the right to work in Japan with flexibility in
terms of employment sector and working hours. All spouse visa holders went through the same
process, one year visa at first application followed by three year visas. None of the interviewees
expressed any concerns about what would happen if they had lost their spouse visas. When we look at
the existing literature, some foreign spouses express feeling pressure to comply with their Japanese
husbands’ and families’ desires as they were dependent on the spouse visa to stay in Japan (Faier,
2007). Although many of the interviewees in this research also depended on their spouses for their
stay in Japan, this did not come up as an issue of insecurity in any of the interviews.
There were three Turkish spouses who had acquired Japanese citizenship and two permanent
residents. There were also three Turkish spouses who chose not to apply for the spouse visa as they
found their own work visa to be safer and more reliable. Those who openly expressed enjoying
advantages of the spouse visa, had middle and upper middle class backgrounds.
Visa categories are strict in Japan and immigrants are not allowed to engage in any kind of
work other than the one specified on their work permit. For instance exchange students can easily
apply for and obtain a work permit to work but only up to twenty-eight hours a week with their student
visas (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013). This was an influential factor in one couple’s
marriage decision, Aki (28, JF) and Tolga (30, TM).
Tolga and Aki had met in Japan through language exchange, dated for a few months and
decided to move in together. The move had also brought up the topic of marriage and Tolga’s visa
status was an important factor in their decision making process. Tolga was in Japan on a student visa
and thus was not allowed to work for more than twenty-eight hours a week although he wanted to. The
couple discussed marriage through the visa perspective, that is, to enable him to work for 40 hours per
week. They had been living together for three months when they decided to get married so they had
known each other for six months in total. Aki explained the situation as follows:
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Aki: He had a student visa at that time, we thought it would be better if we got married since
he could work for longer hours in that case. So we got married really fast.
Researcher: Do you think it’s a bad thing to get married for the visa?
Aki: I don’t know, we might not have gotten married if he had a valid visa with longer working
hours. If he had another visa maybe we might have separated before getting married. Since I’m
very happily married right now I’m happy that we did get married.
Aki and Tolga both had a practical approach to marriage and considered it as a mere
formality that they could use to their advantage. During their separate interviews, both spouses openly
expressed getting married for the visa. In their case, they could openly express this because they both
had full confidence in their relationship which was already advancing in the direction of marriage. For
this couple, visa marriage did not have a negative connotation. It is interesting though how Aki’s
approach differentiates between a relationship and marriage. She comments: “If he had another visa
maybe we might have separated before getting married”. This implies that the possibility of separation
is much lower once a relationship has turned into a marriage. This does not mean that she opposes
divorce under any circumstances, however it implies that when in a marriage, couples need to endure
and work harder to make their marriage work rather than giving up on their relationship. This is also
closely related with stigmas of being divorced in Japan where divorcees are referred to as batsu ichi
(strike one).
Social upward mobility of foreign spouses is a problematic issue due to difficulty in
measuring social class across nations. The main problem is to decide how to make these comparable.
There is a tendency to look at nationalities and classify spouses according to their nation’s overall
ranking of living standards in the world. Cross-country comparisons are based on parameters such as
economic performance, wealth and human rights. This is one of the main problems foreign spouses
face in Japan. Japan is one of the countries with the highest living standards in the world so foreign
spouses inevitably face the rhetoric of upward mobility to a country with higher living standards. This,
however, is not always the case. First of all, the social class of individuals cannot be equated to the
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wealth or living standards of their country of origin. Secondly and more importantly, individuals have
different parameters for measuring living standards as it will be discussed in this section. I will focus
on this topic reference to Japanese spouses’ perceptions on Turkish spouses’ social class.
Perceptions on the Turkish Spouses’ Social Class
In recent years perceptions of social class have changed dramatically in Japan. Although a
large proportion of the society considered themselves as middle class, recent research has shown that
perceptions have shifted towards a social gap society (Ishida & Slater, 2010). When Japanese spouses
in this sample were asked about their Turkish spouses’ social class, most expressed not caring about it.
This could be due to the changing perceptions on social class within Japan or difficulty in measuring
social class across nations as explained above.
One of the spouses who expressed not caring about social class was Shoko (33, JF). She was
33 years old at the time of her interview, married for seven years and was then seven months pregnant
with their first child. In terms of social class she comes from an upper middle class family, has an MA
degree from a prestigious university in Japan and has a prestigious work at an international
organization. After graduating from university and working for few years Shoko had decided to take
time off and travel around the world. Turkey was one of her destination countries. While in Turkey,
she went sailing and that was when she met her Turkish husband. The couple got married three days
after their initial encounter. Although her husband denied to participate in this research, Shoko has
provided information on his social background. Her husband was originally from the less developed
eastern part of Turkey and worked at the western coast during the summer vacations as a sailor. This
implied that he was an irregular worker of lower social class. This implication was supported by him
being a high school graduate. There was a clear social class gap between her and her Turkish spouse.
During her interview she expressed her views on their social class difference in her marriage as
follows:
Researcher: So, you have a M.A. degree?
Shoko: Yes.
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Researcher: What about your husband?
Shoko: He has a high school diploma.
Researcher: Have you ever considered that this could become a problem?
Shoko: No. I’m very unusual, I really don’t care about education status and stuff like
that.
Researcher: Do you think it’s because you're getting married to a foreigner?
Shoko: I think in my case it is because we met and were attracted to each other through a
hobby. You know, sailing. So things like education level didn’t matter. For example, if you
meet somebody through work or through school then what he studies is very important to
you. But in our case, what we shared, what we had in common was sailing which was
completely different from education or culture or something. It was the sea.
It was clear throughout Shoko’s interview that she did not mind the social class differences
between them. Her reasoning was interesting as she emphasized several times during her interview
that what mattered was that they shared a passion for sailing, a hobby. Shoko’s priorities in her spouse
choice was in line with Okano (2009)’s research which showed that young women are more likely to
marry the person they felt “comfortable” with rather than pursuit of upward social mobility or
alternative lifestyles. In accordance, during her interview Shoko emphasized things she shared with
her spouse rather than their differences. She also added that they still go sailing together whenever
they could. Most interviewees shared Shoko’s views on social class. As explained earlier in this
chapter, all spouses in the research underlined personal qualities and characters of their spouses rather
than culture, religion or social class as being important. There were only a few couples who had taken
into account the issue of social class and compatibility. Masato was one of those few spouses.
Masato (53, JM) and Sevgi (51, TF) had met in a third country while studying English and
had initially settled down in that country. In terms of social class, Masato’s interview revealed that he
had in fact taken into account Sevgi’s social class for their marital compatibility. Although he did not
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know about social classes in Turkey, he based his decision on his general impression of the family
analyzed through his lenses of social class in Japan. He defined his perceptions as follows:
The family, the atmosphere, the mentality was very familiar to me. My father used to be
religious so he was a strict man. All my uncles are professors. The men in my family are
very clever people. So for me growing up, an adult was like a professor, a very well-
mannered smart man.
Sevgi’s family was like that. Her father was a very established business person. Her brother
worked at an important art museum. Her mother as well as one of her aunt’s husband were
professors. So, our family backgrounds were similar. That family atmosphere was very
comfortable for me […]
We had similar economic and family background, there wasn’t much difference
economically or culturally. That is very important.
As his remarks in the above paragraph revealed, Masato’s approach to cross cultural social
class is mostly based on education level, occupation and manners. He had calculated Sevgi’s social
class in Turkey through his parameters to determine social class in Japan. Furthermore, his analysis
was not limited to her close family only but also included her relatives. He finished his comments by
underlining that he had pay attention to these because these matter in a marriage: “We had similar
economic and family background, there wasn’t much difference economically or culturally. That is
very important.”
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Chapter V: Negotiating Differences in Married Life
This chapter focuses on couples’ everyday lives with an emphasis on negotiation and
balancing of cultural and religious differences. The aim is to outline what matters and what is worth
fighting for, what do these couples disagree on or fight over. What are their problem solving
mechanisms when they face such problems in their marriages?
With reference to problems often encountered in transnational marriages that were outlined in
Chapter Two, main topics that become problematic for Turkish – Japanese couples were: relations
with in-laws, raising bicultural children and sexuality. Couples had disagreements and even fights on
the first two topics whereas sexuality was a problematic area but not worth having arguments or fights
over. The last section of this chapter, “Living standards redefined through living space” has been a
significant topic in these marriages when wives were Turkish. This is a topic that had not come up in
the existing literature on transnational marriages in Japan.
This chapter starts out with narratives on the intercultural communication mechanisms of
these couples. This sections shows what happens when communication fails and how they handle such
situations. Once these mechanisms are outlined, the chapter passes on to elaborate on the four most
problematic areas of these marriages: relations with in-laws, raising bicultural children, sexuality and
redefinition of living standards through living space.
Intercultural Communication
Problems of intercultural communication came about in many interviews throughout the
research. In line with the existing literature, couples who did not know much about their spouses’
culture or the communication mechanisms within their spouses’ culture face more severe problems.
Melisa (30, TF)’s narrative below portrays a common pattern in how communication fails in these
marriages:
I am reading guidebooks to better understand Japanese people. Japanese people
communicate telepathically. For example something happens and we start arguing and then
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he goes silent. As he remains silent I speak. If he’s waiting for me to communicate
telepathically he’s wasting his time.
Once there was this incident. I had gone back to Turkey after we got married in Japan. He
couldn’t find work but being separated was hard for me and my parents kept saying I should
go and be with my husband as a married woman. But he said he hadn’t yet found work and
that he was still living with his parents. Back then when I arrived in Japan he said: “I have no
work, I’m staying with my parents” Turns out he didn’t want me to come to Japan at that
time. He said he thought I had understood but how could I have understood that if he doesn’t
tell me this directly!? He can’t say negative things directly so I always have to confirm a few
times.
Melisa and Hiroki had been married for a year and a half at the time of their interviews. They
were one of the couples who were facing problems because they were newly wed. They were trying to
get used to being a couple while trying to settle down in terms of stability. Melisa was new to Hiroki’s
culture and Japan. The process was hard for her as she did not have any knowledge of Japan before
their encounter. When she arrived in Japan she had no language skills either, so she was having a hard
time settling in. The couple communicated in English which was a foreign language to both of them.
As was outlined in Chapter Four, however, language abilities were evaluated separately from
communication. In terms of communication mechanisms, the way Hiroki communicated or stopped
communicating to avoid conflict caused a problem for Melisa. It is important to note, though, that his
stopping of communication was in line with men’s tendency to go silent to avoid confrontation when
women ask for a change in the marriage (Komter, 1989). Thus although Melisa thinks it is a cultural
problem, it could be based on gender differences rather than cultural differences. The reason it is
elaborated as a cultural problem is because although communication was outlined as key in most of
these marriages, Japanese spouses had the tendency to avoid conflict or arguments by stopping
communication, male or female. Melisa had difficulty dealing with this method that Hiroki used as
well. She thought this resembled telepathy which was interesting as such a pattern also existed in long
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term marriages. Couples who have been together for long periods are assumed to understand each
other without use of words, by simple gestures or even looks. However in their case it was different.
Hiroki was not waiting for her to understand, he was cutting off his communication in order to avoid
confrontation and conflict. Furthermore, as her husband had the tendency to avoid negative forms at
times it was difficult for her to understand what he meant. She expressed always having to confirm a
few times. Although they occasionally faced some problems in their relationship and marriage, they
considered these as minor bumps and were determined to overcome them through improved
communication.
Communication and mutual understanding between couples was not a given in Turkish –
Japanese marriages and it had to be developed through time for most couples. In accordance, the first
years of marriage were the most challenging for couples. Similar to Melisa’s case, Mine (31, TF) was
also having communication problems with her husband Naoki during the first year of their marriage.
As explained in detail in Chapter Four, Mine and Naoki had met online for the specific purpose of
getting married and did so after a relatively short period of courtship. After the first year of their
marriage, Mine who had never been in a relationship prior to her marriage was feeling irritated and
had her doubts on whether marriages or relationships should be this way. It had gone as far as her
asking for a divorce:
Problems you have in marriages are the same whether the marriage is international or not but
in an international marriage it all becomes bigger (problems), one size bigger. Towards the
end of the first year I couldn’t take it anymore, I thought I was going crazy. I was irritated
and didn’t want to accept things. […] I don’t know, maybe it also has to do with my
imagination and image of marriage…
But him? Nothing! I was telling him I wanted to separate, that I didn’t want him anymore but
he kept on saying no, no. I never heard the word separation from him.
Researcher: So you considered divorce?
Mine: Yeah, I asked for it. It wasn’t because I wanted to separate from him but I just no
longer knew what I wanted or should be doing.
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Researcher: Why did it come to that point?
Mine: I wonder why... Maybe because I just didn’t understand, I couldn’t figure out his
attitude, what I was supposed to make of it. I mean he was doing something but I didn’t
know what he meant by that something. But as time goes by it’s the reverse, you know what
you need to know whatever he does. Then it becomes mundane because he knows you and
you know him, you can argue about small things but they don’t become bigger. Besides, he
has a calm personality, I have a calm personality. […] I have this Syrian male friend who is
married to a Japanese women and when we talk we realize we always fight over similar
things. I guess this goes on until you learn to accept that person for who s/he is.
Mine’s situation was interesting as it resembled the case of a Filipina that Faier (2007) had
studied, when the Japanese husband did not want a divorce no matter what. Even after the wife told
him that she wanted to separate, that she did not want him anymore, he refused. In Mine’s situation
her husband Naoki refused to even consider separation as an option and argued that they needed time
to get used to each other. Mine had come to the point of considering divorce because she was stressed
over not being able to communicate. In the end however, Naoki was right, as a newlywed couple they
needed time to get used to each other and adapt. As Mine decided to give their marriage another
chance, she got better at reading Naoki’s movements and understanding him. During her interview
Mine happily expressed as being over their communication problems. They are still married and now
have a child.
Communication problems among some couples lead to the consideration of divorce as an
option in the first years of marriage. This is in line with the divorce data in Turkey and Japan, where
most of the divorces occur in first five or ten years of marriage (Alexy, 2007, p.181; Turğut, 2011). 
Couples developed diverse mechanisms to deal with the probability of divorce and overcome their
problems. Some managed to overcome their problems through communication, some made changes to
their marriage dynamics. Divorce was seriously considered in some cases but couples tended to avoid
it if they had children and especially if the children were young. There are different patterns of divorce
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in different societies. Japanese and Turkish societies both discourage divorce. Couples tend not to
think about divorce at the beginning of their marriage yet the divorce rate in Japan has risen
significantly in past decades and is around thirty per cent. Although the rate of divorce in Japanese
marriages and their marriages with foreigners are about the same, Liversage (2012; 2013)’s research
has shown that divorce of Turks living in Europe is higher than that in Turkey. When we look at
divorce dynamics, most couples tend to get divorced in the first five years of their marriage in Turkey
and the first ten years of marriage in Japan. Lack of communication as well as relations with in-laws
are the main divorce causes. On the other hand, having a child and the need for economic security are
important reasons not to get a divorce.
Accordingly, decision for divorce is approached differently and by different generations. For
example, Japanese women included in Borovoy’s (2005) research were reluctant to get a divorce
although they had alcoholic or co-dependent husbands. This was explained by two factors, first by
their age and generation, secondly by their empowerment through marriage. Regarding their age and
generation, these interviewees were born in the 1930’s and 1940’s and thus were in their fifties and
sixties when the research was conducted in the 1990’s. Their generation had a relatively conservative
approach to marriage which inclined them to endure the problems they faced in marriage. Secondly,
being married housewives was fulfilling for the women; it provided power in the household and
enabled them to construct friendship networks through their social status. Furthermore, if divorced, it
was very unlikely for them to be able to economically support themselves.
Today, most of the divorcees are in their thirties and have been married for less than ten
years. The percentage of divorces in transnational marriages do not show significant variation
compared to Japanese divorces. The balance between fulfillment within the marriage and potential
freedom plays an important role in the decision making for divorce. Some of the reasons for divorce in
contemporary Japan are husbands not helping with household chores, lack of communication between
spouses, not using polite words, not having sex, verbal or physical abuse, alcoholism, extra-marital
affairs and gambling addictions. On the other hand, reasons not to get a divorce are to ensure financial
support, consideration for the well-being of children and avoiding the social stigma of being divorced
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(Holloway, 2010; Alexy, 2007, 2011). In Japan, those who choose to get a divorce rather than staying
in an unhappy marriage would only do so when their task of raising children is completed. In terms of
financial situation, in 1985 the income of households led by divorcee women with children was only
forty per cent of the income of household led by men (Lock, 1993, p.49-50). The gender gap and the
structure of the labor market are important factors that discourage women from getting a divorce in
Japan.
On the other hand when we look at divorce data for Turks, the main reasons for divorce are
as follows: irresponsible and unresponsive attitudes, domestic violence, adultery, economic difficulties,
alcoholism, gambling and relations with in-laws (Turğut, 2011). These show some similarities with 
Japan. The common reasons for divorce in Japan and Turkey are adultery, alcoholism, gambling,
verbal and physical abuse. The divorce process is different in Japan and Turkey. In Turkey, couples
need to go to court in order to get a divorce whereas in Japan it is a simple procedure of submitting
necessary documents at the municipality. Differences in the divorce system make divorces of
Japanese–Turkish couples troublesome. Under the bureaucratic circumstances outlined above, it may
seem more practical and simple for the couple to get a divorce in Japan but the divorce of a Turkish–
Japanese couple under Japanese law is not directly recognized under Turkish Law. The process in
Japan transforms the Japanese spouse’s marital status however the Turkish spouse’s marital status in
Turkey remains as married until the Turkish registry has been notified. If the necessary legal
document is not sent to the Turkish registry, the Turkish citizen remains married under Turkish law
and thus cannot re-marry. The completion of this process requires the cooperation of spouses. In order
for a divorce under Japanese law to be recognized, Turkish authorities require the Japanese spouse to
submit a document to the Turkish Embassy concerning the divorce. In cases of bitter divorces if the
Japanese spouse refuses to cooperate with the Turkish spouse, the Turkish spouse will remain married
under Turkish law and thus cannot re-marry. This was the case of Yoshiko (42, JF) and her ex-
husband. During her interview Yoshiko proudly declared refusing to submit this document to her ex-
husband even years after their divorce. This was her revenge for him cheating on her.
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Relations with In-laws
Parents and thus in-laws play an important role in spouse choices. This is explained through
two factors. First, the tradition of arranged marriages existed in both Turkey and Japan as omiai in
Japan and görücü usulü in Turkey. Families and parents played an important role in the spouse
selection process. Second, in both Turkey and Japan, marriage is more than a legal contract between
two individuals. Marriage is an institution that connects two families. It connects the kin of the wife to
the kin of the husband. And thus, parents come into the picture through this connection. Children have
their duties towards their parents and this is reflected in their spouse choices as well as their married
life in both Turkey and Japan. Although motives to get married as well as dynamics of marriage have
changed and have been modernized, in-laws still play an important role in marriage decision making
(Nakano, 2011, p.138). Family structures have changed and modernized in the past decades through
the shift to nuclear families. However parents still intervene in their children’s marriage decisions,
especially in the case of daughters. In Japan, parents intervene in their child’s decision on marriage
either to protect them from having illegitimate children or for them to make comfortable marriages. A
comfortable marriage implies marriage with a person from compatible social background who could
provide financial security and stability. However marrying up was discouraged as social upward
mobility through marriage was associated with unhappiness (Hertog, 2009; Okano, 2009, p.208). In
Turkey parents even face social pressures because of their children’s decision for marriage or delay or
marriage.
In-laws’ Reactions to Potential Foreign Spouses
There were parents who did not initially approve of their children’s marriage to foreigners
but there was no dominant trend of rejection from either Japanese or Turkish in-laws based on religion
or culture. There was only one extreme case in which the couple faced rejection from both sides and
few cases in which the Turkish identity became an advantage.
Most Turkish spouses initially faced opposition from their families. There was no gender or
social class based opposition. There were three men who faced strong opposition from their marriages
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which was carried on to their married lives as a problem. Two of them were a low skilled laborer
whereas the other was from upper class.
Mehmet was one of the low skilled laborer men who faced opposition. Mehmet (33, TM) and
his wife had met in a third country while she was studying and he was working. Three months after
their encounter he decided to move out of the country. Since they were already in a relationship they
decided to move to Japan together instead of him going back to Turkey alone. After their decision,
they visited Turkey and were planning on getting married there. However, finding the paperwork
complicated, they decided to get married in Japan instead and delayed marriage until their move to
Japan. Mehmet’s father had passed away and his mother was living with his single sister. His mother’s
approach to his marriage was interesting and changed through time. It was opposition at the beginning
of their marriage and then evolved into rejection and denial through the years. Mehmet expressed
discomfort in his mother’s rejection of the Japanese bride which went as far as his mother trying to
introduce him to potential Turkish spouses while he was visiting Turkey. Mehmet’s mother’s attitude
was in line with marriage patterns of Turkish immigrants residing in European countries: research has
shown that about 70 per cent of Turkish immigrants prefer Turkish spouses (Crul & Doomernik, 2003;
Schoenmaeckers, Lodewijckx & Gadeyne, 1999). Liversage (2012; 2013) gives references to Turkish
immigrants who live in Denmark and the importance of the kin in finding them spouses. Mehmet’s
mother’s attitude was in line with this trend in Europe but he did not care for a spouse from Turkey.
His mother’s attitude made him angry and broke his heart at the same time. It broke his heart because
he had already been married for seven years and had a four-year-old daughter when his mother
proposed this. He also complained that his mother did not show much interest in his daughter although
she was the only grandchild.
There was another aspect of this situation that made Mehmet angry. He was outraged to find
that the person his mother wanted to introduce to him was a divorcee. He found the idea of being
considered as a man to marry a divorcee to be condescending and insulting. He looked down on
divorcee women as if they were “second-hand” goods. In order to justify his approach he mentioned
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his current 20-year-old girlfriend for whom he was the first sexual partner11. His pride in having taken
his girlfriend’s virginity and at the same time stigmatizing divorcee women for not being virgins is the
direct outcome of how gender was constructed in Turkey (Vergin, 1985; Parla, 2001).
Bora was the upper middle class man who faced opposition. In fact, Bora (36, TM) and Tami
(40, JF) faced two sided rejection from in-laws, both based on religion. That is to say, the Turkish in-
laws rejected Tami and Japanese in-laws rejected Bora, based on religious differences. Bora came
from an upper middle class but conservative family in Turkey. He had graduated from one of Turkey’s
prestigious universities and then arrived in Japan for his graduate studies. He is fluent in both Japanese
and English and found good work opportunity in Japan soon after his graduation. He had been
working in the finance sector for over a decade at the time of his interview. His wife Tami came from
a middle class family and had a two-year college degree, she did not speak any foreign languages.
Tami was working at the time of their encounter but she quit her job when the couple decided to move
in together prior to marriage. Even when they started to co-habit, Bora had kept this relationship from
his parents. They only found out about her when the couple decided to get married.
When we look at the rejection from Tami’s parents, they commented that he might be a
“terrorist” because he was a Muslim and disapproved of their relationship. However as Tami insisted
on introductions they consented to meet him in person. When they finally did, they understood and
were perhaps relieved that he was in fact far from being a terrorist and approved their marriage.
Although the issue of social class did not come up during the interview, Tami’s possible social upward
mobility through this marriage might have been another reason for their objection. At the time of
marriage she was already 39 years old, did not work and the couple cohabited, these might have been
important factors in her parent’s approval of the marriage after their initial objection. Research on
marriage has shown that Japanese parents associate upward social mobility with unhappiness (Hertog,
2009; Okano, 2009, p.208).
When we look at the Turkish in-laws’ side of story, they did not approve of his marriage
based on two factors that were linked to one and other; her foreign identity and her Shinto-Buddhist
11He was having an extramarital affair.
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faith. The first factor, her foreign identity had an important implication for in-laws: first that their son
Bora was likely to settle down in Japan instead of going back to Turkey. In fact, prior to his marriage,
Bora had his doubts on whether he would settle down in Japan or eventually go back to Turkey. The
clearest indicator was that although he was a long term resident he had not applied for a permanent
residency or citizenship and kept renewing his work visa instead. Research has shown that the issue of
where to settle down permanently is a difficult one for immigrants. Determinant factors for permanent
settlement of immigrants include family as well. Immigrants who marry into the host society are more
likely to settle down (Şenyürekli1 & Menjívar, 2012; Khoo 2003; Jensen & Pedersen 2007).  
The second source of the rejection seemed to be the polytheist nature of her religion in
particular. The Turkish mother-in-law expressed her disappointment in Bora’s bride choice as follows:
“Couldn’t you have at least found a Christian girl so that we could have believed in the same God?”
This implies that her polytheist faith in particular was the problem. When this came up during our
interview I asked Bora if his parents were religious. He said they were not religious but conservative.
It is interesting how he wanted to de-emphasize religiosity by using the term conservative. Although
their conservatism was religion based, this is the direct outcome of politicization of religion in Turkey
and negative connotations on being defined as religious. Being religious was associated with
backwardness and lower social classes (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 1999; 2006; Laçiner, 1995; Kara, 1995; 
Spencer, 1958).
The relations with in-laws became the central issue for Bora and Tami during their first years
as a married couple. Tami did not even want to visit Turkey with Bora knowing they had opposed
their marriage. This reflected on other aspects of their marriage as well. As Tami refused a wedding in
Turkey, Bora retaliated by refusing a wedding in Japan. The couple ended up not celebrating their
marriage. Furthermore, their struggle with these problems first delayed and then ended their chances
of having children. While relations could be softened with in-laws by having children, this was no
longer an option due to Tami’s age. However, Bora expressed during his follow up interview that
things had perhaps worked out for the best. Tami had a solid stand against Islam and religiosity in
childrearing. She did not deny him the right to teach their child about Islam but she feared that the
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child might grow up to become a terrorist if he did so. Thus, according to Bora, not having children
allowed them to avoid such potential problems. Needless to say, there was no wish for grandchildren
from either Turkish or Japanese in-laws.
The cases of Mehmet and Bora outlined above were the two most extreme cases. Most
parents were accepting of foreign spouses even when they initially had their doubts and objections. In
three particular cases the Muslim identity of the Turkish spouse became an advantage because their
Japanese spouses came from strict Christian families. This was welcomed because as Bora’s mother
had mentioned, they “[…] believed in the same God.” The case of Tolga and Aki is presented in the
next section.
The Muslim identity of the Turkish spouse became an advantage in two cases as Aki and
Masato came from Christian families. Their families were especially religious and they went to church
every week and had nuns among relatives. During her interview Aki commented on religiosity of her
parents and its impact on their marriage as follows:
Aki: My parents are Christians; they go to church every Sunday.
Researcher: No temples or shrines then?
Aki: Christians hate those things, my parents never go to jinja (shrine)
Researcher: Are they religious?
Aki: They are very serious Christians. Very religious. I’m not Christian […] when I was a
kid they took me to church every Sunday. I learned some things but now I’m not Christian.
Researcher: What did they say about Tolga’s religion?
Aki: They knew there are lots of Muslim people in Turkey. But my parents love Muslim
people.
Researcher: Why?
Aki: It’s one of the big religions; they love to go to mosques. They respect Muslim people.
Aki’s parents were very religious and she herself had a strict and religious upbringing. She
expressed her parents’ strong dislike of the Japanese polytheist religious system through: “Christians
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hate those things, my parents never go to jinja (shrine).” Her parents’ welcoming attitude towards
Tolga was based on Islam being a monotheist religion. Once again, worshipping the same God was
emphasized as in Bora’s case.
Social pressures on Turkish parents played an important role in how they approached their
children’s marriage to a foreigner. There were cases where in-laws’ attitudes were negatively
influenced by people around them. Mine (31, TF) and Naoki (41, JM) faced such a problem in Turkey.
Mine’s parents faced social pressures on their daughter’s decision to marry a foreigner. Mine and
Naoki had met online for the particular purpose of getting married. They went to Turkey together for
Mine’s family’s blessings and their engagement. Mine’s family as well as her relatives first warmly
welcomed Naoki to the family. They approved of this marriage. However, only few days later there
were reconsiderations on the family’s part. Mine explained her parents’ situation as follows:
My parents didn’t oppose our marriage when I told them I was seeing someone in Japan. But
then a few months later, as people around them heard about it, everyone started commenting
on this. These rumors influenced my parents. People were telling them things like I would
probably never go back to Turkey again after my marriage. This had an impact on their
approach to my marriage with Naoki. But now that they know Naoki well this subject does
not come up.
I mean we went there, there was no problem at the beginning but then the number of people
around us increased, relatives and neighbors were arriving. Some of them had difficulty
accepting our marriage. This made my parents reconsider their approval of our marriage.
They were afraid that I might really never go back to Turkey again.
All my relatives, elderly family members of the family were there and then Naoki and his
family arrived. There was a bit of tension. People were asking “What are we going to do?”
As if there was a problem, as if they were going to say no and send them back. I was shocked
and couldn’t hold back anymore, I just started crying.
When my dad saw me crying he realized his mistake. He just said: “You children go buy
your wedding rings now”.
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The situation of Mine clearly portrays how strong social pressures can be on in-laws as well
the transnational couple especially when the bride is Turkish. When we look at marriages of Turks in
Europe, the rate of Turkish females bringing in spouses from Turkey is much higher compared to their
male counterparts as well as the number of Turkish women marrying into the host society. This is an
indicator of Turkish females being less likely to marry foreigners in comparison to Turkish men (Crul
& Doomernik, 2003; Liversage, 2012). Although Mine’s Parents had initially granted their blessing
for the marriage, as more people, including extended family members and neighbors intervened, social
pressures increased. Mine’s parents started becoming confused and worried. They even reconsidered
whether they should approve this marriage or not. And this was at the point when the Japanese groom
and his family had traveled all the way from Japan to Turkey for the engagement. This clearly
indicates that social pressures on families with daughters can be very strong for Turkish families.
Naoki’s parents on the other hand, who were not aware of all these tensions, had no reservations
concerning their son’s decision to marry Mine. On the contrary, they were delighted that he was
getting married. Naoki was already 41 years old, at an age his parents thought was unlikely for him to
get married at all.
Relations with In-laws After Marriage
The strongest proof that in-laws are still important actors in their children’s marriage is that in
both Japan and Turkey relations with in-laws is listed within the main reasons for divorce (Alexy,
2007, p.181; Turğut, 2011). Traditional Japanese mothers-in-law could be very harsh on their 
daughters- in-law as they instruct the brides on how to become good wives and wise mothers. This
power of the mother-in-law can be traced back to the ie family structure in which they were in charge
of training new brides to run the household (Lock, 1993, pp.95-99). This was not the case for any of
the couples included in the research. None of the mothers-in-law were trying to educate their
daughters-in-law to be good housewives or mothers. Even if they did, they did it kindly and
maintained good relations. This marked a difference with the existing literature on transnational
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marriages in rural Japan however it should be noted that none of the families in the research lived in
the rural area.
Relations with Japanese in-laws
Cohabitation with the groom’s parents after marriage was the norm under Japan’s and
Turkey’s previous family systems. This has changed with both societies’ transition to nuclear family
systems however topics of co-habitation and caring for the elderly were included in the research. All
spouses were asked their ideas on co-habitation with in-laws. Japanese men in particular were asked
whether they were the eldest son in their family. Only two, Satoru (36, JM) and Masato (53, JM) were
the eldest sons in their families.
Both Satoru’s and Masato’s fathers had already passed away when their interviews were
conducted. In terms of living arrangements, Satoru’s mother lived about ten kilometers away from
them but they did not meet up often. In their case the issue of elderly care had not yet come up as his
mother was still relatively young. On the other hand, Masato’s living arrangements was a modernized
way of the previous family system characterized by cohabitation. Although their two houses looked
like one building, they had separate entrances. Thus they lived next to each other. As the father in-law
had already passed away the mother in-law lived alone and was still healthy enough to take care of
herself.
The Turkish bride who was in closest proximity to her mother-in-law was Sevgi (51, TF).
They lived on the same land with the houses next to each other but with separate entrances. She had
good relations with her mother-in-law. This mother-in-law had even travelled all the way to Europe
when they had their first child. Sevgi’s own mother was unable to go help her as she could not travel
by plane. Sevgi expressed gratitude for her mother-in-law’s help when they had their first baby. This
mother-in-law was already quite aged at the time of Sevgi’s interview and their relations had change
in time. The literature shows that Japanese women go through different stages as they age. When the
impact of illnesses is combined with old age, they tend to change while aging (Lock, 1993). In
accordance, Sevgi noted that her mother-in-law had changed through the years and that, for example,
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it was now becoming more difficult for them to communicate. Her mother-in-law had difficulty
recalling English words whereas Sevgi’s Japanese remained limited. Nevertheless, the mother-in-law
and the Turkish bride, Sevgi had good relations. Sevgi never complained about her mother- in-law, not
during her interview nor any of the social gatherings. She always talked about her with respect. When
Sevgi was asked if she would take care of her mother- in-law in the future, she replied without any
hesitation: “If it becomes necessary, of course!” Masato was the elderly son and had a younger brother.
They had taken over their father’s business together. Masato and Sevgi lived in the family house
whereas his brother lived in another neighborhood. Neither Masato nor Sevgi mentioned dislike or
hardship over this situation.
All couples in the research were asked about their living arrangements and geographic
proximity to in-laws. There were a few cases of Turkish groom and Japanese bride living close to their
Japanese in-laws. This living arrangement was planned for the mother to support her daughter in
childrearing rather than the daughter caring for her mother. This was the special case for four working
mothers; Misaki (42, JF), Megumi (39, JF), Aki (28, JF), and Yuki (48, JF). Misaki and Megumi’s
cases are explained in detail below. These couples had arranged to move close to their Japanese in-
laws for their support in childrearing.
Misaki and Can (49, TM) had met at a cultural event through the Turkish Embassy. The
company Misaki worked in was cooperating with Turkish companies and beyond this she was
personally interested in Turkish culture and was trying to learn Turkish. Can comes from an upper
class family and has received an elite education after which he has found a prestigious job.
Unfortunately Misaki has refrained from providing detailed information on her social background but
she herself has a university degree, is fluent in English and was on a career path prior to marriage. Can
expressed being impressed by her the very first time they met. They exchanged numbers and started
dating soon after their encounter. Their relationship eventually evolved into a marriage through a
similar pattern as many other couples in the research. Can had strategically popped the question when
there was a possibility of Misaki moving abroad for work. And thus she stayed and the couple got
married. They later had two children. Childrearing was heavy on Misaki as she was still working after
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the birth of their first child. This led to the couple’s decision to move close to Misaki’s parents. She
explained the process as follows:
After we had a child we realized it was too difficult to manage everything (household,
work and childrearing) without my mother’s help. I needed my mother to help me out. So we
decided to move to this place because it is closer to their home. When our daughter was small
my mother used to come to play with her a lot.
Can complained at the beginning as this place was very far from his office. But when
we lived in central Tokyo I became ill. I was hospitalized for one week when our daughter
was only 10 months old. I got ill because I was very busy. At that time I was working on a
book translation from English to Japanese. I was working very hard and the baby was crying
often. I still had to breastfeed her and so it was tiring for me. I became ill just after I finished
working on that book. My mother was upset about the situation and she asked why I had
worked so hard, why we lived too far for her to come and help us. So she said: “Why don’t
you move closer to us?” That’s how we decided to move.
Working conditions of these women were important factors for their mothers to help them
with childrearing. In the case of Misaki, her mother was angry at her for pushing herself too much.
She then offered to help if they moved closer. Their move was at the expense of Can’s longer
commute. Although in his separate interview Can reaffirmed disliking the commute, he later liked
their new neighborhood and said this was best for the family. He was worried about Misaki’s health as
well. He was grateful for his mother-in-law’s help and did not express any discomfort from their
increased interaction and presence. Can was not the only husband who appreciated his mother- in-
law’s help. Megumi’s mother had also helped Ümit (TM, 40) and Megumi during their childrearing
process and Ümit was grateful. Megumi described their situation as follows:
My mother picks him (our son) up from the daycare so we see her in the evenings. She
goes back home when Ümit comes back from work. They live close by. Otherwise we
couldn’t have made it.
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Since both Megumi and Ümit worked, they could not pick up their son from the daycare. The
mother-in-law picked him up, brought him home and waited for Ümit to get back from work. It is
interesting that Ümit was coming home before Megumi could. Ümit expressed his views on their
arrangement and his mother-in-law as follows:
Her mother used to come over almost every day until only three or four months ago.
Our son’s school ends around three in the afternoon. He is then dropped off at the daycare
from four to six. My mother-in-law picks him up at six. Recently there has been an illness in
their family so that’s why she can’t come over as often. But she still comes 2-3 times a week
[…] She used to even cook and bring over dinner until recently. I would have to be very
ungrateful person to say anything bad about her. We moved to a house close to hers on
purpose. We live only about half an hour away so she could come every day.
Ümit also maintained good relations with his mother-in-law as he was very grateful for her
help. This couple, as well had made their living arrangements in order to live close to their in-laws.
The issue of them caring for Megumi’s parents had not yet come up as an issue since her mother was
still relatively young. She even bore the role of caretaker for their relative who had gotten ill. When
we look at the literature, the mother-in-law’s role as a caretaker is not a new phenomenon although it
has become less common nowadays. Lock (1993, p.151) notes that in the traditional family
grandmothers used to take care of children when the mothers were working in the field.
Relations with Turkish in-laws
When we look at the Turkish side of these families, their physical contact remained limited
due to the geographic distance. Most Turkish spouses expressed their parents having difficulty
traveling by plane for twelve hours. In relation to this geographic distance, decision on country of
residence was an important factor in how parents approached their children’s transnational marriage.
In the cases of couples living in Japan, Japanese in-laws were more accepting of Turkish spouses
compared to Turkish in-laws’ acceptance of the Japanese spouses. Geographic distance was put
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forward as a problem by Turkish in-laws. On one occasion I had the opportunity to chat about my
research with one of my interviewee’s mother. She kindly offered her views on her Japanese son-in-
law as follows:
He’s like an angel, I couldn’t have loved him more if I had given birth to him myself
however in the end he’s a foreigner. I mean look at us, we always have to go back and forth
between Turkey and Japan, this is too tiring, I am not as young anymore you know, I don’t
know how many more years I can keep on doing this.
The long flight as well as the cost of travelling back and forth between Japan and Turkey often
became a problem in relations with family and relatives. In cases where the couple had children,
Turkish grandparents were complaining about not being able to see their grandchildren as often as
they wished. Although Turkish Airlines has three flights per day between Japan to Turkey, flights are
expensive, long and tiring, especially if the traveler is over sixty or seventy years old. This problem is
even worse for couples who live in a third country as they have to choose between Japan and Turkey
when they have the time and money to travel. Cost of traveling between countries came up during
many interviews and one interviewee, Masato claimed he could define transnational marriages in only
one word: “Expensive.” He was referring to travel expenses in particular as his wife and two children
went to Turkey every year. However, this did not mean that he was complaining and wanted his wife
and children to travel less. He accepted this as an extension of close Turkish family ties and a natural
outcome of his transnational marriage.
Family Ties
Mothers played an important role in communication with the couple whereas relations with
fathers-in-law, Turkish or Japanese, remained weak. When we look at Japanese spouses’ interactions
with their Turkish in-laws, there was a division. While some enjoyed and admired close family ties
within Turkish culture, some were disturbed by Turkish in-laws’ interventions in their marriages and
daily lives. Many Japanese wives expressed finding the Turkish mother-in-law’s interference to be
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overwhelming. This was expressed not only by Japanese wives living in Turkey but also by those
living in Japan even though they only met a few times a year at the most. The way in which the
Japanese wife handled the situation depended mostly on her age and personality. Four different
patterns of family ties with in-laws are presented below through Emi (36, JF), Aki (28, JF), Megumi
(39, JF) and Tami (40, JF).
Emi (36, JF) and Enis (40, TM) had met in a third country while they were both studying
English. The couple had initially moved to Turkey but then re-located to Japan after a year. By her
one-year residence in Turkey, Emi had become familiar with Turkish culture and had gotten used to
strong family ties. During her interview Emi commented on family ties as follows:
Now I prefer living in Japan because all my family is here. I learned about the importance of
family from his family though. They are together all the time. First it was bothering me but
when I got used to it I liked it too. They know you, you know them. When I think about my
own family we don’t see each other that often. We don’t talk that often. […] They don’t call
me but I call them all the time. So, that’s the reason why I want to live in Japan, to be close
to my family.
Emi had difficulty adapting to intense Turkish family ties at the beginning of their marriage
however through time she got used to it and started admiring close family ties. Upon their move to
Japan she realized that her Japanese family ties and interactions were different. Her experience in
Turkey made her want to establish closer relations with her own family in Japan. She started
contacting them more often even though they did not contact her back as often. Although she now
admired these family ties, it was hard for her to get used to this pattern of interaction in the beginning.
During their initial move to Turkey, Emi had to go two months before Enis and live with his parents
while he took care of some business overseas. When asked if it was difficult to live in Turkey, she
replied:
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It was the first time for me to live in Turkey and in the first two months I was alone with his
family. They didn’t speak English and I was learning Turkish at a language school. His
parents drove me to the language school every day by car.
[…] I think I went home after school because his parents were waiting to pick me up. During
the weekend I didn’t do anything. They couldn’t leave me alone; it was hard for them too.
They felt obliged to drive me every day.
In Emi’s situation, her in-laws felt responsible for her while Enis was away and were
overprotective. They did not allow her to use public transportation and were driving her everywhere
by car. They did not want to leave her on her own as she did not speak any Turkish and had just
arrived in the country. They were feeling responsible for taking good care of her until Enis joined
them. However this burdened Emi. On the one hand she was bored from not being able to do anything
on her own, on the other hand she felt bad that they felt obliged to drive her everywhere that she
wanted to go. On top of all this, the language barrier limited their communication. The literature on
communication with in-laws through a language barrier indicates that this could be either an
advantage or a disadvantage depending on the situation. It becomes an advantage when foreign
spouses do not want to communicate with their in-laws. However in cases like Emi’s it can become a
disadvantage in that it limited further much needed communication.
Emi was not the only Japanese spouse to have overprotective in-laws, Aki was facing similar
problems in her relations with the Turkish mother-in-law. In her initial interview Aki said many
positive things about her mother-in-law regarding their first encounter in Turkey. However things
changed after the Turkish mother-in-law visited them in Japan for a month. She seemed more reserved
about her mother-in-law during our follow up interview. Although she refrained from criticizing her
mother-in-law’s behavior, she seemed frustrated and complained about being treated like a child. She
talked about things that frustrated her during her mother-in-law’s stay as follows:
She kept on telling me things like:
“Put on socks!”
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“Wear slippers at home!”
“Buckle up your jacket”
“Wear a hat”
Why was she doing this!? I’m an adult you know, not a child!
These sentences that Aki heard from her Turkish mother-in-law are in fact very common
phrases that Turkish mothers say to their children. Although Aki was not aware of it, this was her
mother-in-law’s way of showing her affection and treating her like her own child. During his separate
interview, her husband Tolga explained in detail why Aki and his mother could not get along well and
why. Her one-month long stay in Japan was a turning point in Aki’s relations with her mother-in-law.
Furthermore, the Turkish mother-in-law’s stay caused problems between Aki and Tolga as well. Tolga
explained the situation as follows:
My mother? She (Aki) really liked my mother when we were there (Turkey), they had lots of
fun, and they got along well. But when she came over to Japan it was different. At first they
got along very well and then she had difficulty understanding my mom. She didn’t
understand what my mom was trying to do. But my mom herself didn’t know what she was
doing, you know [laughs]. I mean Turkish mothers are different, they want to take care of
everything, intervene, change things, redecorate, do laundry, mess up our clothes in the
laundry, and she (Aki) went crazy. Lots happened. Even if I told my mom not to do things
she just did and Aki wouldn’t understand why she’s doing so much housework. She was just
trying to help us out. It’s help. Everyone helps each other out in Turkey. If she wanted she
went into the kitchen and changed everything, put up her own stuff. That caused problems,
she (Aki) was bothered. So we argued, I asked her not to react so much since she (my
mother) was a guest.
The paragraph above clearly depicts how the Turkish mother-in-law was intervening in the
couple’s everyday life. She was changing things around the house, redecorating according to her own
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taste and doing all kinds of housework. Tolga underlined that she was just trying to help them out as
they were both working full time. For him this was normal because he was used to his mother and he
knew how much Turkish mothers intervened in their children’s lives. However he did not understand
why Aki could not accept this. Furthermore, when relations between Aki and the Turkish mother in-
law got tense, Tolga asked Aki to be respectful towards his mother. It is interesting that although it
was the couple’s house in Japan of which Aki was normally in charge, when the mother-in-law arrived,
Tolga asked Aki to respect his mother rather than asking his mother to respect their lives and the way
they had organized it. This also reflected the strong attachment between Tolga and his mother. The
strong attachment between mothers and sons in Turkish culture were evident in many other cases as
well. Japanese wives found it difficult to understand this close tie. Close relations between men and
their mothers causing problems in their transnational marriages is not particular to the case of Turks.
Greek spouses also face similar criticism from their foreign spouses (Bacas, 2001).
Megumi (39, JF) was getting similar treatment from her Turkish mother-in-law but she had a
completely different approach from Aki’s. Megumi did not seem to mind the intervention and had a
rather accepting view of her mother-in-law’s ways. Megumi even had a nickname for her mother-in-
law as uçan kaynana (flying mother-in-law) because she visited them very often wherever they lived,
abroad or in Japan. In comparison to Aki’s mother-in-law, Megumi’s mother-in-law had much more
control over their marriage. Both husbands, Tolga and Ümit were the only child in their families and
had close relations with their mothers. They both talked to their mothers every week. Megumi was
more understanding of her husband’s relation with his mother and she thought it was because he was
the only child. In fact, her mother-in-law had herself arranged and planned all details of a wedding
party for them in Turkey. Megumi and Ümit were then residing in a third country and working. They
flew in to his hometown for five days, attended their wedding party like guests and then went back.
Megumi said she had no problem with her mother-in-law and that she respected her mother-in-law’s
wishes for her only child. Aki and Megumi’s approaches to similar situations were completely
different probably as the outcome of Megumi’s familiarity with Turkish culture compared to Aki’s.
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Megumi had lived in Turkey and was fluent in Turkish whereas Aki had only visited Turkey once and
spoke basic level Turkish.
Going back to the relationship between mothers and sons, the importance of male offspring
in Turkey is especially visible through their interactions with their mothers. This has come up as a
confusing aspect of family relations for Japanese wives. This particularity was not limited to one-child
families as in the cases of Aki’s and Megumi’s husbands. The issue of favoring male children in
Turkish families also became a problem for Bora and Tami when they visited Turkey. When Bora and
Tami visited Turkey together for the first time, Tami felt disturbed by the way attention was on Bora
all the time despite the presence of other guests. She did not refer to herself as being a guest
nonetheless she gave the example of Bora’s sister’s husband not getting enough attention. This was
how Tami described the situation:
Child! He’s still a child I think! Maybe everyone thinks that way but still… I know about
their opposition to our marriage but I think this was surprising. All Japanese mothers would
be shocked. We even fought over this. He calls his mother once or twice a week or maybe
every day. It’s always the same.
[Turns to Researcher] Is it normal for him to call them so often?
When he goes back home (to Turkey) he becomes a child.
Researcher: What do you mean by “he becomes a child”?
Tami: Mothers are different. In Japan if you have guests they should have priority, I don’t
understand why he gets so much attention from everyone every time he goes back.
Researcher: Did you feel neglected when you were there?
Tami: I surely didn’t mean it in that way but I don’t want to go back anyway since they
opposed our marriage at the beginning.
Tami had difficulty understanding the place of Bora in his family and sounded upset about
not getting enough attention as the guest although she denied it when asked directly. To make her
point she said: “All Japanese mothers would be shocked.” This implies that she thinks a healthy and
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normal relationship between a son and mother should be like the Japanese way. During the interview
she even asked me if this was normal. It was. The interesting aspect of her comments is that although
she did not approve of Bora’s close ties with his mother, she visited her own parents once a month and
talked to her sister on the phone almost every day. Her sister co-habited with her parents. This divide
shows that she has a gendered approach on how mothers’ interactions with their children should be.
This gendered approach in relations with mothers was echoed in other interviews with Japanese
spouses as well. One of the Japanese male interviewees who had previously resided in Turkey, Hiroki
(32, JM) commented that Turkish men were anasının kuzusu (mamma’s boy). Thus, the criticism of
Turkish males’ relationship with their mothers was not limited to Japanese wives. While this pattern of
close ties was disturbing for some Japanese spouses, the lack of close family ties in the Turkish sense
was disturbing for some Turkish spouses.
Interactions within Turkish families and Japanese families are different in terms of
involvement and intensity. Relations with Turkish in-laws are often close up and personal whereas
Japanese in-laws seem to prefer the “no news is good news” approach. Grasping these differences in
interaction was problematic for some spouses included in this research. Spouses who did not grasp
these interaction mechanisms had difficulties in their marriages. Mine (31, TF) was one of the few
interviewees who understood the Japanese approach to family ties. She defined her relations with
Japanese in-laws as follows:
I don’t know, I’m pretty comfortable. I mean you know how the bride serves all the time in
our culture, doing dishes and so on (we are not like that).
Naoki’s mother texts me. They are very easy going, his mother always sends us vegetables.
We don’t meet up in person often but we are always in touch. When we visit she says: “don’t
do any housework, you’ll do it when we get old, why don’t you go out for a walk together
instead.” I hope they will live healthy long lives. Our relations are really very good, I even
tell my parents about how nice they are to me.
His aunt lives in Tokyo and we sometimes gather at her house. I mean I do invite my in-laws
to our house as well but there’s no custom of meeting up that often in Japan. We gather when
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there’s an event like New Year but other than that they don’t come to visit, have dinner or
stay over. In that sense we don’t meet up often but that’s not a problem for me because I
know that not meeting up often doesn’t mean relations are bad.
Mine had good relations with her in-laws. They liked her in particular because she joined the
family when they had lost hope in their son getting married. They were very happy about this marriage.
They did not meet up often but talked on the phone. Her mother-in-law was sending them vegetables
that they were growing. Mine does not have a problem with her in-laws because she has accepted the
Japanese way of family ties. She did not complain about not meeting up often. During her interview
she also mentioned “staying over” because it is common in Turkey for people to stay over at family or
friends’ houses although it is quite uncommon in Japan. This is mostly explained through the small
size of apartments in Japan’s urban centers. Mine and her in-laws constantly kept in touch but they did
not meet up often. Mine accepted this as a natural interaction pattern in Japanese society and had no
problem with it. Mine was one of the few fortunate brides who knew about Japanese culture since she
was already residing in Japan and familiar with the culture before she got married to Naoki. This made
a difference in spouses’ interactions with their in-laws. This was in line with the literature on
intercultural communication of spouses in transnational marriages as they were less likely to have
severe misunderstandings if they were familiar with their spouse’s culture. There were Turkish
spouses who complained about not having close ties with their Japanese in-laws whereas there were
Japanese spouses who complained about intensified relations with Turkish in-laws.
Satoru (36, JM) and Zümrüt (40, TF) lived close to his mother but they did not meet up often.
This had not changed after their child was born either. Satoru’s father had passed away long ago and
his mother lived alone. She had expressed to Zümrüt from the beginning of their marriage that she
would not take care of their child. Since Satoru’s mother would not help her with the childrearing,
Zümrüt depended on her own mother for help. Although the couple technically resided in Japan,
Zümrüt and their son often traveled back and forth between Turkey and Japan. They went to Turkey
whenever Satoru went away on a long business trip. When they were in Japan, the Turkish mother-in-
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law often came to Japan. When Zümrüt’s mother visited Japan, she sometimes stayed as long as three
months which is the maximum length of stay in Japan for a Turk on a tourist visa. Satoru was asked
what he thought about this arrangement in general and his relationship with his Turkish mother-in-law
in particular. He commented as follows:
Well, I finally got used to it. The first apartment we lived in when we got married was half
the size of what we have now. It was like one room plus the living room in total. Pretty small.
My mother-in-law came to that house and stayed for two to three months. I really didn’t
want it because there was no place for her to sleep and the space was very limited. It wasn’t
comfortable. Zümrüt said it won’t be a problem. I got used to it, I don’t have a problem with
it now but now it’s more comfortable as we have the kid’s room.
Satoru and Zümrüt had been married for nine years at the time of their interviews. Although
it had taken him time, Satoru had gotten used to close family ties with his Turkish mother in-law. He
expressed not minding these frequent and long stays as long as there was enough space in the
apartment. The issue of living space was an important topic in Turkish – Japanese couples’ lives and
will be elaborated in length at the end of this chapter.
Interviews have revealed that because of the long flight to Japan, Turkish mothers-in-law
tend to stay longer when they visit Japan. The Japanese spouses’ approach to the prolonged stay is
dependent on their living space as Satoru explained above. All spouses, Turkish and Japanese, have
refrained from directly criticizing their in-laws during their interviews. Direct criticism came up only
during participant observation meetings and follow up interviews. Overall, males were less critical of
their in-laws throughout the research. One clear pattern was that none of the Turkish husbands
criticized their Japanese in-laws in any way. This was in line with Turkish men’s approach to the
importance of respecting in-laws in a marriage (Turğut, 2011). The next section elaborates on brides’ 
relationships with in-laws with reference to language barrier.
Language Barrier and Communication Problems with in-laws
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Although previous research had outlined language barrier as an important aspect of
relationship with in-laws, this was not the case in for this research’s findings (Faier, 2007; Nitta 1990).
There was no correlation between good relations with in-laws and language ability of foreign spouses.
There were spouses who considered the language barrier as an advantage and got along well with their
in-laws such as Sayaka (42, JF), and spouses who did not get along well with their in-laws despite not
having a language barrier in communication, such as Zümrüt.
There were cases of language barrier contributing to, rather than preventing, the
establishment of good relations between the Japanese bride and the Turkish mother- in-law. The case
of Sayaka was one of them. Sayaka expressed the advantage of a language barrier as not causing any
confrontation with her mother-in-law. She expressed during the interview that she was using their
language barrier as an advantage by refusal of communication on unpleasant situations. When asked
how her relationship with Turkish in-laws was, she described their communication as follows:
I don't speak Turkish so it was OK. It’s an advantage that we don't understand each other
maybe? I think that’s very good communication;
She asks: “OK?”
I say: “OK!”
We had this kind of communication all the time. When there’s no communication there are
no fights.
Under the topic of language barrier and communication between foreign spouses and in-laws,
determinant factors are personalities, expectations and willingness to communicate on both sides.
Sayaka’s case shows that she was not willing to communicate and would rather use the language
barrier to avoid communication in order to keep good relations and avoid any possible conflict.
Language abilities rendered communication easier however this did not guarantee good relations.
Zümrüt had expressed having good relations with her mother- in-law during her initial interview as
follows:
My relations with my mother-in-law are very good. They lived abroad because of Satoru’s
father’s work so she’s used to foreigners. Her own mother-in-law was nice to her so she
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wanted to do the same when her son got married. The first year I moved to Japan she made
sure we met every ten days, or at least once in two or three weeks. She always wanted to
meet outside since we were both housewives, staying at home most of the time. She told me
upfront that she will not take care of our child if we had any. She said she has already raised
her own. […] She said this upfront: “I won’t take care of your children and I won’t teach you
how to cook”. But she gave me a cook book and said I could ask her if I had any questions.
She’s very direct. For me her being direct is much better than her implying things. We used
to travel together but things changed after we had the baby.
I mean it’s her grandson, she should see him more often but she always says things like she’s
tired or busy. She doesn’t see him (my son) much; I have my disappointment in that sense.
Sometimes she doesn’t see him for two months.
[…] But she could make more time for her grandchild.
Zümrüt’s relationship with her mother-in-law changed through time, especially after she had
a baby. She did not understand why their relationship changed. She felt resentment towards her
mother-in-law for not showing the amount of attention Zümrüt had expected her to show to their child.
This was an issue that came up often at social gatherings that her mother-in-law did not make an effort
to meet up with them. She discussed the issue with her friends rather than discussing it with her
mother-in-law in person. She was especially upset about her mother-in-law not joining them when her
son started daycare. The Turkish mother-in-law had flown in from Turkey for the event.
Satoru’s interview revealed that their relationship had changed not because of their son’s
birth but because of the frequency of Zümrüt’s visits to Turkey after the child was born. Satoru
explained the situation as follows:
Yes, they might have some problems. Zümrüt feels it as well. She goes back to Turkey often,
which is only natural, she should. But my mother doesn’t like it. She believes that once
you’re married you should stay at home. Nothing else.
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For example my mother lives only half an hour away. She doesn’t come to see our son and
Zümrüt keeps on asking why she’s not visiting. Some of our friends’ parents visit very often
but mine visits when she’s available. We do see her once a month but not more often than
that.
Interestingly, this section of the interview revealed two things; first, that they did meet up
once a month which was much more often than what Zümrüt had implied in her interview. Secondly
and most importantly, Satoru was well aware of the problem between his wife and mother but chose
not to get involved. Zümrüt’s mother-in-law did not approve of her being away from her home in
Japan for several months. The mother-in-law wished for them to have stability in Japan. She was, as
the Japanese mother-in-law, projecting on her the traditional role of homemaker and full time
housewife. Another interesting point was how the two men in this chapter had handled the situation
between their wives and mothers very differently. Satoru’s way of handling the situation was much
different from Tolga’s approach as explained in the previous section. Tolga had intervened in the
relationship between his mother and his wife. He had asked his wife Aki to be more understanding
towards his mother’s interventions. On the other hand Satoru did not tell Zümrüt anything although he
was aware of the problem. He was also aware of the fact that she was not aware of the situation and
that it bothered her. In the end, Zümrüt became aware of this problem two years after our initial
interview. She revealed it to me with great surprise that her mother-in-law was upset that she traveled
back and forth between Turkey and Japan so often. ‘”Can you believe this!?” she asked. I remained
silent.
Raising Bicultural Children
Childrearing is an important aspect of marriage that changes the dynamics within a marriage
by transforming spouses into parents. This section presents data on Turkish–Japanese bicultural
childrearing and is organized according to topics that are underlined in the literature on bicultural
children as well as those that the couples have themselves identified as problematic during their
interviews. Couples have gone through diverse bargaining processes while trying to decide in their
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children’s best interest. Negotiations on childrearing start with the decision to have children. Some
couples skip this stage if their child is not planned. But most of the children in this sample are planned.
The second stage is name selection. This is the first major bicultural decision parents have to make.
They have to decide whether the first name will have bicultural connotation or not. Once the baby is
born the third important stage is for the couple to decide on the language(s) they would like to raise
their child in. This process is closely linked to the schooling stage and cultural education.
Most of the couples that participated in the research had talked about having children prior to
marriage. Bora (36, TM) and Tami (40, JF) were one of those couples who discussed the issue but
ended up not having children due to the circumstances of their marriage. Their interview was
conducted with both of them present, upon Tami’s request. For this couple in particular, having
children was far from ratification of a happy marriage, but it was a source of potential problems that
should be avoided.
Researcher: Did you talk about having children yet?
Bora: We didn’t really talk about it much.
Tami: We just got married so we haven’t reached that stage yet.
Researcher: Did you ever talk about choosing names or language preferences?
Bora: We talked about that but that was before we got married. I told her that if we have
children I would like to teach them about Islam and she said they would then become
terrorists [laughs].
Tami: [Objects strongly] I didn’t say they’ll become terrorists. But when living abroad I think
it’s kawaisoou (hard on the children) [Voice softens]. If they live abroad, that is.
Bora: I mean I eat pork as well but I wanted to teach about ways of our culture and religion.
Tami: Like Ramadan and stuff?
Bora: Yes, like Ramadan and stuff. [Turns to researcher] We talked about it but couldn’t reach
an agreement.
Researcher: Did you think about names?
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Bora: Best would be a name that has a meaning in both Japanese and Turkish which could be
written in kanji.
Tami: And there you have a very henna namae (weird name)!
The conversation above taken from Tami and Bora’s interview summarizes various
negotiations between couples and how difficult it can be when both sides are not ready to cooperate or
negotiate. While Bora wanted to emphasize biculturalism Tami wanted to avoid even the possibility of
biculturalism. It was interesting that she said “But when living abroad I think it’s kawaisoou (hard on
the children).” This statement reflects her view that their child will not be Japanese or Turkish but the
child would be half Japanese, incomplete. The Japanese identity is deemphasized by her commenting
that the child would be “Living abroad”, even though she as the mother, is Japanese. The issue of
identity and definition of bi-cultural has come up in Nitta (1990)’s research. The term used for
bicultural children in Japanese, haafu (half) implies that there is something missing, that they are not
complete in either of their identities. Tami’s approach reflects this approach to bicultural children.
Within the same research some bicultural children were emphasizing the word double instead of haafu
which implies that their identities are not half or incomplete, but that they have two identities, thus
they are not half but double. Most couples in this research focused on this double identity approach
rather than the dominant haafu approach.
Decision to Have Children
Most couples in the research expressed having planned the timing of their children just like
their marriages. Just as marriage was considered the natural outcome of a relationship, having children
was treated as a natural outcome of a marriage. The ones who had not planned it expressed their belief
that there was no ideal time to have children but that they took it as a blessing when it happened.
There were few cases of dekichattakon (shotgun marriages) however these couples were already
together for more than a year, cohabited and had discussed having children. Some couples expressed
145
willingness to have children during their interviews and some of them did eventually but some of them
did not.
Only four couples out of thirty-two couples included in the research did not have children. The
decision to have children was relatively easy for most couples as they had, like Tami and Bora,
discussed the issue of having children prior to their marriage. Two couples were not married and thus
having children was not considered as an option as having children outside the wedlock is very
unlikely in Japan due to social pressures (Hertog, 2009).
Spouses have diverse individual priorities that are different from their priorities as a couple.
These are usually in terms of work, schooling or life style choices. A problem that most couples faced
was the incompatibility of their individual priorities with their priorities as a couple. For example, the
husband wanted to have children when the wife wanted to go back to school, or when the wife wanted
to have children when the husband did not want their life style to change. Under this framework,
timing for children had to be negotiated more intensely for some couples. This bargaining process had
two possible outcomes portrayed through the cases of Melisa (30, TF) and Hiroki (32, JM) versus
Ümit (40, TM) and Megumi (39, JF).
Melisa and Hiroki had already lived together for more than a year before they got married.
They had finally put their lives in order when their interviews were conducted. They were residing in
Japan, Hiroki had found and gotten used to his work and Melisa was attending various social activities
and started working part-time. They were well established in their gender roles and having children
was the next step in their marriage. Both spouses expressed liking children in general. Since they were
in their early thirties, at this point in their lives, most of their friends were having babies. During her
interview Melisa sounded very eager and strongly expressed that they both liked and wanted children.
They wanted to have a baby soon. Hiroki on the other hand was having his doubts on the issue. He
believed it was too soon and emphasized the need for more stability and more time. He had just started
work a few months ago and did not think this would be best time for a big change in their lives. They
were married for only a year and a half and he did not feel ready to have children yet. He was aware of
social pressures that Melisa was facing from her parents and the impact of her friends having babies.
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Her enthusiasm and eagerness made it difficult for him to dismiss the subject as a whole as he did not
want to upset her. The interesting aspect of their negotiation was that she knew he did not feel ready
for it but she thought he would never be ready anyway. Melisa thought they might as well have a baby
since she was ready. Three years after their initial interviews they now reside in a third country and are
still happily married but they still do not have children. Their situation resembles the case of Ümit and
Megumi who had to delay their child timing until their mid-thirties.
Ümit and Megumi had initially met when Megumi was living in Turkey. They pursued
individual goals for the first few years of their relationship which turned their relationship into a long
distance one. They were always trying to plan ahead but were having difficulties settling down in the
same city or country even. They both had careers and needed first to synchronize their career paths to
the same country in order to have children. They discussed having children many times throughout
their relationship but whenever one of them was ready the other spouse was not. The couple ended up
having a child when Ümit was ready and willing though Megumi had her doubts. Interestingly,
Megumi expressed during her interview that this had influenced their parenting roles. She expressed
that he was a very caring father attending to all their son’s needs. She felt like he was doing more than
she was in terms of childcare and gave the example of him preparing the child’s bag for daycare
instead of her. During his interview Ümit did not make any comments on who was parenting more, his
worries were concentrated around Megumi’s health and overwork. This implied that he did not expect
her to do more childrearing instead he wanted to help her as much as he could since she had a very
demanding job. This is contradictory to the double shift that George (2005) has referred to as women
doing housework after work. In this case the father was doing the double shift. This, however, was the
exception. Most of the other couples had replicated the gender roles projected on them.
In accordance with gender roles in both Japan and Turkey, women were primary caretakers of
children as nurturing mothers. Although the gendered approach to childrearing remained strong,
couples expressed cooperating during childrearing beyond their traditional gender roles. This was in
line with women asking their husbands to be more cooperative in childrearing after the 1980’s and
1990’s (Holloway, 2010). However, the gender paradigm that Roberts (2002) refers to remained
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strong as none of the fathers within these twenty-eight couples took childcare leave. There was,
however, one Turkish father within the community who was planning on taking childcare leave. The
couple was not interviewed but was part of the participant observation group. The Japanese Childcare
Leave Law allows childcare leave for mothers, fathers or shared by spouses. This couple had decided
on the shared childcare option. He was to take his childcare leave when she went back to work. When
the childcare leave period was over, they were planning on sending the child to daycare. This couple
had done their research as well and they commented that although employing domestic workers was
not an option for them, childcare services seemed well in Japan.
Name selection
Once the couple was expecting a baby the second round of negotiations began. This round was
the most difficult stage for most couples. Most of the couples tried to find names that reflected the
bicultural identity of their child. They wanted names that were meaningful in both Japanese and
Turkish. During this process couples found it easier to come up with girls’ names than boys’ names
and country of residence and gender played an important role in the name selection process. Bicultural
children who were being raised in Turkey had more common Turkish names whereas the naming
process was tough on couples living in Japan. Couples living in Japan had the tendency to search for
names that sounded both like Turkish and Japanese and which could be written in kanji12. Names
chosen by Turkish–Japanese couples that I have come across during participant observation are as
follows; Ata, Arya, Ayata, Ayla, Derin, Eda, Eren, Hayata, Kaan, Kayra, Kemal, Kenan, Lale, Mara,
Mina, Mara, Ryuya, Sara and Sema. Within this list, the most common girl’s name was Mina whereas
the most common boy’s name was Kayra. All couples included in the research expressed the
importance of choosing a bicultural but Japanese sounding name to be a way of deemphasizing foreign
identity to avoid discrimination. They aimed for their children to fit into society without problems.
This approach showed similarity with other transnational families (Takeshita, 2010b; Bacas, 2001).
12Logographic Chinese characters.
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The naming issue was challenging for couples because Turkish–Japanese bilingual name
choices were limited. Most couples residing in Japan had chosen names that could be written with
kanji, only a few children’s names were written in katakana13 and none of the children had their name
written in hiragana14 only. All names had a Turkish meaning even if they were uncommon names.
Negotiations were long when couples had different priorities. This was the case for Zümrüt (40, TF)
and Satoru (36, JM). Zümrüt summarized their negotiation process on name selection as follows:
He didn’t want a Turkish name and I didn’t want a Japanese name. Neither of us
wanted to give him two names. I don’t like the way Japanese names sound, it’s as simple as
that! So we thought about mutual names. I didn’t like names he proposed and he didn’t like
the ones I proposed. I did have this name [the child’s current name] in mind since we got
married. For me it sounded masculine but he thought it sounded feminine in Japanese. We
looked up the kanji and discussed many options, in the end Satoru gave up and we decided on
this name [smiles with victory].
In the above case the child had a very uncommon name in Turkish and a feminine sounding
name in Japanese even though he was a boy. This might have been what Tami was referring to, at the
beginning of this chapter, when she commented: “And there you have a very henna namae (weird
name)!” These names in fact reflected not the double but the haafu nature of children as there are no
common names that the Turkish and Japanese languages share. For this particular reason name choices
were limited. Tami also noted during her interview that she did not see kanji as fit for bicultural
children. She said it did not make any sense for them to have kanji names. This reflected her emphasis
of these children being only half Japanese and they did not qualify for kanji names. Most Turkish
spouses did not want a Japanese name whereas most Japanese spouses did not want a Turkish name.
Interestingly, the issue of picking a neutral name from another language did not come up at any of the
interviews although it is an option considered by many other international couples (Bacas, 2001)
13A component of Japanese writing system used for transcription of words from foreign languages.
14A basic component of Japanese writing system used for writing Japanese words.
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Zümrüt was not the only Turkish spouse who did not like the way Japanese names sounded.
Tolga (30, TM) was also strongly against giving the child a Japanese name whether the child was a
girl or a boy. He and his wife had often discussed children’s names as they both liked and wanted
children. When I asked Tolga whether they talked about having children and possible names he
commented as follows:
Tolga: Yes! We did consider names! I don’t know if you would like it but I really liked this
name Derin (deep). I tried hard to find this name. We were talking about something and I
thought it was very deep and there it was! I had decided on the name if we have a boy, it will
be Derin.
Researcher: Actually I think that’s a girl’s name.
Tolga: It sounded like a boy’s name to me. Well, Aki didn’t like it at all. But then she comes
to me with all these ridiculous names like Kemal, Mustafa, Mehmet, and Ahmet. She hears
these names at her Turkish language classes.
Researcher: Did you think about girls’ names?
Tolga: I did! But she told me it doesn’t fit well in Japanese. I want to name my daughter
Yaprak, if I have a daughter that is. I like this name.
Researcher: Doesn’t Aki propose any Japanese names?
Tolga: What? A Japanese name? You mean like Atsukiri, Yoshikazu and stuff? You must be
joking.
Researcher: So, you are considering Turkish names only?
Tolga: I don’t want to be selfish just because I want a Turkish name but if she can’t come up
with a nice Japanese name… well...
This couple had long discussions about what to name their future children with very little
progress. Tolga, like Zümrüt and many other Turkish interviewees disliked Japanese names. His case
was a bit more extreme as he was proposing Turkish names only. He was open to Japanese name
suggestions if she could: “[…] come up with a nice Japanese name.” During my interview with Aki
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(28, JF), she was very excited to talk about children but was at the same time worried about how they
could reach an agreement on the name issue. She was confused. In one instance Tolga had told her
that if they had a son he would give him his own name, he would name him “Tolga Jr.” Aki could not
be sure if he was joking or serious. If they had a daughter Aki expressed wanting to use her own
name’s kanji in her name. This couple ended up having a daughter a few years later. They gave her
two names, neither were traditional Turkish nor Japanese names. Unfortunately for Aki, neither had
her kanji character in them.
Name selection is a gendered process. Several interviewees had a different approach to
choices of girls’ names. As daughters have to change their surname when they get married, their
names had to be negotiated more intensely to reflect a combination of both cultures even after their
last names have been changed. In a few cases the child was registered under a Turkish name under the
Turkish spouse’s registry and a completely different Japanese name in the Japanese spouse’s registry.
This is possible since there is no link or connection between Turkish and Japanese registries. In one
case, the Japanese mother who kept her Japanese last name had registered her son with a Japanese
name in her own registry in Japan. The child had a very common Turkish name in the Turkish registry
under his father whereas he had a very Japanese name and last name under his mother’s Japanese
registry. The couple lived in Turkey and the husband was furious when he found out about the
situation. The Japanese wife did not think he would have minded since the Japanese registry did not
concern her Turkish husband. The reason the Japanese mother could do this is because Japanese wives
in transnational marriages have the choice to keep their maiden name. Turkish mothers on the other
hand do not have this choice. Turkish women can either keep their maiden name and have two last
names or just take on their husband’s last name.
Language Choices and Schooling
Most parents expressed wanting to communicate with their children in their own mother
tongue. They found it more natural in expressing themselves, especially emotionally since culture is
embedded in language. However nationality of the mother and the country of residence were
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determinant factors in bicultural children’s language choices. As a result, most parents living in Japan
ended up communicating with their children in Japanese. Some communicated in Turkish and two
Turkish fathers spoke to their children in English.
Turkish–Japanese couples’ tendency to speak to their child in their own mother tongue was in
accordance with previous research. Although children went through different stages, in their teenage
years they had the tendency to avoid speaking in the foreign parent’s language and switching to
Japanese to conform to society rather than standing out as different (Nitta, 1990, p.73). Yuki (48, JF)
was one of the mothers who reaffirmed this pattern. She expressed that their daughter was searching
for conformity within society and did not speak Turkish when she was little. She did not like it when
her mother, who was fluent in Turkish, spoke to her in Turkish. She believed that speaking in Turkish
rendered her different and she disliked it. Her opinion changed during her adolescence and she took up
speaking in Turkish at the end of her adolescent years. Now as a young woman she speaks both
languages fluently but they are very different for her. Yuki has explained her daughter’s situation as
follows:
She thinks Gürol (her father) is different when he speaks in Japanese and in Turkish.
She finds him more yasashii (kind) when he speaks Japanese. […]
No matter how long we stay in Turkey, when you think about it, it’s just not her
mother tongue. Lots of bicultural children think that their fathers are scarier when they speak
in Turkish. Even children who live in Turkey are saying this despite living there. It’s not
really scary as they are saying the same thing but… well.
These comments by Yuki portray how culture is embedded in language and how perceptions
on languages can be misleading. The Turkish way of using language as communication is different.
There were many cases of Japanese spouses thinking the Turkish spouse was angry or having a fight
just because he or she was speaking in Turkish. In this case Yuki and Gürol (42, TM)’s daughter
thought that her father, who was fluent in both languages seemed like a different person. Gürol had
chosen to speak to her daughter in Turkish since she was little and while teaching her Turkish, he had
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the advantage of having a Japanese wife fluent in Turkish to help him out. At their home and in their
daily lives they used a mixture of both languages. This family used mostly Turkish when socializing
with the Turkish community. If there were things their daughter did not understand in Turkish, Gürol
and Yuki would explain cultural connotations to her, in Japanese. Although most Turkish parents
wished to teach their children Turkish, there were two exceptions; Can (49, TM) and Ümit (40, TM).
These two fathers had chosen to communicate with their children in English.
In the household formed by Can (49, TM), Misaki (42, JF) and their children, English was the
main language of communication. When asked their language choice at home, Can commented:
We speak in English at home. I don’t speak to my children in Turkish. I was educated
in English since an early age so I guess that’s why I feel comfortable communicating in
English. Not talking in Turkish at home is mostly my fault. But they would forget English if
we communicated in Turkish. There are couples who speak to their children in Turkish but we
can’t meet up with them often as a family. Besides I speak to my wife in English so that is
passed on to the kids too I think.
The father, Can, had lived abroad as a child and started learning English at an early age. It was
the language that dominated his academic formation and even now he used English only at his work.
English was a language he felt comfortable communicating in. He linked their choice of English to
these factors. He also linked it to his communication with his wife. He argued that it was only natural
for the children to pick up on English easily since the couple communicated in English. Another
Turkish father who had chosen to speak to his child in English was Ümit (40, TM). The main
difference between his case and Can’s case was that he communicated with his Japanese wife mostly
in Turkish. The following section from his interview is how Ümit justified his decision to talk to his
son in English:
There’s something Turkish people here just can’t accept. Your kids are not in Turkey,
you can’t raise them as Turks. I mean this is not like America, there’s no notion of “Japanese
with Turkish heritage”. You’re either Japanese or Turkish and there’s nothing in between.
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This isn’t an immigration country. They (Turkish people in Japan) still think like Americans
but their kids will inevitably be gaijin (foreigner). Within this scenario, English is a more
useful language. Secondly, I started (speaking to him in English) when he was two years old.
You have to start early with kids, we had a strategy. There are lots of kids who can’t express
themselves (in Turkish). That didn’t seem like a rational choice. Instead I thought it would be
better to send him to an international school and talk to him in English. There are no Turkish
schools (in Japan) so children’s Turkish can’t develop well anyway. That’s our justification.
Ümit is referring to an approach similar to that expressed by Tami at the beginning of the
chapter. He argued that the dominant mindset in Japan would inevitably define these bicultural
children as gaijin (foreigner) just as Tami did. Secondly, he thought that bicultural children who tried
to speak in Turkish were not fluent because Turkish had no use for a child living in Japan. There was
no school for them to learn it and no social environment to practice it. He had chosen to focus on
English both in their daily lives and in the child’s schooling.
Bicultural children’s language choices change in line with their development processes.
Bicultural children have the tendency to first communicate in their mother’s language and then the
schooling language. Their language preference changes through their socialization period. This can be
divided into three stages: basic communication, fitting in society and standing out as special. In the
first stage, bicultural children are still young and their primary concern is to communicate. So the
language is determined according to whom they communicate with and who they are attached to the
most. That is why the mother’s language is acquired first. In the second stage, bicultural children start
socializing and realize they are bilingual. This stage is marked by their effort to fit into society so they
tend to start using the language of the country they reside in and the schooling language. The third
stage starts with bicultural children becoming young adults wanting to differentiate themselves from
people surrounding them. In most cases, this is the stage that bicultural children emphasize their
bicultural identity by using both languages. All parents expressed concern over their child fitting into
Japanese society with reference to their bicultural identity. Due to culture’s embeddedness in language,
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acquisition of Japanese language had priority for most parents, Japanese or Turkish. This was
especially clear in schooling choices as outlined from this point onwards.
There are two international schools in Japan that have Turkish affiliation. These were
established in 2003 and 2006 by the Gülen Movement. The Gülen Movement is a Muslim religious
network based in Pennsylvania and led by Fetullah Gülen. The Gülen movement has schools all over
the world and is associated with religious fundamentalism through education. Some interviewees
expressed having considered these schools for their children but none of the bicultural children
included in the research were sent to these schools. Turkish spouses who considered these schools
advocated that although these schools offered education in English, their Turkish affiliation could be
good influence to teach them Turkish values. Most Turkish spouses dismissed this schooling option
based on costs and fears from strong religious influence. These schools in particular came up naturally
only during Shoko (33, JF)’s interview. In cases where they did not come up, I asked interviewees for
their opinions about the schools. It came up in Shoko’s interview as follows:
Actually, my husband said; "there's a Turkish school in Japan." He found it in
Yokohama. We checked it and there's one Turkish school in Yokohama. He showed me on the
internet, it was an international school managed by a Turkish person but I think all the classes
are in English. So it’s an international school run by Turkish people. He wanted to go there to
see the school and I said: “Check the price. And it’s like every year” it was 1.4 million yen for
kindergarten. So I asked: "Do you still want this?" and he said "OK, I'll think about it".
I don’t really care but I can understand that he wants to raise the child as Turkish.
As the conversation Shoko had with her husband shows, economic factors play an important
role in determining schooling options. This was one of the factors that led parents to prefer Japanese
schools over international schools. The issue of schooling costs also came up with Gözde (32, TF) and
Hiro (37, JM). This couple had decided to send their child to a Japanese public school. When I asked
about their plans on schooling Gözde’s response was as follows:
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Japanese school. I want to send her to an international school but it’s impossible for
us to cover the costs. Just yesterday I was walking on the street and some primary school kids
shouted behind my back, they said: “sekai de ichiban kiraina ningen gaijin da” (foreigners are
the people I hate the most in the world). Just think about it, if she was in the same class with
these kids what will they do to her knowing her mother is a foreigner!?
I’m really worried but unfortunately we have no other choice.
I asked him again just now and he said Japanese school. He also added that neither he
nor any of his friends attended an international school. He thinks there’s no need to choose
another school when there’s a cheap school nearby.
The case of Gözde and Hiro portrays one of the important dilemmas that the couples faced. On
the one hand they found it economically burdensome to even consider international school. On the
other hand the foreign spouse feared their child would be discriminated against in a public school. The
reason the Japanese spouse, in this case Hiro, did not consider discrimination in his decision making
might be because he did not face it since he was in his own country. Gözde was more worried because
she had just been insulted by primary school children.
There were couples who did not have it as easy as couples outlined above. Can (49, TM) and
Misaki (42, JF)’s case was different, they were settled in Japan with a small probability of moving to
another country and they could afford international school. Needless to say, they had more to negotiate
as the economic aspect was out of the equation. When Can was asked about their children’s schooling
decision he commented as follows:
We had to think about it. First, we wanted the kindergarten to be close to the house
thus it was a Japanese one. We weren’t considering international schools at that time. When
they reached the age of primary school my wife said it’s very important for them to learn
Japanese well and to be raised in that school culture so she said we should send them to a
Japanese school. But then English is also very important. Turkish is important as well but it
just won’t ever be like their mother tongue. We had the idea that they should speak English
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well but Japanese schools are not good at teaching English so our elder daughter is taking
private English classes, one hour every week. She will start junior high school next year so the
issue came up again. My wife wanted her to continue in a Japanese school until high school
for the sake of learning kanji but I objected, if she continues in a Japanese school her
transition to an international environment will become harder and harder. Language is hard of
course but the environment would be challenging as well. So we talked and thought about it.
We agreed to do some research and looked up international schools. At these schools, they
want her to be somewhat fluent in English. Japanese schools have to take the kids regardless
of their language ability but the case of international schools is different.
Can and Misaki’s communication language at home was English. Can felt more comfortable
expressing himself in this language as he had been using it more often than Turkish while growing up.
That is why he did not consider Turkish as their children’s mother language. He was very conscious of
the transnational nature of their family and wanted their children to have transnational identities
beyond Japan and Turkey. His preference was towards international school because he wanted their
children to be free of barriers when they grow up. His wife on the other hand was more concerned
about how their children fit into Japanese society as the couple had settled down in Japan. Thus, she
was insistent on them learning Japanese manners and kanji at a Japanese school. Although she initially
changed her mind, Can was not sure why or how:
My wife was very insistent on the kanji issue but then she just changed. She said:
“OK, they can go to American school” but I didn’t understand why she changed her mind.
Maybe it’s a cultural thing? It’s hard to make a decision for the Japanese side as they are more
conservative. For us it’s all easy though this is not a good thing. Maybe we don’t think
thoroughly in Turkey.
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Japanese language ability was another factor for parents to choose Japanese schools over
international schools. Most parents, Japanese and Turkish believed that children had to speak Japanese
well since they resided in Japan. The importance of kanji literacy was emphasized by many parents.
This was especially clear in the case of Zümrüt (40, TF) who commented:
I definitely want him to attend a Japanese school. I mean I spent 8 weeks on learning
one kanji. Anyone who has some common sense in them would send their child to a Japanese
school.
Her husband Satoru (36, JM) expressed similar views in his separate interview. He also added
his opinion that international schools had lower academic quality:
His (my son’s) main place is Japan. That’s why I talked to Zümrüt and wanted to send him to
a Japanese school. I was against international schools because their academic levels are lower.
Especially in Japan. […]
Most Turkish parents shared Satoru’s views on schooling and almost all children attended
Japanese schools, private or public. Contrary to Nitta’s (1990) interviewees, none expressed having
language problems when they sent their kids to Japanese schools. Most of the Turkish spouses were
fluent in Japanese. If they were not, their Japanese spouse handled school affairs.
All parents were very careful about their children fitting into society and they did many things
to prevent their children from being stressed over their bicultural identity. Foreign parents did things
such as hiding their faces behind giant sunglasses, giving up conversations in their mother tongue or
avoiding visits to the school in order to prevent their child from attracting unwanted attention. Things
Japanese parents could do remain limited as they were already in their host society. There was only
one particular case in which the Japanese father showed extra effort for their child to adapt easily.
Sevgi (51, TF) and Masato (53, JM) met in a third country where both were learning English.
They had initially settled down in the country they met. However after deciding that they did not want
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to get old in a third country, they moved to Japan after about a decade. In their decision making they
took into account their children’s ages and schooling options as well as Masato’s work. They planned
the move three years ahead. Sevgi and Masato were the only couple in the research who could plan
ahead in their marriage. Most other couples lived by day-to-day decisions. When they arrived in Japan,
Masato was worried about his daughter’s first day at school. This after all was, “A country that was
her own but still very foreign to her.” So Masato explained what he did for his daughter’s adaptation
to her new country and school:
Usually the first day is the hardest, very strange and stressing. But there was a girl in
her class [Masato’s old schoolmate’s daughter]. So I called my friend, he lives close to us. I
(explained to him that I) don’t want to put my daughter in a stressful situation. So he said OK,
please come over so that they can meet.
That girl arranged to call some of her classmates before school started and they had a
nice home party. My daughter was welcomed. So when she went to school the first day there
were some kids she already knew from the party. So it was not a hard landing, but a very soft
landing.
In the case above, Masato took care of their child’s adaptation problem in his own way. His
case was very particular. First of all, he was the only parent, Japanese or Turkish, to put in so much
effort in providing his daughter a “soft landing” into her new schooling life. Secondly, he was the only
father who had taken charge of their child’s schooling. In accordance with gender roles in Japanese
and Turkish societies, mothers were mostly in charge of children’s schooling and socialization. In the
case above Masato had taken care of it as Sevgi did not speak enough Japanese and had very limited
knowledge of Japan. Ong (2003)’s research has shown that in cases like hers it becomes a burden on
the children to help them out in communications. This did not come up as an issue in this family’s or
any other family’s interviews; if a problem arose the Japanese spouse intervened.
Some Turkish parents did not want to be involved in their children’s schooling because they
were disturbed by being pointed out as the gaijin (foreigner) parent. This was the case of Gürol (42,
159
TM) as well. Yuki (48, JF), Gürol’s wife explained that she was in charge of their daughter’s
schooling:
[…] it becomes a special thing if he goes there (to the school). At her school there are some
fathers who take care of their children’s schooling, they aren’t many but some do attend.
Gürol doesn’t want to go though because he knows that they will talk to him as a gaijin rather
than as her father. I don’t think he can communicate well (with other people at the school).
But I don’t think it makes a difference for her (their daughter) anyway.
Gürol, just like Gözde, was disturbed by being pointed out as the gaijin parent. This is a direct
outcome of bullying becoming an important problem in Japanese schools. Change in children’s
attitudes observed in recent decades are explained through urbanization as well as changing family
relations that resulted from the transition to the nuclear family. Another argument is that the absence
of father makes it difficult for mothers to discipline their children (Lock, 1993, pp.113-5). It should be
noted that bullying is a serious problem in the Japanese schooling system and that it is not limited to
bicultural children only (Fry, 2007). Although almost all parents expressed fear of their children being
bullied at school, none had reported such an event, except the one that involved Gözde, mentioned
above.
Citizenship, Cultural Identity and Socialization
In the official system, bicultural children are allowed dual citizenship only until they reach 22
years old (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014), after which they have to give up either their Japanese or
Turkish citizenship. This is because Japan does not allow multiple citizenships. This research has
revealed that most families adapt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach in order for their children to keep
both citizenships. Interviewees did not have much to say on the issue of their children’s citizenship
and most implied keeping both citizenships unless they are asked, in person, to give it up. When they
were asked what they would do if asked to choose, all couples said they would just let their child
choose their citizenship as the child would be old enough to do so.
160
Most couples have a practical approach to the issue of citizenship that differentiates identity
from citizenship. Three interviewees have acquired Japanese citizenship themselves for practical
reasons. Japanese citizenship is more advantageous in terms of freedom of movement whereas Turkish
citizenship is preferred when residing in Turkey. Cultural identity of bicultural children, on the other
hand, is considered more important than citizenship. It is formed through the way they interact with
their parents. Thus the parent’s approach to their children’s identity is important. Most parents tend to
think of their children as a member of their own culture or community rather than their spouses’, this
was in line with the existing literature (Bacas, 2001). Within this research the most strongly
opinionated Turkish parent on this issue was Tolga (30, TM).
Tolga (30, TM) and Aki (28, JF) both worked and they both expressed during their interviews
that they wanted to have children soon. When I asked Tolga who would take care of the child, he was
insistent on not letting their daughter be raised in the Japanese way and emphasized the importance of
bicultural identity with reference to culture and language:
My child will not be raised by Aki and her mother. I’m telling you this now and you
should write it in your dissertation that one Turkish guy is very insistent on this. If my child is
raised by Aki and her mother this means my child will not learn anything about Turkey and
Turkish culture. That is unacceptable. No way! If that kid is raised by the Japanese
grandmother she won’t be able to speak to my mother. I wouldn’t allow it to come to that
point.
Tolga’s firm reaction above brings in the dimension of biculturalism and cross generational
interactions. His justification for not letting their child be raised by his Japanese wife and mother-in-
law is that the child should embrace both cultures. It is also interesting that the relationship between
Turkish mother and son comes up again under this topic as well. Tolga does not refer to his daughter’s
communication with his father. It is important to note however that his reaction is against the idea of
monoculturalism rather than Japaneseness itself.
In terms of socialization and cultural education Turkish spouses expressed regret that their
children were not able to play with Turkish children and socialized in Turkish culture. This was in
161
contradiction with the existing literature on Turkish immigrants in Europe who have strong in-group
relations which limits their adaptation to the host society (Ogelman, 2003: Schoenmaeckers,
Lodewijckx & Gadeyne, 1999; Şenyürekli & Menjívar, 2012; Lievens, 1999; Abadan-Unat; 1989; 
Liversage 2012; 2013). This topic of children’s socialization in particular came up during Enis (40,
TM) and Emi (36, JF)’s interview and they had the following conversation:
Enis: Dinner manners, family relations. I wish I could’ve raised my son with my brother’s
children. I feel the lack of strong family ties in Japan.
Emi: You could meet up with my family.
Enis: What’s the point? They’re Japanese!
In this conversation it is interesting to see that although Enis values family ties and
socialization, he values Turkish socialism mechanisms over Japanese. He considers the idea of
establishing close family ties, the Turkish way very improbable with Emi’s Japanese family.
There were attempts within the Turkish community in Japan, to organize play dates for
bicultural children. These bicultural play dates took place about once a month and were usually held at
someone’s apartment. Although children with Turkish fathers were invited as well, it was mostly
dominated by Turkish mothers. There were no Japanese mothers or Japanese fathers attending these
play dates on occasions that I participated. Language barriers of Japanese parents as well as work load
of fathers were factors put forward by them for not attending. These gathering were held in Turkish
style, the host would prepare dishes for all after checking with the guests about the children’s meal
preferences. Attendees did not pay a fee for the food or drinks. They were welcome to bring dishes or
drinks if they wished but there was no such requirement. During these playdates, children ran around
while parents enjoyed their meal. Children mostly communicated among themselves in Japanese.
There was no educational activity on Turkish culture or any attempts to teach Turkish in particular.
Within this framework, it was resembled a strategy to teach Turkish culture through socialization with
Turkish people.
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Japanese spouses who were familiar with Turkish culture were more likely to teach their
children about Turkish culture especially if they had previously resided in Turkey. Yuki (48, JF) and
Emi (36, JF) were such mothers who knew Turkish culture well. I asked them what they thought about
bicultural childrearing and the Turkish way of raising children. In her reply, Yuki emphasized liking
how children in Turkish culture were considered as “public property”. It meant that everyone in
society would look after the children even if they were not their own: “For example on the bus if the
kid is standing someone will take her on her lap. I really like things like that about Turkey.” Yuki had
given the example above to emphasize that she admired Turkish manners and social interaction.
Similar to Yuki’s example, Emi also expressed similar views especially with reference to body contact.
Emi: I like that everyone shows so much attention (to children) in Turkey. We don’t have it in
Japan, I think something is missing when there’s no physical contact.
Enis: For example you didn’t see your mother for a whole year then you just shake hands,
without a hug. They’re your parents for God’s sake!
[Turns at me and proudly claims] Emi also became Turkish in the sense that she started to like
physical contact.
In cultural terms, children themselves played an important role in determining how parents
could interact with them culturally. Bicultural children interacted differently with their parents
according to their culture. The clearest example was the case of Gürol and Yuki’s daughter and their
display of affection in public. As Yuki put it:
Gürol used to bite her, I was closer to the Turkish style than the Japanese style of
childrearing but she (my daughter) wasn’t very willing, she somehow had a rule about it in her
head. She would kiss her father in public but not me, I didn’t do anything about it either
because we live in Japan and I’m Japanese. I didn’t decide on this but she thought it was the
right way, that’s how it developed through time naturally.
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The section from Yuki’s interview above is important because it reminds us that childrearing
is not just about what parents like or prefer for their children. This implies that through their
socialization stages children realize that their mothers and fathers are different and they interact with
them in accordance with their respective cultures.
Islam: Circumcision, Religious Rituals and Pork Consumption
In terms of religious education and religiosity, circumcision, practicing of religious rituals and
consumption of pork were used as indicators of bicultural childrearing. In most cases the child’s
religiosity was a reflection of the parent’s religiosity and approach to religion. Most Turkish parents
expressed willingness to teach their children about Islam but did not feel competent. Despite this
declaration, none of the children in the sample were sent to Qur’an courses for children at Tokyo
Mosque. This is closely linked to negative connotations of religiosity that marks Turkish political
history as well as divisions within the community based on religiosity. Non-religious members of the
community seldom interacted with religious members of the community.
All parents expressed their belief in the freedom of choice for their child’s religion however
none were providing their child’s religious education to allow them this choice. Consequently children
living in Japan were mostly raised in the Japanese Shinto-Buddhist religion. Gender played an
important role in religion for bicultural children. Although there is strong emphasis on virginity and
control over female bodies, this was not reproduced on bicultural daughters in Japan. Boys on the
other hand were physically marked as Muslims through circumcision, there was no equivalent of it for
girls. Circumcision was a controversial topic in the research. It was controversial because parents who
advocated freedom to choose religious belief were circumcising their sons when they were very young.
This implied that they saw it more as a cultural practice rather than a religious one. When asked for
the reason they argued for the healthiness of being circumcised over religious reasons. Although
circumcision is a simple procedure in Turkey, it is treated as a serious operation in Japan with a week
of hospitalization. Most couples found this troublesome and preferred to take care of it in Turkey.
There were also parents who chose not to get their boys circumcised in order to avoid discrimination
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and bullying at school. In either case, circumcision was separated from religious or cultural denotation.
In any case the decision to circumcise boys was a mutual decision taken by parents together and there
was no case of a Turkish parent making such a decision without the consent of the Japanese spouse.
In terms of religious rituals, most families did fulfill the Muslim custom of religious naming.
This is a simple procedure in which the Imam (Muslim clergy) or religiously knowledgeable person
says a prayer and whispers the name of the child into his or her ear. There were three Japanese parents
who came from Christian families, Masato, Aki and Naoki. Masato and Aki came from strict and
religious families but had given up on religion long ago. Naoki’s family was not strict and he had
already converted to Islam prior to marriage. Masato’s first child was baptized, not for religious
reasons but mainly to please his religious mother. She had not asked for it in particular but was very
happy about. Their second child was not baptized. Masato commented that they were over it when
they had the second child. Aki’s child was not baptized either.
Bicultural families tended to celebrate all religious holidays. They would meet up with
Turkish community members on Muslim holidays, buy gifts at Christmas, visit family graves during
obon (festival honoring ancestors’ spirits) and visit shrines for New Year. Masato defined their
situation as a “Mixed religious situation”. As Muslim religious holidays are not official holidays in
Japan, their celebration is more low-key compared to Japanese holidays.
Consumption of pork was not an issue for parents who consumed it themselves however it was
a tough choice for those who did not. This was mainly because they expressed belief in freedom of
choosing faith. Under this framework pork consumption was a two-edged sword. If they gave pork to
their child this would conflict with their belief in their child becoming a Muslim. On the other hand
not feeding the child pork would mean that they intervened in the child’s religion choice. Four patterns
emerged from the Muslim parents’ religiosity and approach to consumption of pork.
Pattern 1 – No pork! - Although he was a social drinker Mehmet (33, TM) did not consume
pork and did not want his wife or child to consume any pork either. His wife was one of the few
Japanese spouses who had converted to Islam after their marriage. She respected his choice on pork
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consumption and thus adopted his approach to religion. There was no consumption of pork in their
household.
Pattern 2 – No pork! For now – Gözde (32, TF) is a social drinker but she does not consume
pork. When asked whether her husband, who was a stay home dad, cooked and fed pork to their
daughter the answer was a firm “No”. Pork was never cooked in their household. Although her
husband occasionally consumed pork outside the house, Gözde did not allow it in the house. She
expressed being disturbed by the idea of eating a meal cooked in a pan that was previously used to
cook pork. Even if it was washed afterwards the idea itself disturbed her. Gözde did not give any pork
to her daughter at this point. However she was aware that the child was likely to consume it as she
grows up especially since they lived in Japan and her husband consumed pork. She expressed having
no intention of forbidding it when her daughter grows up however she seemed a bit uneasy simply by
the thought of it. She had never discussed their daughter’s religion with her husband Hiro.
Pattern 3 – No pork! Unless we don’t know it is pork – Enis (40, TM) consumed alcohol but
he did not consume pork. He was not very strict about pork consumption and linked it to the mindset
he was brought up in rather than religion or religiosity. Since both Emi and Enis worked, their child
went to daycare and although Enis himself did not eat pork he did not want to intervene in the case of
his son. His son fitting into Japanese society had priority over controlling his pork consumption. He
explained his views as follows:
I don’t eat pork. I mean it’s not religious but I can’t. We talked about this with Emi. Should we
give him pork? Or not?
Because of the way I was raised eating pork is just wrong. I’m sure I ate it in Japan many
times without knowing. It’s not a problem if I’m not aware of it but if someone tells me it’s
pork I can’t eat it from that point onwards. For example if cat meat is delicious yeah you can
eat it but if someone tells you it’s cat meat you just can’t. That animal isn’t supposed to be
eaten.
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Pattern 4 – Yes pork! - Most of the parents who participated in the interview expressed having
no problem consuming pork and were feeding their children pork without any reservations. These
parents had one topic less to negotiate or worry about compared to parents who followed patterns 1, 2
and 3.
Transition to Parenthood: From “Husband and Wife” to “Father and Mother”
Having children had an important impact on all marriages. It changed the dynamics within the
family by transforming the couple into parents. In accordance with their new roles as parents their
priorities as well as relationship between each other changed. Almost all couples expressed having
started to argue more after they had children. Couples’ arguments increasing after having children is
not the particular case of transnational couples however it is more problematic for them (Christensen
et al, 2006; Komter, 1989; Cools, 2006). This transition to parenthood and its implications for the
couples’ relations is presented in this section through the cases of four Turkish spouses; Mehmet (33,
TM), Ümit (40, TM), Gözde (32, TF) and Zümrüt (40, TF).
Mehmet and his wife had initially met in a third country and then moved to Japan together. He
expressed during his interview that his wife had changed after their daughter was born. He was feeling
neglected. Once their daughter was born his wife’s entire attention and affection became channeled to
the child and he was feeling lonely in his marriage. He explained the situation as follows:
Once you have a child husband and wife relations fall to second place, they (Japanese) just
can’t balance it. People in Turkey can balance it, I see my friends in Turkey…how to put it?
[Pauses] I envy them. Although they have children the way they look at each other is
different…
This is closely related to ties between the mother and child in Japanese society. Nitta (1990,
p.4) argues that the family becomes redefined as the relationship between mother and child rather than
husband and wife. This is reaffirmed by research findings on co-sleeping habits of children with the
mother which shows that once children are born they become the focus of the family, kodomo
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chuushin (child centered). With the production of offspring, Japanese women’s interactions with their
husbands change. Their roles in the family as husband and wife are then redefined as father and
mother (Tahhan, 2007, p.154).
The childrearing process in Japan has changed to include warmth and responsiveness to meet
children’s needs (Hidako, 2011, p.37). With reference to meeting their child’s needs, Mehmet’s wife
had taken matters into her own hands. Mehmet was a low skilled laborer who did not have a steady
job. His wife considered it necessary to provide for their child. After their daughter was born, she
decided to go back to school so that she could get a degree and start working again. Since they had a
small baby, she could neither do it all on her own in Tokyo nor could she depend on him for help.
Thus, she moved back to her hometown to live with her mother who took care of their daughter while
she went back to school. Mehmet was left out of this picture as he remained in Tokyo and continued
working. His wife’s decision to move back to her hometown was hard on Mehmet. He was already
feeling emotionally distant before her move and was worried about how things would play out in the
future when the family is reunited. Mehmet was not the only interviewee who mentioned changing
family dynamics after having children. Similarly, Ümit also implied their relationship as a couple had
changed through time and especially after their son was born. When asked about topics the couple
argued over he commented:
When I look at the chronology of fights, we used to have more intense arguments at the
beginning. Now we can’t have intense arguments because there’s no intensity. That intensity,
flame we had at the beginning is gone. Arguments became less intense through time. That’s
inevitable in a marriage. On top of that Japanese women’s attitudes change when they become
mothers to the extent of dumping the husband, you know… [Laughs]
Ümit’s case was similar yet very different from Mehmet’s case. Although there was no
geographic distance involved for this family, there was a change in the couple’s relationship dynamics.
He explained these through two factors; first he approached the issue as a natural evolution of the
relationship and considered the decrease of passion as a natural outcome of their long term
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relationship. His approach had its echoes in the literature on how relations of married couples change
over time (Cools, 2006). The second factor however, for him, was specifically rooted in Japanese
culture. He was aware of Japanese women’s change of attitude after childbirth that was explained
above with reference to works of Nitta (1990), Hidaka (2011) and Tahhan (2007). He accepted the
channeling of attention to children as a natural outcome of having a Japanese wife and living in
Japanese society.
The change in relationship between spouses was not limited to marriages with Japanese
women. Gözde, a Turkish wife also expressed that their relationship had inevitably changed after they
had a child. Her husband Hiro was less willing to talk about this subject. While I was talking to the
couple, the issue of marriage and how it changes a couple’s life came up as follows:
Gözde: This is a topic that troubles us you know.
Researcher: What is it exactly?
Gözde: I mean how marriage changes your life… or maybe I should say how it changes after
giving birth and having a child.
Hiro: [In Turkish] There’s no life after marriage!
Gözde: [Surprised and strongly disagrees] What the!? No life? The child is our life now!
The conversation above indicated that Gözde and Hiro had also gone through stages similar to
those portrayed in Mehmet’s and Ümit’s cases. Their relationship as husband and wife had changed
and their marriage became centered round their child. This implies that these changes are not limited
to marriages with Japanese wives only. The following case of Zümrüt reaffirms this change in
relationship. Zümrüt expressed during her interview that she argued with her husband mostly over
their childrearing techniques. She gave the following examples:
“Is that how you’re going to feed him!?” or “Why isn’t he wearing something else!?”
That kind of arguments. Arguments are all about the kid but we also have arguments on other
subjects, I mean how can you not have arguments after ten years of marriage?
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An aspect of Japanese childrearing that Turkish spouses found unusual was the co-sleeping
practices with children. Although co-sleeping exists in Turkey as well, the length is longer in Japan.
Most Japanese couples co-sleep until the children themselves decide to sleep in their own room, in
some cases this could continue until the child is 15 years old and in some cases it can be transformed
into sibling co-sleeping. There are functional explanations for co-sleeping in Japanese families such as
lack of space, importance of skinship, danger of earthquake and feeling of security. The norm for co-
sleeping is the kawa no ji (the river kanji) in which the child or children sleep between parents. This
sleeping practice has important implications on the couple’s life as it marks an important step in their
relationship transformation from spouses to parents (Tahhan, 2007).
There are also cases in which the mother sleeps with the child and the father sleeps in a
separate room. With reference to this arrangement, the literature on co-sleeping is linked to two
aspects, physical proximity thus skinship and relationship between the couple. In terms of skinship,
co-sleeping with children is explained through the importance of physical contact which is absent in
most Japanese interactions in daily lives. According to this approach, the lack of human contact
during the day is compensated through the night. The second aspect is the relationship between
parents. Co-sleeping with children is often a method used by women to avoid sexual relations with
their husbands (Tahhan, 2008). This extended co-sleeping practice in Japan has no equivalent in
Turkey. Parents may sleep in the same room or bed with their infants but the length of co-sleeping is
much shorter than in Japan. This can be explained through skinship being a regular aspect of daily life
in Turkey and living spaces being much more spacious than in Japan. The topic of co-sleeping has a
direct impact on the couple’s sex life and this will be further elaborated upon in the next section.
Sexuality
Turkish Sexuality
Sexuality and gender are complicated and fragile topics to elaborate upon with reference to
Islam. Turkish Islamic tradition emphasizes virginity prior to marriage and presents a major difference
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between Muslim society and Japanese society. Although in Japan the age of first sexual intercourse
can be as early as in the teen years, Turkish girls are traditionally expected to get married as virgins.
Consequently, dating can be limited or even not allowed by some families. This is one of the main
reasons the average age of first marriage for females is as low as 22 in Turkey. The delay of marriage
age for Turkish females leads to the questioning of their virginity as in other sexually conservative
cultures. In comparison, the age of first marriage is as high as 29.2 in Japan (Turkish Statistical
Institute, 2010; Planning and Statistical Research and Training Institute Japan, 2010; Koç, 2007;
George, 2005).
In the more conservative eastern rural parts of Turkey the virginity of a daughter is regarded
as the honor of the family and a young woman having sexual intercourse before marriage would have
dishonored her whole family (Karaçay-Çakmak & Altuntaş, 2008).  Although this remains mostly 
limited to the less developed periphery in Turkey, virginity still remains an important topic related to
Turkish culture and religiosity. The issue of linking virginity and honor is not limited to the case of
Turkey as it is observed in diverse geographies such as Cambodia or India as well (George, 2005; Ong,
2003). When we look at the case of Muslim countries in particular, Bekker et al. (1996) clearly show
the importance of virginity in Islamic countries. Their research focuses more precisely on Muslim
women from Moroccan or Turkish descent who live in the Netherlands and who are facing problems
due to social pressures. They refer to rituals before, during and after the wedding night including the
showing of the cloth with the bride’s blood as the symbol of her virginity, to all family members,
relatives and friends. Virginity of the bride symbolizes the honor of extended families on both the
groom’s and bride’s side and the bride might be forced to marry an inferior class if her family realizes
that she is no longer a virgin. Muslim women face a dilemma when they are positioned between two
cultures with different viewpoints on the issue of virginity (Beck & Keddie, 1978). These problems
are structured around hymen restructure operations and sexual and social inequalities. These structural
biases were also reflected on me, the researcher, by the group of low skilled laborers as presented in
Chapter Three. They approach Turkish divorcees easily as they are considered to be sexually loose,
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and no longer concerned about virginity. This is also explanatory of their attitudes towards Japanese
women who do not abide to the rule of virginity either.
The topic of virginity as outlined above cannot be applied to Japanese women in the research
as none of them were Muslims prior to marriage. However when we look at marriages between
Turkish females and Japanese males included in this research, two Turkish brides have openly
expressed being virgins at the time of marriage: Hülya (31, TF) and Mine (31, TF). Hülya lived in
Turkey whereas Mine lived in Japan. Both were 26 at time of their marriages. Mine, as one of the few
completely devoted and practicing Muslims included in the research, believed in getting married as a
virgin and wanted to get married to a non-Turkish but Muslim man. She did not date any men prior to
marriage. Her husband, Naoki (41, JM) was not a Muslim at the time of their encounter however his
interest in Islam had brought them together and he converted when they decided to get married. He
was one of the few spouses included in the research who had converted. Naoki had made a smooth
transition into being Muslim like a Turk, he still consumed pork and alcohol, did not visit the mosque
but had been circumcised. Mine who had also defined herself as a liberal Muslim had no problem with
the way Naoki had chosen to live his religiosity. In return, Naoki expressed his gratitude for her
understanding and acceptance of his religiosity.
Hülya’s case was different. She had strongly and several times emphasized her liberal views
by de-emphasizing culture and religiosity. Although I had not yet asked her whether her decision to
get married was religious based she distanced herself from Muslim or cultural approach on virginity as
follows: “It just happened that way… I don’t really believe in the necessity to be a virgin when getting
married. But it only felt right with him.” Throughout her interview Hülya chose to proudly distance
herself from Turkish customs and Islamic culture as she seemed to have a negative image of Islam in
general. She emphasized this negative image of Islam through her dislike of Turkish men that she
defined as pushy and insistent in terms of sexuality. Ironically, Turkish men’s insistency on sexuality
is the result of virginity being praised in Turkish culture. The pressure on women to remain as virgins
until marriage limits young men’s sexuality prior to marriage as well meaning it is difficult for them to
find sexual partners. Under this framework men can be insistent on their female partners and try to
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persuade them for premarital sex because it has no implication on them when the woman loses her
virginity. Social stigmas of premarital sex are limited to women only. Quite interestingly during his
interview, Hülya’s husband Kotaro (33, JM) expressed that he had intentionally taken things slowly in
his sexuality with Hülya:
I was living in Turkey for six months before I met her, I didn’t have any Turkish
girlfriends because they told me that gender relations are different from Japan here. And my
Turkish friends told me that I should be careful and take things slowly if I ever have a Turkish
girlfriend.
As the section of his interview indicates, Kotaro was advised, even warned by a Turkish male
friend on dynamics of sexuality in Turkey. His adjusted approach allowed this couple to make a
smooth start to their relationship. Turkish women have less flexibility compared to men in shaping
their lifestyles and sexualities. Interviews with Turkish males as well as participant observations have
shown that sexuality is heavily gender biased in the Turkish Muslim community to the disadvantage of
Turkish females. Turkish females are expected to be more conservative and careful in their
relationships with foreigners especially non-Muslim men, compared to their Turkish male counterparts.
Turkish males residing in Japan seemed to consider their intimacy with Japanese women as a
natural outcome of their residence in Japan, but there were implications of resentment towards Turkish
females’ intimacy with foreigners in general and Japanese men in particular. This trend is re-affirmed
in the marriage trends of Turkish females in Europe. Research has shown that about 80-90 per cent of
Turkish female migrants in Europe choose to bring in a spouse from Turkey (Crul & Doomernik,
2003; Schoenmaeckers, Lodewijckx & Gadeyne, 1999; Liversage, 2012; 2013). Turkish women
involved with non-Muslim men are perceived as being sexually loose. This stigma was expressed in
many diverse social gatherings with social groups from different socio-economic backgrounds but the
clearest expression of it was during Birol (36, TM)’s interview. The topic came up in relevance to his
marriage decision as follows:
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Birol: I thought I would eventually marry a Turkish person or maybe a foreigner but hadn’t
considered Japanese.
Researcher: Did you have any Turkish girlfriends here?
Birol: There aren’t many (Turkish) girls who come to Japan and the ones that do are usually
either married or they have arrived with their boyfriends.
Researcher: Or she has a Japanese boyfriend here?
Birol: If she has a Japanese boyfriend she’s no good anyway! [Laughs]
The conversation above clearly portrayed Birol’s gender bias. In this conversation he
somehow disgraced Turkish females involved with Japanese men although he, himself was married to
a Japanese women and had a bicultural child. He did not seem to be aware of this dilemma that his
gender bias was causing.
Japanese Sexuality
Dynamics of gender relations in Japan are different from the case of Turkey as explained
above. In Turkey’s case gender relations of couples are formulated around virginity and premarital sex.
On the other hand in the Japan’s case the main problem lies within interactions of genders, more
precisely, communication and socialization of couples. The lack of communication between couples
has led to the increase of sexless marriages in Japan.
In Japan genders rarely mix under friendship and this is reflected on marriages through
relations of husband and wife. Within a marriage it is common for the husband and wife to live
separate lives in terms of socialization. Although women depend on their husbands economically, they
cannot rely on them for emotional intimacy (Lock, 1993, p.106). This particular way of socialization
has also come up within this research. When Tami (40, JF) and Bora (36, TM) were asked if they
socialize together, Tami replied:
[…] Hmmm let me think… Well not much I guess. Or do I ever go? No, I don’t ever
go actually. You know how it is, women want to talk and socialize with women. Well, maybe
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that’s a big difference between Japanese and Turkish people. Japanese people meet up with
their friends separately.
The case of Tami and Bora clearly portrays the Japanese pattern of separate socialization. In
this case, Tami was aware of the difference in how Japanese and Turkish couples socialize and she
preferred the Japanese way. She preferred meeting up with her own friends because “women want to
talk and socialize with women.” Most couples in this research eventually ended up with this pattern of
socialization. The adaptation process was different for all the couples and in some cases it took several
years. When asked if they socialize together like Turkish couples or separately like Japanese couples,
Satoru (36, JM) explained their case as follows:
Satoru: Let’s say we’ve finally overcome that point. There were some problems in the past,
we couldn’t agree. Especially when there was my friend’s wedding. My friend only invited
me. That’s how things are here (in Japan), if they don’t know you both they would invite only
the person they know. I mean the place is small and all seats are decided in advance. It’s a
closed, private event. It was hard for her to understand this. We went together twice. The
second time I had to ask my friend whether I could bring my wife along. It was disturbing for
me to have to make this request. That was the first year we moved to Japan. Then she got used
to it and now we have no problems since friends of my age did not get married after that. She
does understand it now though.
In terms of vacations… Well she goes to Turkey on her own so I occasionally go skiing with
my friends on weekends. It doesn’t become a problem […] but it’s not every weekend.
Researcher: What about socialization with the Turkish community?
Satoru: No. I mean we passed that phase as well. Before we had a child there were receptions
at the Embassy all the time, Zümrüt would receive invitations like everyone else. She wanted
me to go as well but it was three to four times a month. Sometimes it was during the day, it
wasn’t possible for me to attend those. I went about once a month at most though. All other
people attended with their spouses so she complained at the beginning but then got used to it.
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It’s not just that I didn’t want to go but also because I was away on business. I tried to attend
as much as I could while in Japan but not always.
The case of Satoru and Zümrüt (40, TF) presents a couple in which both spouses had made
concessions to adapt to their spouses’ socialization preferences. On the one hand Satoru made
concessions by attending some events organized at the Turkish Embassy whereas Zümrüt had stopped
trying to tag along to Satoru’s social activities. This couple as many others, ended up socializing
separately. It is important to note that this does not mean that they do not do activities together. It just
means that the wife does not have to socialize with the husband’s friends and that the husband does
not have to socialize with the wife’s friends.
One criticism that this separate socialization process attracts is the loss of intimacy and
communication among couples which may result in sexless marriages. As the couple shares less and
less, they become alienated or lonely within their marriages. In such cases satisfaction of emotional
and sexual needs are pursued outside the family and thus spouses may join the dating scene again
(Ronald & Alexy, 2011, p.18). This is observed in some of Japan’s transnational marriages and brings
about the question on whether dating while married is cheating or if adultery can be justified by the
dynamics of the marriage. Under this framework, Faier (2007, p.152)’s work gives reference to
Filipina wives who do not consider dating as cheating if there is no sexuality involved. Furthermore, a
Chinese wife cited by Liu-Farrer (2010, p.107) has taken this argument to the next level by arguing
that although she was having extramarital affairs it was because her husband was impotent. It was his
fault that she was cheating. Furthermore, this wife did not think she was neglecting her wifely duties
since she provided him with dinner in the evenings and gave him a generous allowance, from his own
income that is.
It is important to note that both parties have their own reasons and how one spouse acts has a
direct impact on how the other spouse reacts (Tahhan, 2007, p.161). In transnational marriages, the
visa aspect also becomes important. Suzuki (2010, p.407-8)’s Filipina interviewees who did not want
to risk having a divorce were seeking affection outside their marriages. This assumption was based on
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their Japanese husbands’ tendency to force them to end their love affairs instead of divorcing them.
These dynamics are not limited to foreign women’s transnational marriages in Japan only. Research
has shown that men can feel left out and even shut off from family life in Japanese marriages. As
mothers socialize with children and make plans that do not include the father, men are pushed away
from the family. Consequently, spouses could seek leisure outside the family or start considering
divorce (Tahhan, 2007, p.155; Alexy, 2010). Alexy (2011, p.248) notes that the lack of
communication and even physical contact between spouses may lead to a divorce.
Within this research there was only one spouse who had openly revealed his extramarital
affairs; this was the particular case of Mehmet (33, TM). In line with dynamics outlined above, as it
was explained under childrearing in Chapter Five, his wife had pushed him away after their daughter
was born and this led him to search for new romantic companions outside of marriage. For this
research the main factor that affected couples’ sexuality was having children. This will be explained in
length in the next section.
Sexuality of Turkish – Japanese Couples
Although initially not included as a question in the research, many couples expressed having
sexless marriages. Some couples expressed it openly whereas some implied it through long working
hours, separate life styles, co-sleeping with children and having days without any interaction in the
same household. The decision to have children itself had an impact on the couples’ sex life. A husband
expressed at the end of his interview that sex had changed since they had gotten married. She wanted
to have children but he did not feel ready. The pressure he felt from her to have children made sex
seemed like a dull duty.
During another interview, a female spouse was asked whether they were planning on having
children. She said they did want to have children but they could not yet. When asked if one of them
would undergo treatment she shyly confessed not having sex with her Japanese husband. It had been a
few months. She explained this by her husband’s working hours. He came home late, tired and once
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he had his dinner he would quickly fall asleep. Fortunately, the couple did end up having a child the
following year.
In cases of couples still having sex, there was a clear pattern of having less sex after the
children were born. As explained in the previous section, having children changed the relationship
between husband and wife into a relationship between father and mother. Co-sleeping with children
strengthened the pattern of the couple not having sex. Most couples co-slept with their children until
the child wanted to sleep separately. One wife expressed not having sex with her husband although it
had been more than a year after their child was born. They co-slept with their child and their
interviews revealed neither of them being interested in having sex anymore.
It is important to note that sexless marriages were not limited to families with children. There
was one Turkish female interviewee who expressed worries about the irregularity of their sex life
although the couple did not have any children. They did have sex occasionally but during some long
periods in between they did not. She did not know if this was normal and wanted to know about other
couples’ sex lives.
Sexual relations between spouses after childbirth are different in Japan and Turkey. Although
there is literature on sexless marriages in Japan, there is no such literature on Turkey. This, however,
is closely related to the power of women within the family. Although Japanese women are strong in
the private sphere, the power of Turkish women varies according to their socio-economic background
and education level. It should be noted that although sexless marriages is not an important topic in the
Turkish case, marital rape is. The revision of the Civil Code to render marital rape a crime has taken
affect only in 2005 in Turkey. The commonality of marital rape is considered the direct outcome of
gender relations within the family and Turkish men having control over their wives and their bodies.
The rate of marital rape is closely related to demographic and social-economic characteristics. Most of
the victims are under 30 or over 50 years old and from lower social classes (Asirdizer & Yavuz, 2009).
In summary, the main topics related to sexless marriages within this research were: the
decision to have children and sex becoming a dull duty; not being able to have children because of
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sexless marriages; not being able to get back to having a sex life after childbirth; changing parental
roles and; sex just being irregular due to different factors in the couples’ lives.
Living Standards Redefined through Living Space
Interviewees were asked their ideas on living standards in Japan and their perceptions of
upward or downward social mobility. Although most interviewees expressed being satisfied with
Japan’s higher living standards, some spouses were not because they had different criteria. This
revealed that there are different ways of defining higher living standards depending on individual
experiences and priorities. Spouses who were pleased with Japan’s higher living standards elaborated
on security and welfare. On the other hand, some spouses like Zümrüt (40, TF) and Melisa (30, TF)
argued for downward social mobility to lower living standards. Their scale in measuring living
standards was different compared to other interviewees. Zümrüt and Melisa were both housewives and
they focused on living spaces and work life balance of their husbands when defining living standards.
In terms of living spaces, home is considered as the area of personal expression (Sand, 2003, p.2). The
living space is especially important for housewives who spend most of their time at home. Melisa had
just started doing part-time work occasionally whereas Zümrüt was a full-time housewife with a baby.
Zümrüt and Satoru (36, JM) had met in Turkey over a decade ago while he was working there.
They went through the common stages of friendship, courtship and marriage like most of the other
couples in the research. Although Zümrüt was working when they initially met she quit work after
their decision to get married and move to Japan. In Japan she could not find work at the standards she
wanted so she did not join the workforce. The couple resided in a third country together as well, she
did not work there either. In transnational marriages, the family plays an important role on the
decision to migrate (Castles, 2004). Once the decision on the country of residence is made, spouses
who follow the main breadwinner face challenges in finding work in the country of destination
(George, 2005; Kofman 1999). Furthermore, Satoru’s work involved long business trips and the
possibility of re-allocation to foreign countries. This limited Zümrüt’s options for work and she
decided to become a full time housewife. This in turn had an impact on her perceptions of living
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standards. During her interview, when Zümrüt was asked about social upward mobility of Turkish
spouses to higher living standards in Japan she was furious to say the least. She commented as
follows:
Are you kidding me!? Look where I live! I could have had a spacious apartment if I was back
home, have a proper dish washer, a good washing machine.
Since Zümrüt was now a full time housewife, for her living standards were more about the
household than welfare level or security in Japan. The issue of living standards defined by the living
space was an important topic in Zümrüt and Satoru’s marriage. They both expressed, during their
separate interviews that most of their arguments revolved around furniture and organization of their
living space. This is how Zümrüt summarized their situation:
Furniture is our main topic of arguments. Turkish people are addicted to furniture. This
doesn’t exist in Japanese culture. I mean if I say I want to buy a bag for 1000 dollars or if I go
buy one for 550 dollars he’s very happy but then he wouldn’t let me buy a couch for 300
dollars.
For Zümrüt, living standards mean having enough living space and necessary equipment in
that space to lighten her housework. Her second comment shows that beyond the equipment, there is a
certain way she would like to decorate her apartment. She summarizes this through: “Turkish people
are addicted to furniture. This doesn’t exist in Japanese culture.” The same topic also came up during
her husband Satoru’s interview. He explained the situation as follows:
We have too much furniture. I mean, couch, table, plates, small but many things. I sometimes
really hate it. We filled up a whole container when we were moving. She was in Turkey with
the baby and I was about to leave for a business trip for three months when the boxes arrived.
150 boxes and no place to put them, they were everywhere in the apartment. We had just
bought a couch before we moved. I didn’t want that couch up to the very end. I didn’t want it
even after we bought it because it was too big […] it would have filled half of the living room
[…]
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It’s not about the money, it would’ve been better if she had chosen a smaller one. Our house
was big there but here in Japan they couldn’t fit it through the door so we threw it away. I
can’t believe she still brings this up.
Satoru re-affirmed their different approaches to organization of living space. He is aware that
living space and furniture is important for Zümrüt, however he has difficulty grasping why it matters
and why this issue keeps causing arguments in their marriage. Since the couple belongs to an upper
middle class, they have both reaffirmed during their interviews that the conflict over managing living
space was not related to economic factors.
Zümrüt’s definition of living standards also included her husband’s long working hours and
extended business trips. These were placing the burden of most housework and childrearing duties on
her shoulders. Social networks are important in the childcare process of migrants and it is hard on
female migrants to take care of the children when they do not have a network they could rely on or
hire domestic helpers (Levitt, 2001; Hertog, 2009). The issue of getting help with household chores
comes up as an important aspect in research on migrants when it is common in the country of origin
but rare in the country of destination (George, 2005, p.83). Along these lines, Zümrüt criticized their
living standards from these aspects and compared them to their life in a third country. In Japan she
could not rely on family support to raise her child, or hire a housekeeper or a full time nanny. She had
all these options if she had been living in Turkey. Her Japanese mother-in-law had told her from the
beginning that she would not help with childrearing. Although her mother often flew in to Japan to
help her out, Zümrüt did not have anyone else to rely on except a few friends in the Turkish
community.
Melisa had complaints similar to Zümrüt’s. Melisa (TF, 30) and Hiroki (JM, 32) had met in
Turkey while he was travelling. They also followed the friendship, relationship and marriage pattern,
step by step. They had lived together in Turkey and then in a third country. She was a university
graduate but did not have a firm career. She worked in Turkey but then quit work to join him abroad.
Unfortunately things did not go as planned and Hiroki was out of work which made both of them
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unemployed. He then decided to move back to Japan and find work whereas she went back to Turkey.
Melisa later joined him in Japan and they got married. When they got married Hiroki was unemployed
and lived with his parents but social pressures on Melisa and her family had increased because of her
travels overseas and their co-habitation. Under these circumstances, the couple had limited economic
resources to start up their family and this was reflected on their living space.
After Hiroki found work, the couple started living in central Tokyo. Being newlyweds and not
having any savings, Hiroki had chosen a modest Japanese apartment for the couple in order to save
money. The couple slept on a futon (Japanese mattress) and sat on the floor in their tatami room.
According to Melisa, just like in the case of Zümrüt, their living space was the proof that she had
moved down to lower living standards. Although sitting and sleeping on the floor is considered normal
in Japan, it is associated with poverty and backwardness in Turkey. As Melisa did not know much
about Japan or Japanese culture she found sleeping on a futon and sitting on the floor to be tiring and
condescending. This is how she commented on her living space during her interview:
Researcher: What about your home?
Melisa: We have a tatami room. When you enter the apartment there’s the kitchen to your left,
a space on your right and then the tatami room. We have one low table in the tatami room. We
sleep on a futon. There’s a low sofa but he’s so used to living on the floor that he never sits
there […]
Actually he told me this from the beginning. I wanted to live in central Tokyo and he said: “If
you want to live in Tokyo it has to be a small apartment”. Being close to the station is an
advantage for me. But in the future if we have a child and if we are still living in Japan we
definitely have to move to another house. It would be impossible otherwise!
Research: Do you have guests?
Melisa: I read that Japanese people don’t usually invite guests home but Hiroki is just the
opposite, he insists on inviting them over. But I didn’t want it, I told him I can’t make my
guests sit on the floor. But we did invite them over in the end and they found this natural. I
guess it was possible somehow.
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Organization of Melisa’s living space was in strong contradiction with what she was raised in
and wished for. She found sitting and sleeping on the floor condescending. This is especially clear
when she claims: “I can’t make my guests sit on the floor”. For her, extension of this condescending
act equals being a bad host. Her hopes remain vested in the couple having a child soon so that they can
move to a more spacious apartment. Melisa’s husband Hiroki was aware of her discomfort about their
living space and life style in a tatami room. The issue came up when I asked him how she was doing
in terms of getting used to life in Japan. He commented as follows:
I’m sure she’s having a hard time as well as me but she doesn’t show it. She only shows it
with the futon, living on the floor, on tatami. We only have this very little sofa and we sleep
on a futon. I think she’s having a hard time dealing with this.
Researcher: How did you decide on that? Did you negotiate?
Hiroki: Me, I don’t like to have anything in the room or for myself, I don’t like these things, I
don’t want anything. I want to be light, if something happens I take my backpack and go out.
The case of Melisa and Hiroki resembles the case of Zümrüt and Satoru. The main difference
in these two cases is that Melisa is new to Japanese culture whereas Zümrüt is not. Melisa thinks their
living arrangement also has to do with money whereas Zümrüt’s case clearly shows that it is about the
living space rather than money. This is clear when Zümrüt comments:” I mean if I say I want to buy a
bag for 1000 dollars or if I go buy one for 550 dollars he’s very happy but then he wouldn’t let me buy
a couch for 300 dollars.” On the other hand, Melisa also thinks it has to do with money and her not
contributing to household finances. As it was indicated in Chapter Four, she had commented: “If I had
a regular income I would have had more of a say. I would’ve insisted. Hiroki always tells me that this
is a temporary living arrangement and that I should hang in there.”
In both cases presented above, Turkish brides are discontented with Japanese style homes. The
issue of living space being problematic in transnational marriages is a subject that has not attracted
much attention in the existing literature although it seems to be important for Turkish – Japanese
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couples. Thus, this topic needs further elaborations with reference to how the process is negotiated
among couples.
When we look at these two cases, Zümrüt has more power in her marriage compared to Melisa.
Although they are both housewives, Zümrüt is ten years older than Melisa. She has not only been
married for longer but she also has a child, and this gives her leverage in her family.
Another Turkish bride who lived in a house with tatami rooms and slept on a futon was Mine
(31, TF). Contrary to cases of Zümrüt and Melisa, she did not complain about the situation. When
asked if they slept on a futon or western style bed she simply replied futon as it did not seem to matter.
We had our interview at a cafe and then moved on to their house. As we sat around the kotatsu (low
table) in their tatami room I asked her how she felt about her living space. She was aware of the
controversy between the Turkish and Japanese way of organizing living space. She had adapted to the
Japanese style easily as both her initial move to Japan as well as Japanese husband were her particular
choices. In Zümrüt and Melisa’s cases, their move to Japan was a direct outcome of their spouses
work in Japan. This made Mine more accepting of Japanese living space arrangements. This was in
line with couples having less disagreements when better informed about their spouses’ cultures.
Mine did however have an anecdote about cultural differences within the living space and
sitting on the floor. When Mine and Naoki (41, JM) visited Turkey together for the first time, her
family and relatives had gathered in Mine’s parents’ living room. Relatives, neighbors, family friends
and many guests had arrived to see the Japanese groom. After some time the room became so crowded
that there were no seats left. In this situation, Naoki who had remained standing until everyone had
settled decided to sit down on the floor. This caused a shock wave and panic in the room. On the one
hand, these Turkish people could not understand why on earth he would sit on the floor instead of
continuing to stand up or squeezing in with other people on the sofa. On the other hand, they felt
ashamed that they had failed at being thoughtful hosts, and unable to provide their main guest with a
seat. This was the exact failure that Melisa did not want at her home when Hiroki wanted to invite
people over: “But I didn’t want it, I told him I can’t make my guests sit on the floor.”
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Living space was very important for another interviewee, Sevgi as well. However her
approach to this issue was completely different from the cases outlined above. In fact, she was one of
the few interviewees who had a home that was decorated in Turkish style. The first time I visited their
home I strongly felt that I was entering a Turkish home. At the entrance of their living room they had a
china cabinet, a dining table for six people with chairs, two sofas with a coffee table in the middle, a
TV stand and liquor cabinet, small round tables at corners of the sofas with elegant lamps on them.
Beyond the Turkish styled furniture, there were small details like statuettes, family pictures in frames
and evil eye decorated objects that made their home very familiar, even to me, a stranger who had just
walked into their lives. Sevgi was very successful in creating her home away from home. During her
interview she explained in detail circumstances that had led to this decoration:
[…] It was very hard when I first arrived in Japan. I went into depression, I don’t even want to
remember those days. But I think it has been influential in the way I decorated our home.
When we arrived in Japan nothing was ready in the house, there was no furniture, you could
even say we were just rolling around. The kids went to school every day but they didn’t
understand anything. We had no friends. How should I put it? I would send my younger
daughter to school and when she came back she would ask “Why did we come here? Why
didn’t we go to Turkey?” I just couldn’t handle the pressure. After two months I told my
husband I wasn’t feeling well. I was crying without reason during the day. I had already been
through a depression after the birth of our second child so I knew what I was going through.
That’s why I told my husband about it. We went to a clinic and I started taking medication.
Four months after that, as soon as the children’s school year was over I headed over to Turkey
with my children. When I went to Turkey I told my family about my situation and that I
wanted to stop taking medication, I asked for their support to overcome my depression. They
were kind enough to give me full support during our stay. When I came back to Japan I was
feeling much better.
When we came back I decided to re-arrange my living environment. I was a housewife back
then, when we first arrived in Japan […] Then I got better as I rearranged our living
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environment. I told my husband that I wanted to redecorate one room in this house every year.
I wanted to make it just like our previous home because I was missing it very much. I wanted
to have something familiar, something that belonged to me at least when I came back home at
the end of the day, you know. I’m now recommending this to all young Turkish people who
are having trouble adapting to Japan. I tell them they should at least control their living space.
When you are in Japan, with Japanese people, you have to adapt to their culture and in many
instances you have to be the one to make concessions. In such a situation I think it’s very
important to at least prepare a comfortable living environment for yourself at home
As her narrative suggests, Sevgi was one of the spouses who had a hard time adapting to Japan.
She was depressed and on medication for several months. This also had to do with her not being very
familiar with her husband’s culture. She then realized that as a housewife who spends most of her time
in the family home, she needed to take matters into her own hands and reorganize their living space, to
create a familiar space for herself and her family in this new country that both she and her daughters
were foreign to. The advantage that Sevgi had over other cases presented in this section was that Sevgi
and Masato owned the house they lived in and their stay in Japan was permanent whereas there was
the probability for Zümrüt and Melisa to move abroad depending on their husband’s work.
This section has shown that arrangement of living space is an important and gendered aspect
of transnational marriages although not granted much attention in the existing literature. This was only
problematic for foreigner housewives who were the homemakers. Turkish husbands had no comments
whatsoever on living space, they had let their Japanese wives take care of those. This was in line with
the argument of yuvayı dişi kuş yapar (the female bird constructs the nest) analyzed by Baltaş, Steptoe 
and Duman (2000, p.2) which implied that the household is mainly under female control.
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Chapter VI: Religious Practice and Identity Construction in Marriage
This chapter analyzes the impact of religious and cultural differences on the couples’ lives
with an emphasis on Turkish spouses’ Muslim identity that is constructed in line with their middle and
upper middle class ideologies. Research on religiosity of Turks conducted by Çarkoğlu and Toprak 
(1999; 2006) has shown that religiosity is closely related to social class. Furthermore, research on
religiosity of immigrants has shown that religiosity of immigrants is correlated to their position in the
labor market and thus their social class. Immigrants from higher social classes adopt more easily
(Inglehart & Norris, 2009). The first section of the chapter focuses on politicization of religion in
Turkey and provides a background in how Turks conduct their religiosity. The second section provides
narratives of interviewees and outlines their approach to religion and religiosity with reference to their
social class. The third section presents narratives on how Japanese spouses perceive the Turkish
Muslim identity with reference misperceptions and conflicts. Finally, the last section focuses on
religious rituals in couples’ lives. Most of the last section is devoted to the topic of death and funerals
as this was the most significant and problematic ritual in these couples lives.
Politicization of Religion in Turkey
Religiosity is a term easy to define but problematic to measure, consequently many
researchers attempt to carefully bypass this stage of defining religion. However, Geertz (1993) has
provided a definition that many have used and borrowed. He had defined religion as a cultural system.
Religion and culture are very closely interlinked and strongly blended. Thus, the study of religion and
religiosity requires a focus on one culture in particular and how that culture has shaped it.
This section presents how religion was shaped within Turkish culture with reference to its
politicization in the past century. This section is important as it constitutes a base to understand how
Turks define their religiosity, which will be presented in the second section of this chapter.
The Republic of Turkey was founded as a laic democratic state in 1923. Its roots are in the
Ottoman Empire that was ruled by moral rules based on Islam, similar to Sharia, for centuries before
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that. The Turkish Republic emerged from a break with its Islamic roots and is characterized by a reach
towards the west, Europe, for modernization. The particularity of the Turkish reform compared to its
European counterparts has its base on internal growth and improvement rather than imperial ambitions
to expand (Spencer, 1958). This was the outcome of the Ottoman Empire’s loss of power and
willingness to gain back power in the world stage through modernization. At that time in history
modernity was associated with the west, and European powers in particular. That is why the Ottomans
as well as many other nations undergoing political decline had turned their faces towards the west. At
that time there were four dominant schools of thoughts: Ottomanism, Westernism, Turkism and
Islamism. Although these were different in their bases and aims, all accepted the superiority of the
West. The question was not whether the Western model should be adopted as they all agreed that it
should be. They only could not agree on to which extent the Western model should be adopted.
Within the process of modernization outlined above, the aim was a laic base for the Republic.
However support for laicism at the popular level was weak due to the top down elite nature of the
Turkish revolution. Islam had been used as a guide in regulating relations among Ottoman subjects for
centuries and replacement of these by-laws that reflected European values could not be easily
absorbed by the society at large. In order to facilitate the transition, the ruling elite of the revolution
chose to deemphasize religion through the abolition of caliphates and exiling of the Sultan, who was
considered as a spiritual leader besides being the head of the Ottomans.
During the first years of the republic, religion was limited to a great extent by the ruling elite.
The ruling elite who had led the revolution aimed for democracy but held absolute power in a one
party system. Their initial purpose was to prevent the rise of opposition until the reconsolidation of
democracy and internalization of its values. Their ruling method itself contradicted their desired
outcome. Three decades after the revolution this group of elite decided it was time to reconsolidate
democracy by moving on to a two party system. Even within this process they allowed the rise of
opposition only within themselves. The real opposition which underlined religiosity and Ottoman
values was repressed and denied entrance to politics. The transition to multi-party system through this
opposition from within the ruling elite changed Turkish politics. Through Turkish politics, following
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political parties pursued populist policies in order to come to power. Within this process religion was
politicized and its rise, with an emphasis on the glorious Ottoman was inevitable from the 1970’s
onwards. Under this framework, the foundation of the Turkish Republic was formulated on reforming
the old religious and backward Ottoman and this discourse was reproduced by the secular elite which
gave religion and religiosity a negative connotation. Religiosity was associated with less educated
lower classes. This is reflected on religiosity in contemporary Turkey as well, according to Çarkoğlu 
and Toprak (1999; 2006)’s findings on religiosity in Turkey, the level or religiosity decreases as the
education level increases.
Although the Turkish Republic was founded on the western model there was a strong
difference. Since Europe had undergone the separation of church and state, secularism was
internalized. The Turkish Republic was based on this model although there was no break within. The
top down nature of the revolution as well as concentration of political power in the hands of an elite
minority prevented internalization of these values. The result was radicalization of Islam and its clash
with modernity that was defined in western terms. This led to the association of Islam with
backwardness and opposition to modernity.
As outlined in the previous section, religion has been politicized in the Turkish Republic. This
influences interviewees’ definition of Religion and Religiosity. There is literature on how religiosity
changes after immigration with reference to different religious groups. However, it should be noted
that Turkish people define their religiosity within Turkey through a combination of individual
preferences to begin with and this is closely linked to social class. This results in individualized
religiosity that is defined in different ways within Turkey as well as within diverse Turkish immigrant
groups. Turkish Muslims argue that they are not religious but then reproduce religious rites. There is
flexibility in each individual’s choice, according to his or her preferences on how much of these rites
she or he will reproduce. These preferences are widely influenced by social class. The choice of how
Turkish people individually formulate their religiosity is reflected on their relations with their foreign
spouses when they enter transnational marriages.
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The Turkish religiosity is difficult to grasp for foreigners and even foreigner spouses who
perceive Islam as a strict religion. These perceptions will be elaborated later in this chapter. These are
the main topics that have come up during the interviews that were considered as significant in defining
religiosity. The following sections will elaborate on perceptions of Islam with reference to these
indicators.
Turkish Spouses’ Formulation of Religiosity
Perception of individual religiosity shows variation in different social groups and is difficult
to analyze. In this section I have chosen topics that have been outlined as problematic within the
literature on Muslim immigrants. The approach to religion showed differences in accordance with
social class within the Turkish community in Japan in line with Çarkoğlu and Toprak (1999; 2006)’s 
research. In many instances, religiosity itself was criticized and demeaned by upper middle classes,
this was in line with the decrease of religiosity with increase of educational achievement. The de-
emphasis of religiosity was reproduced by members of this class. Within this group there was a
tendency to detach religion from culture and emphasizing culture while de-emphasizing religion. The
way Ceyhan (31, TM) defined his religiosity reflects this class’ approach to religion as follows:
There is a fact that I can’t deny, I’m a Muslim in cultural terms because I spent the first 20
years of my life in a Muslim environment. For example if there was a funeral or a religious
feast I would go to the mosque with my father to pray. However that doesn’t mean that I
meet all religious requirements or that I avoid things that are forbidden. It doesn’t even mean
that I’m a believer. In that sense I think the term ‘liberal Muslim’ is appropriate to define me.
Ceyhan is a well-educated Turkish male from an upper middle-class family in Turkey. In his
definition, religiosity is very difficult to evaluate separately from Turkish culture and identity. He
emphasizes the importance of rites in terms of family ties and their reproduction resulting in the
transfer to younger generations. According to him this can be confused for religiosity even in the
absence of a religious mindset. Although Ceyhan expressed not being a practicing Muslim and linked
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it to family rituals and habits back home, I later found out through participant observation that he still
carried on these rites in Japan, even in the absence of his family members. This reflects his
reproduction of religious rituals despite having no obligation to do so. His situation and explanation of
liberal Turkish Muslim religiosity as cited above frames well the conflicting situation where individual
de-emphasis of religiosity is carried on in parallel with reproduction of religious rites. This is the
direct outcome of what Geertz (1993) had defined as religion itself being culture.
Some members of this group dismissed religiosity on the basis of not fulfilling all
requirements of being a good Muslim. This dismissal was conflicting, as on the one hand it was based
on self-criticism on religiosity but on the other hand there was no effort or willingness to change or
improve this self religiosity. They did however define themselves as Muslims in social settings and
reproduced rites. They emphasized living their religion according their own rules, or rules passed on to
them by their families. The remark made by Enis (40, TM) summarizes this approach: “They (people)
might ask us what kind of Muslims we are, the only thing we do is not to eat pork. We have no
religious practices.”
All upper middle class Turkish interviewees who have participated in the research have
identified themselves under the framework explained above. Terms such as “liberal” or “moderate”
were used to soften religiosity. Most of the individuals in this group consumed alcohol, about half did
not mind consuming pork. Only one expressed practicing daily prayers, few fasted during Ramadan
and some occasionally went to the mosque. This was in line with the research conducted by Baltaş and 
Steptoe (2000) on upper middle class in England. Their interviewees had a similar pattern of
religiosity with Turks in Japan as outlined above. This reaffirms the strong correlation between
religiosity and social class as the study mentioned above has produced different results compared to
previous research on Turks in Europe from lower social classes. It is important to note that with
reference to pork consumption, Turks who had previously resided abroad found it more acceptable.
Pork was not available in Turkey until very recently and it is still hard to find it as demand for it is
very low. Some interviewees expressed their stand on consuming pork in terms of the mindset they
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were raised in. In Cem’s (40, TM) words: “It’s not that I think I will burn in hell if I eat pork but it just
feels wrong because that is what we were told since we were kids.”
As was explained in Chapter Five, pork consumption became problematic with reference to
bicultural childrearing. The four pork consumptions patterns that were outlined reflect the religiosity
of Turkish spouses in each family.
A divergence from the existing literature on Muslim immigrants and food consumption was
the de-emphasis of halal15 food by these Turkish immigrants. Within this group of Turks, search for
halal food did not come up as an issue during any of the interviews, and it did not come up as a
discussion subject in any of the participant observations gatherings either. In terms of participant
observation gatherings, there was no effort made to hold events at locations where halal food was
available. This did not show diversity based on social class. As it was mentioned in Chapter Three in
the methodology section, low skilled laborers gathered at bars. Although pork consumption was less
common among low skilled laborers, there was no discussions on search for halal food.
In terms of Muslim practices in their everyday lives, Turkish interviewees were asked if they
fasted. Most interviewees expressed difficulties in fasting during Ramadan due to their workload
although they expressed willingness to do so. Most male interviewees confirmed visiting the mosque
in case of funerals and some were fasting during Ramadan. The only interviewee who claimed to be
attending Friday prayers was Mehmet (33, TM). He commented: “It might seem okashii (strange) but I
do go to Friday prayers when I can. You know once you go there you feel inner peace, you relax.”
Mehmet’s attendance of Friday prayers can be explained through two factors, his social class
and work conditions. First, as indicated at the beginning of this Chapter, religiosity has been
associated with lower social classes, Mehmet was a high school graduate and a low skilled laborer.
Secondly, being an irregular employee allowed him to go to the Mosque on Fridays in the middle of
the day to pray. There are physical limitations of working conditions that should be taken into account
with reference to visits to the Mosque. Physical limitations such as availability of mosques or mesjits
15In Islamic belief system Allah is the sole authority in giving and taking life. Thus, there is the need to say
a prayer before slaughtering animals. Only the meat that was produced according to these rules is
considered as halal food.
192
in Tokyo. Furthermore, working conditions do not always allow men to take extra time off from work
every Friday.
Ishi (2008) refers to some members within the Brazilian community in Japan becoming more
religious after their move to Japan but there was no such case within this research group. Research
conducted by Kojima (2006) on trends of increasing and decreasing religiosity within the Turkish
community has shown that religiosity might increase after the initial move but then it decreases after
ten years of residence as an immigrant. Unfortunately, the above mentioned research does not provide
information on social class.
Religiosity was slightly different for different social classes. Two aspects of religiosity that
were significant in this research were consumption of pork and alcohol. These two aspects of
religiosity in particular were touched upon in all interviews. Most low skilled laborers did not
consume pork and were stricter on the topic of pork consumption in particular. However they did
consume alcohol and did not search for halal food. Some of these men expressed occasionally
attending Friday prayers, if they were in the area of a mosque or mesjit. The difference with the group
above was that as low skilled laborers they tended to be in and out of work, none had a long-term
employment history except for Mete (32, TM). Although Mete was a low skilled laborer himself, he
did not socialize with this group, he expressed disliking their manners in general. Mete did not fast
during Ramadan or visit the mosque either.
There was an interesting difference between the group of low skilled laborer men and upper
middle class of men in terms of defining religiosity and approach to alcohol consumption. Most of the
Turkish interviewees consumed alcohol, only a few did not. During participant observation meetings
with the group of low skilled laborers, they seemed apologetic that they were not “good” Muslims,
consuming alcohol. They seemed to believe they should not be consuming alcohol but yet they met up
at a bar every week. This presented a contradiction for them as willing to be “good” Muslims but not
willing to follow strict rules. They showed their respect to religion by not drinking on days prior to
religious holidays. They seemed to believe that it would be very bad to have alcohol in their system on
a religious holiday when they go to pray at the mosque.
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There was no equivalent of such guilt in consuming alcohol among upper middle class Turks,
neither during their private interviews nor during social gatherings. Those who did not want to
consume alcohol simply did not. There was no gender based difference in this respect either, some
upper middle class women occasionally had drinks at their lunch gatherings. This indicates that social
class has an important impact on religiosity. Low skilled laborers have tendency to be more
conservative in religious terms compared to upper middle classes. This distinction between classes and
their religiosity is important because it influences how they interacted with Japanese society and their
spouses.
Although alcohol consumption of Turkish spouses is dependent on how they define their
religiosity, it is a part of everyday life in Japan (Kawano, 2010; Borovoy, 2001). Contrary to the
assumption that this is a difference likely to cause problems between couples, it did not. Turkish
interviewees from middle and upper middle class who did not consume alcohol did not intervene in
their Japanese spouses’ consumption of alcohol. In most cases the Japanese spouse’s alcohol
consumption was considered a result of Japanese culture. This topic in particular came up during Mine
(31, TF) and Naoki (41, JM)’s interviews.
Mine: I don’t drink but I do go to izakayas (Japanese style restaurants) with his relatives,
they drink and I pour them their drinks, we have no problem.
Researcher: Do you drink? [To Naoki]
Naoki: Yes I do.
Mine: He has beer almost every day with dinner.
Naoki: Well you know Japanese people…
Mine: [Turns to researcher] Well you know Japanese can’t relax without their beer but
there’s nothing bad about that.
Naoki: Turkish people don’t eat meat or drink much alcohol though.
Mine: Yeah I hear this all the time in Japan, “Have a drink” or “Let’s have a BBQ!” like that
right?
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My father used to drink a little when he was younger but he quit. He used to drink with his
friends but he doesn’t anymore. Almost no one drinks in my family now.
I think it was a bit hard on Naoki not drinking in Turkey. For example in the evening he
would say “Let’s have a beer!” But I have to explain to him that it would shock them (my
parents) because they’re not used to it. I mean someone drinking beer at home. We have no
such custom so we just went out for fresh air instead.
The part of the interview above summarizes an important difference between the two
cultures very well. When we look at the case of Japan it is considered a normal part of daily life to
have a beer after work whereas when we look at the case of Turkey it is unlikely for people to drink at
home daily. Another interesting aspect is the gender divide in the Turkish case, Mine noted that her
father “[…] used to drink with his friends” which implied that her mother did not drink. This reflects
how in Turkish culture alcohol consumption is traditionally associated with strength and masculinity
besides being associated with secularism. Mine was coming from a relatively conservative middle
class family in Turkey. She consumed neither pork nor alcohol. She was the only interviewee who
expressed practicing daily prayers. She was an exception to the correlation between education and
religiosity as she was both highly educated and a practicing Muslim. However, she had defined herself
as a liberal Muslim as well. She used this reference to distance herself from religious fundamentalism
and the negative image of Islam that has been elaborated upon at the beginning of this chapter.
Japanese Spouses’ Perceptions of Islam
Terrorist attacks on the 11th of September 2001 have changed the way Muslim immigrants
are perceived, especially in the United States but also in other developed liberal democracies (Ong,
2003, p.283). The already negative image of Islam as a conservative religion that failed to modernize
was further burdened with these terrorist attacks. Today, Muslims are subject to discrimination at
many levels in various countries around the world (Chang, 2013). In line with this tendency, there is
prejudice against Islam and Muslim people in Japan as well. The most recent proof of this
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discrimination was a recent news article on privacy breach through sharing of personal data (“Court:
Police can gather personal information on Muslims”, 2014). In the case of personal data being leaked
by the Japanese police, Muslims were treated differently based on the argument that police should be
allowed to gather information on Muslim individuals just because they are Muslim. Terrorist attacks
carried out by Islamic radicals were then cited as proofs for this necessity.
Diversity within Islam is the outcome of different ways in which it blends with different
cultures and political structures. This has resulted from particular political histories, social dynamics
and customs of Muslim countries. The way Islam blends with cultures in different countries makes it
difficult to differentiate culture and customs of that country from Islam as a religion. In the case of
Turkey for example, the laic nature of the Republic renders it more liberal and flexible compared to
other predominantly Muslim countries around the world. It also paves the way for Turkey’s
consideration as a moderate Islamic model, a model that is strengthened by political, economic and
social ties with the West, especially with the United States and European Union countries (Çarkoğlu & 
Toprak, 2006). Despite having a dominantly Muslim population, Turkey has a moderate Islamic
model through its liberal political foundation that emerged from rejection of religious fundamentalism.
In spite of these facts, a recent declaration made by the previous governor of Tokyo, Mr. Naoki Inose
indicate that these are still not acknowledged in Japan. While Tokyo and Istanbul were competing for
the 2020 Olympics in 2013, Mr. Inose made the following declaration about Turkey: "Islamic
countries, the only thing they share in common is Allah, they are fighting with each other, and they
have social classes." This event had more media coverage in Japan than in Turkey but the incident was
soon forgotten with the resignation of Mr. Inose from his post and the triumph of Tokyo as the next
city to host Olympics in 2020.
In line with above mentioned perceptions of Islam in Japan, the Turkish interpretation of
religiosity was confusing for their Japanese spouses. Most Japanese spouses had more strict images of
Islam. This confusion came up during many interviews as well as Tolga (30, TM)’s. Tolga had a
middle class background in Turkey, he was not a practicing Muslim and consumed both alcohol and
pork. His self-perception of religiosity was similar to Ceyhan’s, as explained at the beginning of the
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chapter. His wife Aki (28, JF) was very surprised and intrigued by the fact that he was acting very
different from the way she thought Muslims were supposed to act. During her interview she said:
We had learnt at school that Muslim people don’t eat pork but when we went to a
restaurant with him for the first time he ate so much of it! He was so surprised that everyone
was asking him; “Why do you eat pork? Why do you eat pork?” He looked so upset. “I eat
pork because it’s so delicious” he said.
I was surprised that there were so many different kinds of Turkish people. It’s like
Japanese people, isn’t it? The mindset and behavior. My Turkish teacher doesn’t drink
alcohol or eat pork, women at my school usually wear the headscarf, and I think that's very
interesting.
Aki came from a Christian family and was going to the church every week-end when she
was growing up. She had stopped going to church when she became an adolescent however she was
interested in foreign cultures and religions. After she met Tolga, she started taking Turkish lessons at
the Turkish Culture Center in Shinjuku. Her teachers at this culture center had explained to her that
Turkish people are Muslims and therefore they cannot eat pork or drink alcohol. This contradiction in
defining Turkish religiosity was confusing for Aki. Her husband Tolga had tried to explain to her
about different levels of religiosity within Turkish Muslims. However as he tried, Aki’s perception of
Islam and Muslims confused him. During his interview, Tolga argued:
Aki is not religious at all but she is interested in Islam. I don’t know... She covers her
head and stuff, she bought a head scarf and covered her hair on the train, and I was so
shocked thinking to myself “Why on earth would she do that!?” She was saying that she
looked like a Muslim woman, I was shocked. I don’t know why she does stuff like that at
times.
Aki’s perception of Islam is different from that of Tolga. This is mainly because Tolga was
born and raised in Turkish religiosity whereas Aki’s knowledge was limited to books and lectures. She
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had no direct interaction with Muslims from different cultures. This has resulted in her perception of
Islam as a strict religion in which consumption of alcohol and pork are forbidden and women wear
headscarves. Furthermore, her strict views on Islam have been strengthened by her attendance of the
Turkish Culture Center in Shinjuku. There is a strong view within the community that this culture
center has strong ties with the religious based Gülen movement (explained in Chapter Five under
language choices and schooling options for bicultural children).
Similar to Aki and Tolga’s discussions, Cem (40, TM) was also talking about religion with
his unofficial spouse. Cem and his spouse met in Japan through work and as it was explained in
Chapter Four, they had chosen not to get married but were co-habiting. During his interview Cem
commented:
(Japanese) find our history very complicated. For example the Kurdish-Turkish
distinction, religiosity and people’s obsession with religion in general. They ask me why
there’s the concept of Jihad in Muslim culture...
We don’t really argue [with my girlfriend] or shout at each other as Japanese people
don’t understand our religious situation. For example one of my friends had no idea that
Islam, Christianity and Judaism are all related monotheist religions.
Cem does not consume pork or alcohol. He had made this declaration through a long
explanation of not being a religious person. He argued just having chosen not to do as a healthy
lifestyle preference. That was the way he constructed his religiosity. In this section of his interview
Cem explained in length how Japanese people around him lacked knowledge of cultures and religions
in general. He was surprised that there are people who do not know that “[…] Islam, Christianity and
Judaism are all related monotheist religions.” From this point he concluded that we could not expect
Japanese people to understand Islam since they do not know basics about monotheist religions. His
view is strongly biased because he was raised in a monotheist religion whereas most of these Japanese
people were not. He had not realized that just as these Japanese people were not well informed about
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Islam, he did not know about the history or sects of Buddhism and Shinto religions. He only knew
basics such as Japanese religiosity being constructed through a blend of Shinto and Buddhist practices.
Naoki (41, JM) was the only Japanese male spouse who had converted to Islam. He was
already interested in Islam when he met his wife Mine (31, TF) as explained in Chapter Four. Naoki
originally came from a Christian family but he was never religious. During his interview I asked him
why he became interested in Islam in the first place, he replied:
I wondered why Muslims were working so hard, why they were putting so much
effort into praying. I thought about this. For example how can a person be willing to pray
five times a day?
Naoki’s views are similar to Aki’s views before her encounter with Tolga. Both of these
Japanese spouses had a strict image of Islam in their minds. Naoki in particular gives reference to
namaz (Muslim prayer) which is mostly practiced by elderly and religious people in Turkey. Within
this research, his wife was the only interviewee who practiced namaz.
The number of Japanese spouses who had interest in Islam or had converted to Islam was
low within this research. This is the outcome of a legal technicality. As indicated in Chapter Two, due
to its laic nature, conversion to Islam is not a requirement for foreign spouses under Turkish law
whereas it is a requirement in countries like Iran and Pakistan (Kudo, 2007; Takeshita, 2010a).
Furthermore even though religious marriages performed by Imams are widely exercised and socially
accepted in Turkey, they have no legal stand. Legal marriages need to be registered at municipalities
just like in Japan.
With reference to freedom of faith, Turkish spouses in this research had the tendency to
emphasize the importance of tolerance for religious difference. Furthermore, almost all of them
expressed having no disagreement on religion or religiosity with their Japanese spouses. However,
some Japanese spouses disagreed during their private interviews. In their private interviews some
Japanese spouses expressed that they carefully avoided discussions on religion in order to prevent any
misunderstandings or conflicts that may lead to an argument. Their Turkish spouses were not aware
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that their Japanese spouses were avoiding the subject. Not all couples had arguments on the topic
however all Japanese spouses understood that religion was a delicate topic for their Turkish spouses.
Shoko (33, JF) found out about it through a very bad argument with her husband. This was in fact the
story of the worst fight in their marriage. She summarized the incident as follows:
One time we got into a huge fight that was really really bad. Do you remember when
there was this cartoon of the Mohammed? In Denmark? At that time I said it was freedom of
speech and of course he said the complete opposite. That was really the biggest fight we ever
had in terms of cultural differences. […] And I actually learned a lesson from that. He did
too. We have different opinions because of our backgrounds and how we're raised... [Pause]
There are things that we pass to each other but there are things that we cannot agree on. We
decided... or... we came not to talk about sensitive stuff like those. You know there's no point,
there's no line, we just go on, argue argue argue, of course my opinion and his opinion differ
and we can say things to hurt each other. You know there's no point. So we eventually came
to a point where we don’t talk about it.
Shoko’s husband is a low skilled laborer with a high school degree. He is originally from the
less developed Eastern part of Turkey and is sensitive on religious issues in accordance with his social
class and education level. Despite having their most severe argument on the issue of religion Shoko
avoided labeling him as a strict Muslim firstly because he occasionally consumed alcohol and
secondly because he had not asked her to convert to Islam. He did not consume pork in line with the
general trend of his social class.
Many Japanese spouses expressed confusion over the way Islam had blended with Turkish
culture, somehow trying to differentiate between Turkish culture and Islam. The majority of Japanese
spouses understood that Turkish people were practicing Islam only to the extent they were willing to
practice it but they had difficulty internalizing this. They had difficulty internalizing it because most of
them perceived Islam to be a strict religion as explained in the beginning of this section.
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Religious Rituals in Couples’ Lives
Since couples who are studied in this research reside in Japan and are less religious due to
their social class, Japanese religious rituals were considered a natural part of their lives. As it was
indicated under bicultural childrearing in Chapter Five, these families had a “Mixed religious
situation”. They tended to embrace all religious holidays. When we look at the practice of religious
rituals that couples practiced, they did not place much importance on them with the strong exception
of rituals for the dead. This section will first introduce religiosity in Japan with reference to rituals and
then elaborate on why and how death came above as the most important religious ritual for Turkish –
Japanese couples.
When we look at Japanese religiosity, it is characterized by a mixture of Buddhist and Shinto
rites. Although there was an attempt to separate these during the Meiji Restoration period, it has failed
and the mixture has prevailed. In contemporary Japan, life-cycle rites for the living are mostly
associated with Shinto rituals whereas funerals are carried out according to Buddhist rites (Kawano,
2010, p.79). Although this defined the religiosity of most Japanese spouses there were exceptions.
Masato (53, JM) came from a Christian family but he expressed not believing in any religion
at the time of his interview. He despised religion and religious system with a rational mindset. His
wife Sevgi (51, TF) on the other hand was religious though not conservative. She consumed alcohol,
did not wear the headscarf but avoided eating pork. During his interview Masato explained how he
came to terms in respecting his wife’s religiosity despite his distance from religion as follows:
I attended Sevgi’s father’s funeral and they did it Muslim style. I didn’t know how it
was done. Men were supposed to go to the mosque with the body so I went along with her
cousin to clean her father’s body before burial 16 . Before that I didn’t know how they
worshipped. Then I thought about how I was doing stupid things. Why was I insisting on my
style? That was the moment I abandoned all religious prejudice. Being good is enough, no
protocols is needed, you can do it like this or that, don’t eat pork or don’t eat fish or be
vegetarian. That sort of things are just to show your religion, to show your identity to others.
16 Before the funeral the body of the deceased is washed at the mosque with the help of relatives.
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That’s not important for me I thought. If I say this clearly to Sevgi she will be angry. If I tell
her I’m refusing all religion, I mean.
All couples either Japanese or Turkish attended funerals with their spouses if there was a
death in the family. Masato had attended Sevgi’s father’s funeral. This was his first time seeing and
praying along with Muslims. Watching these rituals made him realize that although he did not have
faith, he should not project his mindset on others but be more humanitarian and focus on the goodness
of people. He also decided not to upset his wife on the issue of religion ever again. He stopped making
remarks about religion altogether.
The funeral mentioned above was not the only Muslim funeral Masato attended. In the
summer of 2013 Masato’s wife Sevgi passed away after a long battle with cancer. Masato respected
her faith even with her passing. He first organized a funeral for her at a funeral house in Japan which
allowed her friends in Japan to say goodbye to her. Her body was then transferred to Turkey for a
proper Muslim ceremony followed by her burial next to her father’s grave as she wished. Masato as
well as their children were present at both events.
Death was a topic that came up during the research on only a few occasions. The main
difference between Japanese and Turkish faiths is that the body is cremated according to Japanese
faith whereas it is buried according to Turkish faith. Both societies hold prayers for their dead
however the Japanese have more rituals and they are morally obliged to invest in their dead materially
and socially for them to join their ancestors. Although carrying on these rituals for the dead through
their enshrinement and regular offerings to the family altar are normalized, these practices are not a
reflection of religiosity. Caring for the dead is considered a must for their eternal peace. This care is
typically carried on by one couple in each generation according to Kawano (2010, p.26).
None of the couples in the research had a family altar in their homes though most of them
did visit the family grave on special occasions and during Obon (festival to honor ancestors’ spirits).
Although people in Japan are increasingly concerned about who will take care of their family graves
(Kawano, 2010, p.68), this did not come up as an important concern during any of the interviews.
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Most interviewees expressed not having thought about the subject much because death was not a
pleasant subject to talk or thinks about.
The issue of death came up during Satoru (36, JM)’s interview under an unrelated topic,
when I asked him whether they had chosen a religion to raise their child in. He linked religion to death
and rituals and commented as follows:
Both I and my wife were born into our religions so we did not choose, I don’t know
what will happen with our son. As long as he lives in Japan, he will not be officially
registered under any religion. But in case someone in the family dies, the funeral has to be
done according to religious belief. He will have to face this when I die. I hadn’t thought
about it much either until my father passed away. Then they told me about how the religious
ceremony has to be carried out. My mother’s side had Shinto funerals whereas my father’s
side had Buddhist funerals. But there isn’t much difference really. If I die early it will be
very hard for Zümrüt because she’s in a foreign country. I think it would be very tough. I
don’t know about our son though. He will have to choose his faith for himself.
Satoru’s association of his son’s religiosity with death and the necessity for rituals was in
conformity with Japanese religiosity and its organization of life and death rituals. He had given this
example because his own father’s death marked the first important religious choice his family had to
make, the funeral. He felt this might be reproduced in his son’s case as well when he dies.
Satoru was not the only interviewee who had thought about funerals. The issue of death and
funerals also came up during Ümit (40, TM)’s interview. The subject arose not in connection with
childrearing but in maintaining good relations with the community. Ümit thought that maintaining
good relations within the Turkish community in Japan was a must to guarantee a proper funeral and
burial after death. The topic came up when I asked him whether he was visiting the mosque in Tokyo:
I went to the mosque for the first time when my mother was visiting Japan, I took her
there, to the Turkish Mosque in Yoyogi. The second time was for a funeral. The person who
died had arrived in Japan thirty years ago, he had also helped me when I first arrived in
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Japan […] Turkish people who live in Japan do not have the luxury to act as they please or to
have severe arguments with each other. The reason is simple, you need people to take care of
your funeral when you die. You have to think about who will be there for your funeral when
you die. That doesn’t mean you have to befriend everyone but I mean for example in that
case some people did not show up because he was a very religious man. I was really upset
about this, I think that was wrong on their part.
If you want to be buried in Japan you have to prove that you’re not Buddhist. He told
his wife he didn’t want to be cremated and it was really hard to find him a grave. There is a
need to make arrangements in advance but to tell you the truth I haven’t yet planned it all out.
As Ümit has noted above, today, earth burial is prohibited in most areas of Japan and 99 per
cent of the dead are being cremated. Cremation started becoming more common than burial only after
the 1940’s so it is relatively new. The transition from burial practices to cremation was the outcome of
long and political events that led to law reforms over Japanese history. In Japan, there has been a
blending of Shinto and Buddhist practices for centuries. The Meiji restoration period marked the
banning of cremation for two years, between 1873 and 1875. This decision was influenced by Shinto
leaders who wanted to weaken Buddhist influences. The aim was to promote the newly re-defined
Shinto religion. The ban was lifted due to reactions. An important turning point was the passing of the
Disease Prevention Law in 1987 which dictated that the bodies of those who passed away from
contagious diseases have to be cremated. Although cremation is the norm today, it became more
common than burial only after the 1940’s (Kawano, 2010, pp. 54-57). After cremation, ashes are kept
at the family home for about forty-nine days although this period has regional variations. Ashes are
eventually put into the family grave because there needs to be a safe distance between the domestic
space and remains of the dead. The family grave is inherited by the eldest son making it important to
have children who can care for the grave and the ancestors. Proper burials are also important for the
reproduction of social class as the family reputation can be tainted with the assumption that they could
not afford a funeral (Kawano, 2010, pp.121-157).
204
None of the interviewees had thought about death in particular or planned their funeral. The
issue of death and funerals did not come up easily during interviews. I had the opportunity to meet up
with Yuki (48, JF) and Gürol (42, TM) after realizing the lack of data on this topic because Turkish
spouses had avoided the topic of funerals in their interviews. Gürol as well wanted to avoid the subject
at the beginning, he first said he wanted to be cremated and then added “Preferably the day before the
burnable garbage so that they can throw away my remains”. Yuki was a bit more serious on the
subject and expressed having once discussed this with their child. Gürol intervened again after her
remark and explained he wanted to avoid the topic of death in general and the possibility of him dying
in Japan in particular. He then referred to the funeral that Ümit17 had referred to in his interview. That
funeral in fact turned out to be a turning point, a realization for both of these men that problems they
faced in Japan will continue even after their deaths. Gürol explained at length what had happened on
the day of the funeral.
A few years back, a Turkish University professor who was himself in a Turkish–Japanese
transnational marriage passed away. He wanted to be buried in Japan as his wife was Japanese and
their daughter resided in Japan. After a research on cemetery options, the family decided on a
cemetery in Yamanashi. It was a Buddhist cemetery but they allowed Muslims to be buried there as
well. On that day Gürol took a few hours off from work and went to the funeral at the mosque. He was
shocked to see that only six people showed up for the funeral ceremony. It was a very sad moment for
him. He was resentful towards other members of the community in Tokyo. He commented that they
would show up at the mosque during Ramadan for free meals but neglect their primal duties like
attending their comrades’ funerals. He was both angry and sad. It made him think about his own
funeral and what would happen after his death. The funeral had same impact on Ümit who was also
present. This was a turning point for the Turkish community in Japan because this event had led these
two men to establish the Turkish Male Group that was explained in the participant observation section
under Chapter Three. The bitterness Gürol had over the issue of the funeral was not just the number of
17Ümit and Gürol had met at this funeral.
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attendees. He said the imam and other attendees attempted to leave the body there and go for the noon
prayer, he was furious and told them it was unacceptable to leave the dead unattended.
The way Gürol told the story revealed that he looked down on the Imam for his lack of
knowledge on Islam in general and the lack of respect for the dead in particular. The dead man’s wife
wanted to make a short speech at his funeral and the Imam did not allow it saying it was against
funeral customs. Gürol found this pointless and said: “Her husband is dead, she’s mourning and we’re
only six or seven people in total, what difference would it make for him (the Imam) whether she gives
a small speech to us or not?”. He was very critical of the Imam’s conduct of the funeral in general. In
fact, Gürol’s father was an Imam, so he was brought up in a rather religious environment and was
fairly familiar with the general rules. He was not a practicing Muslim himself though.
The body of the deceased was then to be transferred to the cemetery. Considering the low
attendance at the mosque, Gürol decided to take the whole day off from work and headed to
Yamanashi with the Imam and a few other men for the burial. When they arrived at the graveyard they
were shocked to see the size of the grave. The grave was dug by a scoop truck and was very deep and
wide compared to other graves they had seen in Turkey. It was about two meters deep with no
mechanism to place the body at the bottom. Gürol and another man had to enter the grave themselves
to place the body in. Two other men were handing them the body over their heads. After they
managed to place the corpse in it was time for the burial. They started filling the grave with soil using
scoops, as it is done in Turkey but the hole was so deep and wide that it seemed as if the task would
never end. They did not want to use the scoop truck that had initially dug the grave because it seemed
disrespectful towards the dead to treat the grave like a construction site. Overall, the event was tiring,
traumatizing and very sad for those who attended.
This long story told by Gürol made it clear why Turkish people in Japan wanted to avoid the
topic of death and funerals. Turkish people were aware that decisions on their funeral would become a
problem once they were dead but just as in other aspects of their marriages they decided to let the
topic go undecided. It was a problem that had to be solved when it arose.
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Chapter VII: Conclusion
Globalization is a transformative process that has facilitated people’s movement across
borders around the world. This has in return intensified and diversified intercultural communication
between geographically remote communities. One of the outcomes of this increased interaction has
been the increase in the number of transnational marriages. Marriage is a social institution that is quite
complicated even for people born in and raised through the same socialization mechanisms and this
social institution becomes much more complex when it gains a transnational nature and involves two
geographically remote countries defined by different gender roles, cultures and religious belief
systems. This dissertation has focused on the intimacy crossroad of Turkey and Japan through findings
on transnational Turkish – Japanese marriages.
Movement of people across borders have developed to such an extent that new migration
patterns and networks have been formed, and these have consequently led to new encounters,
interactions, intimacies, and marriages. Transnational marriages and the complexities they entail are
best explained under the framework of globalization with reference to facilitation of people’s
movement across borders and the increased interaction of cultures resulting from it. Globalization
plays an important role in the formation of transnational families through its aspects cited above. It
facilitates the interaction of people from different cultures through increased interconnectedness and
information flow. This interaction results from and is further fueled by development of technologies.
In transnational marriages one of the spouses or in some cases both spouses, have to settle in a
foreign country. Thus, it is inevitable for at least one of the spouses to be an immigrant. In case the
couple chooses to reside in a third country, they both become immigrants. At this point it should be
noted that a transnational marriage could be either the cause or the consequence of migration. Some
spouses migrate after marriage, as a result of their marriages whereas some immigrants might marry
into the host society they live in.
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When we look at their dynamics, transnational marriages are similar to those encountered in
marriages among people born and raised though the same social mechanisms however at the same
time they are more complicated. At the end marriages are about gender relations but the way different
cultures define gender relations has an impact on how transnational marriages work and how couples
communicate.
When we look at marriage trends in Japan we observe a contradiction. While marriage
among Japanese nationals is decreasing and delayed, marriages with foreigners have been increasing,
at least until very recently. Japanese marriage dynamics are explained through gender relations and
social pressures in Japanese society. When we look at Japanese marriages, within their respective
gender roles, men are breadwinners and women are homemakers. Spouses’ relations are characterized
by cooperation rather than affection. Changing marriage trends as well as the dropping birth rate
resulting from it implies that the Japanese are no longer willing to carry on these gender roles
projected on them. Thus, decision making for marriage has changed in line with expectations from
marriage. For example, expectations such as “three high” and “three C” have come into discussion
with Japanese women’s spouse choices, that is, high educational achievement, high economic security,
high (tall), comfortable, communicative and cooperative. Tachibanaki (2010)’s research has shown
that Japanese people still express a willingness to get married, but their criteria has risen to limit their
spouse choices among the Japanese.
When we look at the dynamics of increasing transnational marriages, they present clear
gender based differences. While Japanese men have the tendency to prefer Asian spouses, Japanese
women’s spouse choices show more diversity. The high rate of Japanese men’s foreign spouse choices
is a direct outcome of cross-border marriages through agencies and agreements which are bringing in
foreign brides. When we look at the case of Japanese women, there is a strong pattern that has been
attracting more and more attention in the literature: number of Muslim husbands. The strongest
changing pattern for Japanese women’s foreign spouse choices has been the increasing number of
Muslim husbands (Takeshita, 2010a, 2010b; Kudo, 2007). In this respect, two new nationalities have
joined Japanese women’s top ten foreign spouse choices: Pakistanis and Iranians.
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Islam is a religion foreign to Japan. Its dynamics and the way it blends with diverse cultures
is often overlooked or misunderstood. There is diversity among Muslim cultures formulated in diverse
countries because religion itself is a cultural structure (Geertz, 1993). There is difficulty in
differentiating or separating culture from religion. At the individual level religiosity shows diversity
based on social class (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 1999; 2006). Furthermore, religiosity changes with the 
immigration process as well as the length of stay (Kojima, 2006; Inglehart & Norris, 2009). Previous
research has revealed that Japanese spouses have difficulty grasping the complexity of religiosity
formation as they often attempt to separate their spouses’ culture from religion and disregard their
foreign spouses’ social class in the country of origin. The miscommunication goes both ways,
separation of culture and religion is difficult to understand for Muslim spouses who are born and
raised in one particular Muslim culture. Most of these Muslim spouses are only familiar with the
particular way of Islam that they were raised in.
What Matters in Turkish – Japanese Transnational Marriages?
When couples in the research were asked if they had taken into account their cultural and
religious differences at the beginning of their marriages, almost none had. Only two couples expressed
having had such concerns. For most other couples the differences did not matter at the beginning of
their marriages because they focused on common points and personalities. Based on their emphasis on
communication and friendship during the courtship period, these couples can be classified as
companion couples, whom, according to Alexy (2007) are couples less likely to divorce.
They focused on personalities and characters rather than culture or religion. Most of them
were not even aware of how their cultural differences would end up affecting their relationships. Thus
in most cases the couples chose to deal with these problems as they arose. Couples expressed that
communication and personal qualities matter the most. In terms of communication, what they meant
was the willingness to communicate rather than language ability. This showed a variation from the
existing literature (Faier, 2007; Piper, 1997; Nitta, 1990) as even couples who did not have a common
language to communicate in at the beginning of their relationships did not express having
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communication problems. There were a few cases of men withdrawing from arguments but this cannot
be limited to a problem in intercultural communication as it is explained under gender differences in
theories on marriage (Komter, 1989).
Interviewees focused on their spouses’ personal qualities and deemphasized culture as well as
religion. The most striking difference from previous research was a clear break from the findings on
attributes of Japanese husbands. Contrary to the literature on Japanese men outlined in Chapter Two
(Faier, 2007; Borovoy, 2005; Kelsky, 2001a; Nitta, 1990), Japanese men were labeled as affectionate
by their Turkish spouses. Furthermore, when the subject was discussed with reference to negative
attributes, Turkish females attributed these to work life balance in Japan rather than their husbands in
particular. This break from the existing literature could be explained through few different aspects.
First of all, it is important to note that expectancies from a marriage as well as how couples are formed
are important. As outlined in Chapter Two, marriages have different foundations in different cultures.
In this research, most marriages were natural outcomes of relationships. Interviewees considered
marriage as the outcome of a process that had started with encounter, continued with courtship and
tested with co-habitation. This classified these couples as companion couples who value friendship
and communication. Thus, when compared to other categories of foreign brides, these Turkish women
were unlikely to get married to begin with if they had incompatible expectations from a marriage. The
most striking difference in comparison to other foreign brides was no mention of expecting love to
grow through time after marriage (Le Bail, 2012; Liu-Farrer, 2010). It should also be noted that none
of the spouses in the research were dependent on their marriage to live or work in Japan. They were
either already residing in Japan at the time of their encounter or had no particular interest to reside in
Japan if not married to their Japanese husbands.
With reference to religion and culture, problems in these marriages were not as severe as
outlined in the literature on transnational marriages in Japan or transnational marriages of Turks in
Europe. This was the direct outcome of their middle and upper middle class which decreased their
religiosity and conservatism.
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There were social pressures on Japanese spouses as well. These were formulated around
marriage timing. During their interviews most if not all interviewees have used the term “it was time”
for their marriage timing. There was culturally formed social pressure for marriage and these were
stronger felt by women, both Turkish and Japanese. “Timing” had two connotations, the first
connotation was difficulty in finding marriage partners after a certain age (Yamada, 1999; Brinton,
1992) and the second was being in a long-term relationship. Social pressures were especially
significant for Turkish women and their families. This was in line with the strong patriarchal Turkish
model which was founded on control of female bodies leading the consideration of their virginity as
honor of the family. This was an influential factor for Turkish women’s decision to get married.
Beyond social pressures, most couples saw marriage as the natural continuation of their relationship
and a step in their adult life cycle. Those who did not believe in marriage were the minority. An
important gendered aspect of marriage timing was linked to the ability to carry on projected gender
roles. Japanese men wanted to be on career tracks and have financial stability before entering marriage.
In terms of gender roles and household management, similarities of Turkish – Japanese
family systems were reflected on these marriages as a natural adaptation process. Most of the men
were breadwinners and women were housewives who worked part-time or were full time homemakers.
There was only one exception. The case of this couple reflected how they face social pressures and
feel unease themselves in not fitting in their traditional gender roles. The Turkish wife had criticized
herself for not being a good wife because she felt as she was not helping enough with the housework.
She was working fulltime and none of the men working fulltime had expressed guilt over not doing
housework to help their housewives. She had also expressed guilt over them living in a third country
and her husband not being able to work. The issue of the spouse who follows, and difficulties these
spouses face in in finding jobs overseas have been covered in the literature however in this sample in
particular, this did not become an issue except for the case of this couple. Willingness or lack of
motivation to work was an important reason for spouses not to complain.
There were two important differences between Turkish and Japanese gender roles that were
reflected on these households. Firstly, Japanese spouses accepted the women as powerful in the
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household by default whereas Turkish spouses believed it relied on a balance of power that is
dependent on their financial contribution. In line with Fox (1973)’s and Remez (1998)’s research on
balance of power within the household, Turkish spouses had the tendency to think that income and
contribution to household finances mattered. This was in line with the general theory on balance of
power in marriages (Blood & Wolfe, 1960). Japanese spouses, both men and women found it natural
for women to be more powerful in the private sphere regardless of her financial contribution. Secondly,
in terms of management of household finances, the control of money was an important indicator of
masculinity for Turkish husbands. Although the father figure and being the breadwinner are important
foundations of masculinity in both Turkey and Japan, in the case of Turkey, this had to be
complemented by control over money. This showed similarity with the case of other transnational
families with strong patriarchal traits (George, 2005).
Although the legal status of foreign spouses was significant in other research on transnational
marriages, it was not for this case. This was linked to their social class as well. Contrary to the foreign
spouses that previous research is based on, none of the Turkish spouses relied on the spouse visas.
None had previously worked illegally or overstayed their visas in Japan. Furthermore, not all Turkish
spouses held spouse visas. Three had acquired Japanese citizenship whereas some preferred to keep
their work visas as they were already residing and working in Japan when they had met their spouses.
There was only one couple who have expressed getting married for the sake of a spouse visa. The
Turkish spouse was already residing in Japan on a visa but wanted to be able to work for longer hours
and the couple who were already cohabiting had openly discussed the subject and decided together.
What is Worth Fighting for in Turkish – Japanese Transnational Marriages?
Couples have more conflicts in the early stages of marriage which is also supported by the
divorce data according to which most divorces occur in the first five or ten years in both Japan and
Turkey. All couples have expressed founding their marriages on communication as these are
companion type of couples (Alexy, 2007). When couples faced difficulties in their everyday lives they
tried to overcome these through communication. As was explained in the previous section, they did
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not face severe conflicts in the household as gender roles show similarities in Turkish and Japanese
families. However when couples did face serious problems, Japanese spouses had the tendency to
avoid these topics altogether rather than discussing and overcoming them. In many cases this led the
Turkish spouse to believe the problem has been solved. For these Turkish-Japanese couples, most
problematic subjects were relations with in-laws, bicultural childrearing, sexuality and living space.
Relations with in-laws mattered for Turkish-Japanese couples. This was in line with the data
on divorces in Japan and Turkey as problems with in-laws rank high in factors that lead to divorces
(Alexy, 2011; Tuğrut, 2011). As the focus of the study was on couples residing in Japan, there was 
more opposition from Turkish spouses’ families. This was in congruence with the literature on
immigrants being more likely to settle permanently if they marry into the host society (Şenyürekli1 & 
Menjívar, 2012; Khoo 2003; Jensen & Pedersen 2007). Opposition from Turkish in-laws was based on
fear of their child’s permanent settlement abroad rather than his or her marriage to a foreigner per se.
Differences in the way family ties were constructed caused problems especially in terms of
Turkish men’s attachment to their mothers. There were no interviewees who criticized their in-laws
openly during their interviews however these occasionally came up during participant observation. All
spouses Japanese or Turkish refrained from criticizing their in-laws directly. Compared to other
foreign spouses covered in the literature, almost none of these Turkish spouses faced severe criticism
or interference in their family lives from their Japanese in-laws. This can be explained by the fact that
most of those spouses who did face criticism were residing in more rural areas or whereas participants
of this research were all residing in the greater Tokyo Area. Furthermore, language barrier did not
become a problem with in-laws, again, the notion of willingness to communicate in intercultural
communication theory was most relevant. Furthermore, just as language barrier did not cause
communication problems, language fluency did not guarantee good communication either.
The most problematic aspect of Turkish – Japanese transnational marriages was bicultural
childrearing. This was the main issue worth fighting over for these couples. Although couples had
deemphasized their cultural and religion differences at the beginning or their relationships, the nature
of their relationship changed once their children were born. This was in line with their transition as a
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couple of spouses into mother and father and the change in their gender roles to incorporate more
duties. Although having children is a process that changes spouse’ relations in any marriage,
transnational or not, these couples had more tough decisions to make. The first round of tough
decision was the naming process as it is for many other spouses in transnational marriages. All
spouses in Japan wanted bicultural names for their children. It was difficult to come up with names
that met their criteria of having easy pronunciation and good meaning in both languages. The process
was problematic because each spouse perceived the child as a member of their own culture and
community and they wanted this to be reflected through their names. In terms of negotiation dynamics,
the spouse that insisted won the name battle. In most cases it was the Japanese spouse who gave in.
One of the dilemmas or even contradiction on the issue of bicultural childrearing was the naming
process because although these couples emphasized the importance of the child fitting into host
society and therefore preferred Japanese schools, they insisted on bicultural names. This presented a
dilemma as they have marked their child as bicultural by name despite their emphasis on fitting into
Japanese society.
A second strong dilemma under childrearing was linked to religion. Although religion was
deemphasized by couples, and religious choices of children were left to them to decide when they
grow up, some sons were physically marked by circumcision. This contradicted with the Turkish
parents’ freedom of choice discourse on religion. However it might have been their approach to
circumcision as a cultural trait rather than a religious one. On the other hand, social pressures that are
projected on Turkish women with reference to gender relations, schooling and virginity were not
projected on bicultural daughters. This also presented a break from the literature on Turkish
immigrants in Europe. It is important to note that the difference lies within these Turkish-Japanese
families being middle and upper middle class. This led them to de-emphasize religion and
conservatism. These couples wished to transmit transnationalism to their children contrary to low
skilled laborers who’s social class was reproduced by their children in terms of schooling and
marriage decisions.
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Another important and contradictory topic in bicultural childrearing was the consumption of
pork. When children were young, parents had to decide on whether they should allow their children to
consume pork or not. Either way they were intervening in their religiosity. If they did not allow the
child to consume pork they were forcing their values on the child, if they let the child consume pork
then they were influencing his choices. All Turkish parents reflected their own religiosity on their
children from this aspect and there were four pork consumption patterns as explained in Chapter Five
under childrearing.
Almost all couples acknowledged that having children had an impact on their sex lives. The
topic of sexuality was controversial and it remained in the grey area of whether it could be classified
as problematic or not. Spouses implied having sexual problems during their interviews but did not
communicate about it with their spouses. Sexuality was an issue hard to approach for them and thus
although they had problems, it was not worth fighting for. This research has shown that there are
sexless marriages within Turkish – Japanese couples as well.
The topic that unexpectedly became a subject of negotiation, which has not been covered in
the existing literature, was the organization of the family living space. Turkish housewives were
displeased with their living space management in Japan. They were disturbed by the space limitations
which prevented them from decorating their homes with western style furniture or western style house
appliances. They even went as far as to define their situation as downward social mobility. There was
a gender based difference between Turkish spouses’ approach to the issue. Turkish men who were all
breadwinners did not complain about the arrangement of the living space and had left the decision to
their wives in line with the Turkish saying that the female bird makes the nest (Baltaş, Steptoe & 
Duman, 2000).
Religiosity and Religious Practices
Whether religion became a problem or not in the transnational family depended on the
religiosity of the Turkish spouse. The religiosity of the Turkish spouse was closely linked to his or her
social class in Turkey and in Japan. In this research none of the interviewees had built their lives on or
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around religiosity. For both Japanese and Turkish spouses, religion played a role in their lives mostly
through life cycle and death related rites. This was in line with the role religion plays in Japan
(Kawano, 2010). Ways in which Turkish spouses practiced their religiosities according to personal
preferences made it easier for couples to reach agreements.
The politicization of Islam in Turkey which has burdened religiosity with a negative
connotation was an important factor in the way these middle class and upper middle class Turks
formulated their religiosities. Turkish middle class and upper middle class spouses were not as strict as
Turks from lower social classes residing in Europe. The impact of social class on religiosity (Çarkoğlu 
& Toprak, 1999; 2006) as well as its reflection on transnational marriages (Baltaş & Steptoe, 2000) 
were in accordance with the literature on religiosity of Turks. A significant difference arose when
Turks were compared to other Muslim immigrants in Japan. Most importantly, marriage with Turks
did not require converting to Islam. Consequently, Japanese spouses were surprised by the relatively
relaxed rules of Turkish Muslims in comparison to their image of a strict Islam which were reinforced
by Iranian and Pakistani immigrants. Furthermore, contrary to the example of Pakistani husbands
wanting their children to be raised in prestigious schools in Pakistan, there were no cases of such
demands from Turkish spouses. It should be noted that research conducted on these marriages with
Pakistani men remains limited to middle and lower social classes. Although it might have been a
heavy financial burden on these Pakistani-Japanese couples to provide a good education to their
children in Japan, it was not a problem for most of these middle and upper middle class Turkish-
Japanese couples.
In terms of religious practices in their everyday lives, couples had the tendency to celebrate
all events regardless of religious connotations. As an interviewee has put it, they had a “Mixed
religious situation”. However one religious rite was more important than others, death. The issue of
death was not initially included in the research however it came up in relation to other subjects such as
bicultural childrearing or prejudice against religions. Religious rites for the dead are very different in
Turkish and Japanese cultures. This was an issue Turkish interviewees wanted to avoid but it kept on
coming up. These couples dealt with problems only as they arose and they knew that it would be a
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great problem when they die. Still, they wanted to avoid thinking or planning their own death. There
was one death in the research however for this case in particular funeral arrangements could be done
in advance because it was the outcome of a long illness and the family already knew they did not have
much time left together.
Significance and Contribution of Research
The value of this research lies within the category of spouses that I focused on in terms of
social class. Although middle and upper middle class immigrants constitute about 30 per cent of
immigrants in Japan, foreign spouses who belong to this category are being neglected in the literature
on transnational marriages. There is a need to conduct more research on middle class and upper
middle class immigrants not only because of their percentage but also because the way they construct
their marriages is different. Furthermore, research on transnational marriages of Turks in Europe has
shown that social class plays an important role in couples’ intercultural communication (Baltaş & 
Steptoe, 2000) whereas explorations on this aspect of transnational marriages remain weak in Japan.
The fact that social class plays an important role in religiosity has been disregarded in this area of
studies. Lower classes tend to be more conservative in terms of religiosity (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2006). 
Furthermore, issues that are significant in marriages with foreign spouses from lower classes such as
visas are not significant in marriages with middle and upper middle classes. On the other hand, there
are topics that come up that have not been covered in the existing literature such as living space
arrangements.
Secondly, most of the existing literature on transnational marriages is founded on women’s
narratives. In the case of Japan it is either as foreign wives or Japanese wives. This could be an
important factor in the dominant criticism of Japanese husbands as opposed to criticism of Japanese or
foreign wives. For example, in the study of Filipinas in Japan, these women are self-defined as
affectionate and caring while they criticize their Japanese husbands and even Japanese women in
general. However, we do not hear about qualities or criticism of these women from their husbands.
The issue at stake here is not just qualities of spouses but also the dominant narrative being gender
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biased. This is reflected on all areas of these marriages. Thus, the existing literature presents only one
side of the story whereas I argue the necessity to bring in both genders as a marriage is built by two
people, not one person. I have included narratives of both men and women in order to carry this
research beyond the monologue of female spouses that form the core of the existing literature on
transnational marriages.
Thirdly, the way in which gender roles are constructed in cultures influence the transnational
marriage in question. When we look at the existing literature on Turks’ transnational marriages in
Europe, differences in how gender roles are defined in Turkey and in Europe constitute a problem in
these couples lives (Liversage, 2012; 2013). I argue that when the way gender roles are constructed
show similarities in couples’ respective cultures, such as Turkish and Japanese cultures, this allows
these couples to have a smoother transition to married life in comparison to other transnational couples.
Fourthly, when we look at the existing literature on Muslim immigrants in Japan, we see that
most of these interviewees have been approached at religious settings. This is perhaps due to
difficulties of foreign researchers to infiltrate into these social groups. However it is important to note
that this creates an important gap in the literature by focusing only on religious Muslims belonging to
lower social classes. This research aims to portray the diversity within Muslims through a break from
the trend of recruiting Muslim interviewees from religious settings such as Mosques or mesjits.
Limitations of Study and Future Project
One of the limitations of this research was the identity of the researcher as explained in
Chapter Three. Although being Turkish allowed me easy access to the Turkish community, I was
stigmatized as a divorcee when I first started field research. This stigmatization was evident in my
relations with low skilled laborers although it did not come up as a problem in my socialization with
middle and upper middle class members of the community.
Another limitation of this study has been the protection of identities, since the Turkish
community in Japan is relatively small I have tried hard not to reveal my interviewees identities and
refrained from giving too much information at some points in the research. That is also why I do not
even use pseudonyms under the topic of sexuality.
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The research has on the one hand re-emphasized some of the problems that were dominant in
the existing literature on transnational marriages such as relations with in-laws, child-rearing and
sexuality. This implies that these topics are key regardless of social class differences and that they
merit further research. Especially research on how these problems come above and are dealt with by
different social classes would be most significant to study. The issue of bicultural childrearing would
be especially interesting to compare between social classes in order to understand how social classes
are being reproduced through bicultural children.
On the other hand, this research introduces two new topics that have been overlooked in the
existing literature on transnational marriages in Japan. These are choices of death rituals and
redefinition of living standards through living space. Future research on these two topics would
contribute most to the existing literature.
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Appendix I: Details of Informants
Gender Nationality
Country
of
residence
Name Age Marriageyears Children
Educatio
n Employment
Male TR JP Enis 40
6 1M
M.A.
Own
business
Female JP JP Emi 36 College
Male TR JP Cem 40 co-habitation - M.A. Regular
Female TR JP Melisa 30
1,5 -
Universit
y Part-time
Male JP JP Hiroki 32 University Regular
Female TR JP Mine 31
4 -
PhD Housewife
Male JP JP Naoki 41 2 YearsCollege Regular
Female BOTH JP Güngör 56 University Part-time
Male TR JP Tolga 30
2 -
M.A. Part-time
Female JP JP Aki 28
4 years
Universit
y
Regular
Male TR JP Mehmet 33 7 4F Highschool Unemployed
Female JP JP Shoko 33 7 pregnant M.A. Regular
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Female TR JP Gözde 32
4 1
PhD Regular
Male JP JP Hiro 36 High-school Unemployed
Female TR JP Sevgi 51
23 22F&15F University
Part-time
Male JP JP Masato 53 OwnBusiness
Male BOTH JP Ümit 40
6 5M
M.A. Regular
Female JP JP Megumi 39 M.A. Regular
Female TR JP Zümrüt 40
9 1,5M
Universit
y Housewife
Male JP JP Satoru 36 University Regular
Female JP JP Yoshiko 42 4(Divorced) College Regular
Male TR JP Bora 36
1 -
M.A. Regular
Female JP JP Tami 40 2 YearsCollege Housewife
Male TR JP Can 49
14 8F & 11F
Universit
y Regular
Female JP JP Misaki 42 University Part-time
Male BOTH JP Gürol 42
18 17F
Universit
y
Own
business
Female JP JP Yuki 48 M.A. Part-time
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Male TR JP Birol 36
4 4M
M.A. Regular
Female JP JP Sayaka 42 Highschool Part-time
Male TR JP Ceyhan 31
co-
habitation -
PhD Regular
Female JP JP Natsuki 33 2 YearsCollege Part-time
Male TR JP Mete 32 7M MiddleSchool Regular
Female TR TR Hülya 31
1,5 -
Universit
y
Own
Business
Male JP TR Kotaro 33 College
Female JP TR Natsumi 45 19 None M.A. Part-time
Female JP TR Haruka 45 15 13M &10F PhD Part-time
Female JP TR Mariko 32 2 1,5F University Housewife
Female JP TR Ayuka 45 18 18M College Housewife
Female JP TR Hinako 30 7 4F & 1F College Housewife
Female JP TR Harue 37 7 1,5F M.A. Housewife
Female JP TR Tomoe 45 18 3F University Part-time
Female JP TR Gami 40 8 3,5M University Part-time
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Female JP TR Sakiko 38 11 5F & 1M M.A. Part-time
Female JP TR Hikaru 33 3 1M Housewife
Female JP TR Shizuka 42 11 5M Housewife
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Appendix II: Interviewee Information Form
Personal Information
Participant #__________________
Name :
Gender F 。 M
Birth date :
Age :
Education Level
Primary School
Middle School
High School
College (2 years) / Vocational School
University (4 years)
Master’s
PhD
Employment / Work
Contract based・Freelance
Family business
Housewife / Stay home husband
Non-regular Employment（Part-time・Side-job）
Regular Employee
Retired
Self-owned business
Student
Other
Monthly Income (after tax)
No income
Less than 150,000 yen
150,000 to 250,000 yen
250,000 to 500,000 yen
More than 500,000 yen
Source of Income（Multiple answers allowed）
Work Income
Public Pension
Property Income
Social Security benefits other than Public Pension
Support from children
Support from parents
224
Other
Living arrangements
Living alone
Living with girlfriend / boyfriend
Living with parents
Living with spouse and children
Living with spouse and married children
Living with spouse only
Living with spouse’s parents
Other
Area of Residence
Country :
City :
Municipality :
Type of Housing
Company Housing
Government/Public Housing
Own house
Parental house
Rental apartment / mansion / house
Other
Spouse Relationship
Single
In a relationship since :
Married
Since :
Separated
Since :
Married :
Divorced
Since :
Married :
Children
Child 1 Child 2 Child 3 Child 4
Gender M・F M・F M・F M・F
Name
Birthdate
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Appendix III: Interview Questions
Name / last name
Age
Citizenship
Legal status
Permanent residency
Citizenship
Spouse visa
Other
Ethnic identity (if you think it is worth mentioning)
Would you consider changing your citizenship? Or have you?
Religion
How would you define yourself? Religious? Liberal?
How important is religion in your life?
How important is your spouses’ religion for you?
Religious practices
Religious celebrations with the family
Education
Education level
Your spouse’s education level?
How important do you think education is for married life?
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Employment
Are you currently working?
Full-time / Part-time / other
Are you pleased with your current occupation?
Would you like to work in the same sector if you were to move to Turkey / Japan?
Do you think you have better employment opportunities in your spouses’ country?
Monthly income;
Less than 150.000yen
Between 150.000 – 250.000yen
Between 250.000yen – 500.000 yen
500.000yen and more
Household
How do you balance household finances?
Household expenses; food, cleaning etc.
Furniture and household appliances
Rent and monthly expenses; electricity, water...etc.
Do you send back remittances?
Division of labor at the household
Cleaning, laundry, cooking (Turkish food / Japanese food)
Bi-cultural childrearing; Childcare, schooling, PTA meetings...
Taking care of the elderly
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Encounter
When, where and how did you meet?
What was the first thing you noticed about your spouse?
Marriage
When did you get married?
Who proposed?
Had you ever consider marrying a foreigner?
Did you consider living together rather than getting married?
Wedding
Turkish wedding?
Promise, engagement, hanna night, official ceremony, religious ceremony, wedding party?
Japanese wedding?
Shrine ceremony, wedding dinner, wedding speeches
In Turkey? Japan? Or both?
Was there anything you wish you had done differently about your wedding?
Socialization
Relations with your neighbors
Friends
Most of common friends Japanese? Turkish or Foreigner?
Do you socialize with your friends together or separately?
Socialization as a couple
Shopping
Staying in and watching a movie
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Cooking
Travelling
Going out at night
How often / how long do you see each other?
How many hours a day?
Do you communicate with each other during the day?
Phone? Emails?
Weekend plans
Do you spend your weekends together?
In-laws
How did they respond to your decision to get married?
How often do you communicate with your spouses’ family?
Which language do you communicate in?
Do you get along well?
Do you have children? Would you like to have children?
How many?
How old?
Turkish or Japanese names?
Which language do you communicate in?
Ideally where would you like to raise your children? Turkey, Japan or a third country?
Which culture would you like to raise your children in? Turkish culture? Japanese culture? Or bi-
cultural?
Education preferences for children; Turkish school? Japanese school? International school?
Are you worried about your child being racially discriminated against?
Have you thought about your child’s citizenship choice at the age of 20?
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There are disagreements or arguments in each family, do you think your spouse being a foreigner
influences the rise of these?
Why?
Which language do you communicate in with your spouse?
Do you speak Turkish / Japanese? Other languages?
How long have you known Turkish / Japanese?
Have you ever been to Turkey? / Japan?
When was the first time you visited Turkey / Japan?
What was your first impression?
How often do you visit?
Would you consider moving to Turkey / Japan one day? For retirement?
Are you content with the living conditions in your country of residence?
Do you find it hard to live here as a foreigner?
Have you gotten used to cultural differences? Do you still face problems?
Do you have adaptation problems when travelling between Turkey – Japan?
What do you miss the most about Turkey / Japan?
What disturbs you the most in Turkey / Japan?
What is the first instance that comes to your mind when you hear; “Cultural shock”
Have you lived abroad before?
Have you travelled abroad before? Do you travel abroad?
Do you think your international marriage renders you special?
Do you have friends or family member who also have international marriages?
Is there an argument topic that comes up often?
What do you dislike most about your spouse?
What do you like most about your spouse?
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